

THE  
**DUTCH IN CEYLON**

AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR EARLY VISITS TO THE ISLAND,  
THEIR CONQUESTS, AND THEIR RULE OVER THE MARITIME  
REGIONS DURING A CENTURY AND A HALF

**R. G. ANTHONISZ**











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# CEYLON:

Reduced from a Map of the Early  
Dutch Period printed in  
Amsterdam.



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WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS  
AND  
AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE DIARY KEPT  
DURING THEIR OCCUPATION OF KANDY IN 1765



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## ASIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

\* 31, HAUZ KHAS VILLAGE, NEW DELHI - 110016  
Tel : 2656-0187, 2656-8594 Fax : 011-2649-4946, 2685-5499  
e-mail : asian\_jj@vsnl.com / aes\_publications@yahoo.co.in

\* 5, SRIPURAM FIRST STREET, CHENNAI - 600 014  
Tel : 2811-5040 Fax : 044-2811-1291  
e-mail : asianeds@md3.vsnl.net.in

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# THE DUTCH IN CEYLON:

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Island, their Conquests, and their Rule  
over the Maritime Regions during a  
Century and a half.

BY  
R. G. ANTHONISZ, I.S.O.  
*Formerly Government Archivist, Ceylon.*

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS  
AND  
AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE DIARY KEPT  
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VOLUME I.  
Early Visits and Settlement in  
the Island.

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## THE DUTCH IN CEYLON. Vol. II.

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## PREFACE

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This is an attempt to supply, to the best of my ability, what has been a "long felt want," viz., a connected and complete, yet concise, account of the Dutch occupation of Ceylon, which extended from A.D. 1640 to 1796—a period of 156 years. During more than a century of the British rule in Ceylon numerous books have been written under the title of "histories," "accounts," or "descriptions" of the Island, from which the English reader has been able to obtain a considerable amount of information regarding its ancient inhabitants, the dominant races who, for several centuries, held sway over its mountain regions and lowlands; and also regarding those European peoples who came in succession and established themselves here, taking possession of parts of the Island. But we have yet much to learn about certain periods of this part history; and of such periods the Dutch occupation of the maritime parts of the Island will be found to have been very imperfectly treated. Information on the subject is only to be obtained from scattered and disconnected accounts by various writers, some of them of doubtful authority.

The aim of the present work is to place before the general reader, as concisely and accurately as possible, a narrative and descriptive account

of the whole of the Dutch period, from which a correct estimate might be formed of the character and conduct of these colonists, and of the nature of the services rendered by them to the country and its inhabitants. It is essentially a history of the Dutch people who came here, and is based for the most part on information which they have themselves supplied, the trustworthiness of which lies in the circumstances of its origin. No reasonable doubt could arise as to the genuineness of original documents containing reports of contemporary events, minutes of council proceedings, confidential communications, and a variety of other such records made with no thought of publication, but with a view to convey the most accurate information to those who were to act on it. In that part of the early history of the Dutch here, where they came in contact with the Portuguese, the testimony of such writers as Ribeiro and De Queyros cannot, of course, be disregarded or depreciated, and I have used my judgment in availing myself of it, as far as possible, side by side with the Dutch authorities.

Imperfect knowledge has led to many misconceptions and wrong judgments, and it is clear that if a correct estimate is to be formed on the subject a more intimate study of the facts and circumstances of the whole period is needed. In view of this, and having had some facilities for collecting information, I had long in contemplation the writing of a popular work such as this dealing with the settlement of the Dutch in Ceylon, their mode

of life here, and their activities, domestic and political, during their rule of a century and half, treated, if possible, with more fulness than was permitted to any previous writer. So, when about ten years ago, Sir Edward Denham, then Director of Education, desired me to write a book on the Dutch period in a popular form for use in schools I was glad to accede to his request, and some parts of the present work were then written. But I soon found it difficult to proceed for want of a more substantial work on which an elementary treatise such as was required could be based. I had perforce to go for my material to a mass of undigested manuscript and some unpublished authorities, which made the task of selection and condensation laborious. Being hindered in this way, I was obliged to suspend my work, and other obstacles having then arisen to interfere with my carrying out the project, I had to lay it aside for the time.

The greater part of this book has been written in my retirement in the country and I have laboured under other disadvantages, which must account for the delay in its publication. I have endeavoured to be as exact as possible in the relation of facts, omitting nothing which seemed to me to be relevant, and only avoiding such unimportant details and particulars as would have needlessly increased the bulk of the work. I have done my best to place before the reader as true and faithful a presentation of the subject as I could, and to be just and fair in the expression of my views on debateable questions.



I have in appropriate places acknowledged my indebtedness to the various authorities on which I have relied. I am also beholden to several friends who have helped me in my work by their sympathy and encouragement. To these I must here tender my thanks, and to those who have ably and generously assisted me in taking this book through the press, I must express my deep and lasting gratitude.

R.G.A.

Toniston, Henaratgoda,  
20th February, 1929.

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# THE DUTCH IN CEYLON.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY.

[AUTHORITIES.—The works published from time to time on the subject of the early history of the Netherlands and of the rise of the Dutch power in Europe and Asia and in the Western Hemisphere are too numerous to mention ; nor is it convenient to refer to all the scattered sources from which the facts mentioned here have been gathered. Among the books consulted in the preparation of the following outline, those which furnished information in a ready and compact form were three works by H. M. F. Landolt : 1 *Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis*, 2 *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Krijgswezen*, and 3 *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen* ; and *Beschrijving der Kolonien en Geschiedenis van hare Ontdekking en Ontwikkeling* by L. Muller, all published in the Volks-Bibliotheek by H. W. Weijting, Amsterdam. A concise statement of the position of the Dutch East India Company will be found in Chapter I of the Introduction to *De Gouverneurs-Generaal en Commissarissen-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indie* by M. A. van Rhede van der Kloot. One of the most important authorities on the subject of the Rise of the Dutch Power in the East is *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie* in 13 volumes by J. K. J. De Jonge, published at The Hague, 1862-1888.]

Ceylon had from very early times attracted the notice of people who lived in distant lands. Stories of the richness of its vegetable and mineral products and of the beauty of its scenery had been carried to Europe by those who came in contact with the Arab traders (or Moors, as they were called) of the East. These Arabs had long been in the habit of visiting the Island and obtaining from it cinnamon, precious stones, and other things which were much valued in those days.

When at length a passage by sea to the East was discovered by the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama, his countrymen lost no time in coming to these shores and taking their abode here. And here, for a century-and-half, they lived, at times in friendship, but mostly in conflict, with the Sinhalese King, whom they compelled to remain in the hill country in the interior of the Island, while they held sway in the maritime regions.

The Dutch first appeared in Ceylon at the beginning of the seventeenth century when the Portuguese had already been established here nearly a hundred years. They eventually drove away the Portuguese from their fastnesses and settlements and, in their turn, held dominion over the sea-board provinces of the Island for a hundred and fifty years. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch maritime power was the first in the world, and they ruled in the Far East almost without a rival.

Before we come to speak of the Dutch Settlement here it is well to go back a little and take a glance at them in their Fatherland in Europe, to ascertain the circumstances under which they made their way to this part of the world. They were, as we know, a small nation in Europe, and their country, a little corner in the north-west of the continent, was not half the size of Ceylon. A great part of it was below the level of the sea and had been wrested from the ocean by their indomitable perseverance and labour. Having been ruled for five centuries by their own native princes—counts as they were called—the sovereignty of the land at length



passed by their matrimonial alliances to certain foreign houses; first to that of Burgundy, and then to that of Austria. In the middle of the sixteenth century, by his abdication of his Dutch possessions by Charles V, Emperor of Austria, in favour of his son Philip II of Spain, that prince became ruler of the Netherlands. He was an absolute stranger to his Dutch subjects; knew nothing of their language; lived away in Spain; and, as a bigoted Roman Catholic, hated the Dutch for their spirit of independence. He began a course of religious persecution almost unparalleled in history; and, for eighty years, the Dutch struggled against his tyranny, undergoing intolerable suffering, but giving proof of steadfast courage, determination, and perseverance; until at last, they won their independence.

The independence which they gained at the cost of so much suffering and endurance gave birth to a spirit of emulation and enterprise for which they soon became distinguished. Before long they were the foremost merchants of Europe. The discovery of the way by sea to the East Indies had made Lisbon the great emporium for the East Indian merchandise, and, as it was the Dutch ships chiefly that furnished the nations of Europe with these commodities, the trade with Portugal was to them one of the most important sources of prosperity. In the meantime Philip of Spain, the inveterate enemy of the Dutch, on the death of the last surviving prince of the Aviz dynasty in Portugal, had succeeded in acquiring the throne of that country (1581); and now, to check the increasing prosperity of his rebellious subjects—to strike, as he thought, at their life blood—he prohibited the trade of



the Dutch in Portuguese harbours. This, however, added to other obstructions which they met with, such as privateering on the part of the English, heavy imposts laid on them by the States General under pressure of their English allies, etc., gave the Dutch merchants and their employees the very stimulus they needed. It was that which eventually led to the foundation of the Dutch colonial empire. Prevented from obtaining in Europe supplies of the articles then in demand in the markets of the world, the Dutch were compelled to find other ways of procuring these in order to maintain their trade. They decided that they must themselves go to the East and fetch them in their own ships. The passage round the Cape of Good Hope seemed to them at first too dangerous owing to the might of the Portuguese and the Spanish who swarmed the southern seas. Therefore the plan was devised of proceeding northwards along Russia and Siberia to China. Three voyages were undertaken with this object, and in these voyages Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla among other places were discovered, but the ice drifts and the great cold compelled the ships to return without accomplishing their object, and at length, the northward route was abandoned as impracticable. Bold spirits then came forward who were prepared to hazard a voyage to India by the south in the teeth of all dangers, and a Company was formed by certain merchants of Amsterdam under the name of *Maatschappij van Verre*, or "Company for distant lands." They equipped four ships with 250 men which sailed out on the 2nd April, 1595, having on board a bold, adventurous voyager, Cornelis Houtman, who in his frequent trips to

Portugal, had made considerable profits in Indian merchandise. These ships had a most eventful voyage which lasted over two years. They did not touch at Ceylon, but visited Java and many other places in the East, and returned to the Fatherland laden with rich spices.

Encouraged by the result of this first voyage, other companies were formed, independent of one another, and various voyages were made by which the Dutch became more and more acquainted with the people and the products of the lands in the Indian seas. But these separate companies organized for navigation to India were soon compelled to co-operate owing to the inordinate competition which arose among them, and threatened to ruin the trade of the country as against foreign rivals. It was to obviate this that the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (V.O.C.) or the United East India Company was founded in 1602. It obtained a Patent from the States General of the United Netherlands, as the country of the Dutch was then called, which gave it the monopoly of the Indian trade. The management of the Company was vested in a college of seventeen directors, who were chosen by local assemblies called Chambers, such as the Chamber of Amsterdam, of Zealand, of Delft, of Rotterdam, of Hoorn and of Enhuizen. These directors, known as the Lords Seventeen or the Assembly of Seventeen, nominated the Governor-General of the Indies and the Councillors of India, and appointed to their posts the other high officers who were to carry on the business of the Company in the East.

The powers which the East India Company acquired under the Patent or Charter granted to them may be briefly summarized as follows: They obtained the right to enter into treaties and agreements with Indian Princes, to wage war, to build fortresses, to enrol soldiers, and to appoint officers and commanders. All the servants of the Company had, however, to take the oath of allegiance to the States General.

Founded principally for commercial purposes, the Company remained faithful to their aims. Commercial profit continued to be their chief object, and with that object they entered into agreements with native princes and peoples for obtaining those commodities which were in demand in the European markets. With that object too they often had recourse to arms in order to enforce their real or fancied claims. And so it happened that in the pursuit of their main objects the Company came into possession, sometimes against their wish, of a continually increasing extent of territory. And they found, that, having set out primarily as traders, they had eventually to play the *role* of sovereign.

On the 30th January, 1610, Pieter Both of Amersfort went out as the first Governor-General to the East, with a threefold commission. He had (1) to capture for the Company all the Spice Islands; (2) to select a harbour to serve as a resort for the fleet; and (3) to establish at this harbour a Dutch colony as a centre for the community in the East, in the same way as Goa served the Portuguese. And for this purpose a number of handicraftsmen, some with their families, went out with him as pioneers for the colony.

None of these objects, however, could be accomplished at first, as there were already rivals to contend with, and of these the English were becoming more and more formidable. It was not till Jan Pietersz Coen of Hoorn, in 1617, succeeded to the post, practically the first Governor-General, although the fourth to bear the title, that the Company began their vigorous operations. He governed, directed the line of action which the Company were to follow, and laid the foundation of the establishment. In 1619 the centre of the Government was placed at Jacatra, known thereafter as Batavia, and stations and factories were opened in various quarters. We shall see that it was not till 1640, when Anthony van Diemen was Governor-General, that the Company obtained a permanent footing in Ceylon, but that the Island had been visited before that by the Dutch, and that its resources had long attracted their notice.



MONOGRAM OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY.



## CHAPTER II.

### JORIS VAN SPILBERGEN.

[AUTHORITIES.—The following chapter is based chiefly on Valentyn, Vol. V. *Byzondere Zaaken van Ceylon*, pp. 100-106. Valentyn it seems had taken over his account from the Journal of Spilbergen's Voyage originally published at Delft in 1605, bearing the title "'t Historiael Journael van 't ghene ghepasseert is van wegen dry scheepen, ghenamt den Ram, Schaep ende het Lam, ghevaren uyt Zeelandt naer d' Oost Indien onder 't beleyt van Joris van Spilbergen, Generael, Anno, 1601." Several reprints of this had likewise appeared and a French translation published in Amsterdam in 1703 in the "*Recueil des Voyages*" etc. A fuller and more detailed account of the events here given in a condensed form will be found in Donald Ferguson's learned paper on Joris van Spilbergen in the *Ceylon Literary Register*, vol. VI, pp. 308 *et seq.*]

The first Dutchman who visited Ceylon was the Admiral Joris van Spilbergen, who set sail for the East on the 5th May, 1601, with three ships, the Ram, the Schaap, and the Lam, from Vere, a seaport in the island of Walcheren in Zealand. A journal has been preserved in which the names of all the places touched at and the daily events of the voyage have been carefully recorded; but, as we are at present only concerned with the events connected with Ceylon, it will be sufficient to mention that Spilbergen arrived off Cape Comorin, the southernmost point in India, with two of his ships after an adventurous voyage

of twelve months. The other ship, the *Ram*, which was under the command of a skipper named Guyon le Fort, was lost sight of when rounding the Cape of Good Hope.

From Cape Comorin the Dutch Admiral steered his course to Point de Galle ; but, without landing there or at any of the other places which were strongly fortified by the Portuguese, he sailed round the south coast of the Island and made for Batticaloa, where he anchored on the 31st May, 1602.

He learnt that the town of Batticaloa, where the chief of the province resided, was about three miles inland ; so he sent him a messenger proposing to enter into trade with him. In the meantime he learnt from some Sinhalese who came on board that there was plenty of pepper and cinnamon to be had, but that it was to be obtained from the chief of the place. These Sinhalese brought with them a Portuguese interpreter ; for Portuguese was the only European language then heard or spoken in Ceylon, and the natives of the Island had no idea that there were other white people who spoke a different language.

The messenger sent to the chief was received by him very kindly, and, when Spilbergen himself afterwards went on shore, he was met with every token of welcome. The chief promised to supply him with the pepper and cinnamon he wanted and gladly accepted the presents which the Dutch Admiral bestowed on him. Several days were spent in visits to the shore, and there was much interchange of courtesies ; but Spilbergen, whose principal concern was to obtain a lading

for his ships, found that, while accepting his presents, the Sinhalese chief made no attempt to provide the Dutch with the products of the Island which they had come for. He kept putting them off from day to day, at one time pretending that he suspected Spilbergen was a Portuguese, although he had sufficient proof and assurance to the contrary. He also made an attempt to induce the Dutch to moor their vessels nearer the shore and to unload their goods ; but Spilbergen, who suspected treachery, was shrewd enough to secure himself against any risks. When he had been nearly a fortnight at Batticaloa he learnt for the first time that there was a King who had his court at Kandy in the interior of the Island, who was sovereign lord over the whole country, and that it was with him he ought to deal if he wanted to trade in the Island. On learning this he first decided to proceed to Kandy at once, but was persuaded to defer his journey till he had communicated with the King through a deputy, and had also sent him some presents. The chief of Batticaloa also dissuaded him from undertaking the journey, urging that the way was long and most difficult. So a messenger was sent with some presents, and Spilbergen awaited his return on board his ship.

Meanwhile he bargained daily with the natives for precious stones, of which a large variety, such as rubies, topazes, garnets, sapphires, cat's-eyes, etc., was brought to him, for which he gave goods in exchange. But he had yet received nothing of pepper or cinnamon from the chief



of Batticaloa in return for the presents he had from time to time given him, although nearly a month had passed since his arrival at the port.

In three weeks' time the deputy returned from Kandy accompanied by two envoys from the King. They brought presents from His Majesty with the offer of his friendship and the promise of as much lading as they desired. The envoy also in the name of the King invited the Dutch Admiral to the Capital.

The same day an event occurred which greatly rejoiced the hearts of the Dutch. It was the arrival of the ship *Ram* commanded by Guyon le Fort, with which they had parted company more than eight months previously, and which they had given up for lost.<sup>(1)</sup> From the account given by her commander it appeared that the ship was driven by a storm into the Bay of St. Augustin in the island of Madagascar, having lost a mast and bowsprit and run the danger of completely foundering.

It was then decided that Spilbergen should lose no time in proceeding to Kandy. His mission was to offer the Sovereign of the land the friendship of his masters, the owners of the ships, and of the Prince of Orange, and to form an alliance with him against his enemies. Spilbergen started on his journey from Batticaloa on the 6th July, taking with him ten of his men, among whom were some who played on various musical instruments. By the chief of Batticaloa he was furnished with elephants, palanquins, and carriers and with attendants who conveyed

(1). See *ante*, p. 9.


him as far as the limits of the province of that ruler. There he was met by the King's messengers who came with pipes and drums and other signs of welcome, and he was conducted with much ceremony from village to village. The King's Mudaliyars at each halting place received him with cordiality and solicitously provided for his comforts.

At a village called Bintana, now known as Alutnuwara, on the banks of the Mahaweliganga, where he stayed for two days, he was entertained by a princess, the daughter of the chief of Batticaloa, who was one of the wives of the King. Here there was a beautiful pagoda or temple and a large retinue of priests, whose processions and quaint and elaborate ceremonies were of much interest to Spilbergen and his party. As the party neared the capital, provisions and refreshments came to them from the King, consisting of food of various kinds, fruit, and wine. This last, which was made of grapes grown on the King's own vines, was said to be as good as any made in Portugal.

The last stage of the journey was the transport across the river which flowed past the King's capital. Here the King's Chief Mudaliyar, Emanuel Dias, a Portuguese, with other Mudaliyars and some Portuguese in his service, who had their ears cut off, met him to conduct him across. A thousand armed men carrying banners taken from the Portuguese formed an escort, while loud native music accompanied the procession, and, as the King's palace was passed, salutes were fired in honour of the distinguished visitor. Spilbergen had three trumpeters march-







*From Baldeus*

KING DON JOAN'S RECEPTION OF SPILBERGEN.



ing in front, one of whom carried the Dutch Flag, while four other servants followed trailing along the ground a silk flag of the Portuguese which was afterwards presented to the King.

Spilbergen spent five days at the King's court, a residence having been prepared for him in the European style, and he had a good deal of the company of the King's Chief Mudaliyar Emanuel Dias, a Portuguese, who, for the time being, was a faithful servant of the Sinhalese King and was much trusted and honoured by him.

The King's name was Vimala Dharma Suriya, who, having been in early life educated and baptized by the Portuguese, was also known by the name of Don Joan. He received Spilbergen in audience on the day of his arrival, sending three horses to convey him to his presence, but he dismissed him early on the plea that he needed rest after his long and tedious journey. Spilbergen however took the opportunity to make several presents, which the King graciously accepted and laid out on the carpet for the inspection of the members of the Royal Family.

At his second interview, the following day, the King offered to sell him some cinnamon and pepper; but, as the price named seemed exorbitant, Spilbergen preferred not to bargain with him for it. And to put him off without any offence, he adroitly proceeded to assure him that the object of his visit was not so much to procure cinnamon and pepper as to offer the King the friendship of his master, the Prince of Orange, and his assistance against their enemy, the Portuguese. This assurance pleased the King



so much that he explained it to his courtiers and embraced Spilbergen, exclaiming, "I make a present of all the cinnamon and pepper I have collected. My only regret is that the quantity is so small." This, he said, was because he had not been prepared for such a sudden visit ; and, besides, he had not made the trade in these articles a business of his, but had, on the contrary, lately caused them to be destroyed to prevent them going into the hands of the Portuguese.

Several other interviews took place between the King and the Dutch Admiral at which many trophies taken by the Sinhalese from the Portuguese, such as cuirasses, morions, and other armour, were exhibited, and Spilbergen was taken to visit some magnificent pagodas containing beautifully sculptured images. The interior of these sanctuaries surpassed in their gorgeous glitter the embellishments which he had seen in some of the Roman Catholic churches.

The King, who had been educated and baptized by the Portuguese, enquired of Spilbergen about the religion of the Dutch and learnt that it was different from that of the Portuguese. The Dutch, Spilbergen informed him, were true Christians, who worshipped God in their hearts, and not with such outward show as the Portuguese. The King seemed pleased with this conversation, and, pointing to his palace and city, he said: "All this has God given me." But he deplored the character of his Sinhalese subjects, who were so greedy that they took without compunction whatever they could take surreptitiously.

In this manner they conversed repeatedly on various subjects, the King never weary of listening to what Spilbergen had to say of the Dutch and their affairs. He was glad to receive the gift of a portrait of the Prince of Orange in full armour, which Spilbergen presented to him, and which he hung up in the chamber which he usually occupied, saying that he would always have it in sight.

On one occasion Spilbergen was taken to visit the Queen in her apartments, where she sat with the Royal children, all dressed in the European fashion as a compliment to the visitors. "See," said the King, "I, my Queen, the Prince and the Princess, will carry on our shoulders the stones, lime, and other materials, if the Dutch and their Prince be pleased to come and build a castle in my land; and they will be allowed to choose for that purpose any spot, port, or bay which will suit them."

The time for Spilbergen's departure from Kandy at length arrived, and he took a friendly and cordial leave of His Majesty, who made him his ambassador to the States of Holland, giving him letters authorizing him to make agreements on his behalf, while he also conferred on him titles of honour and numerous gifts. Spilbergen, at the King's desire, presented him with some of the musical instruments which he had taken with him and left behind two of his men who were skilled performers on them.

The return journey was accomplished in twenty days, and preparations were at once made for setting sail from Batticaloa before the breaking of the south-west monsoon. In the meantime Spilbergen had the chance put in his way of giving practical proofs of his hostility to the Portuguese and his friendship towards the Sinhalese King. This was the capture of three Portuguese vessels within a few days of one another.

The first was a galiot,<sup>(1)</sup> carrying forty men, laden with arecanut and small quantities of pepper and cinnamon. She yielded without much resistance to a sloop,<sup>(2)</sup> which was sent against her manned by only fourteen men. Spilbergen made a present of the ship and cargo to the King. The next was a sampan or small skiff, with a cargo of arecanut which he presented to the Chief of Batticaloa, who, though he accepted the gift, demurred that the capture should have been made in front of his territory. The third was also a sampan<sup>(3)</sup> laden with arecanut, which was

(1). The kind of vessel here referred to would appear to be that constantly mentioned as forming part of the Portuguese fleets in India, which Padre Bluteau in his *Vocabulario Portuguez* (1712-21) defines as "a small galley with one mast and with 15 or 20 benches a side, and one oar to each side."—See *Hobson-Jobson* (Yule and Burnell). The name was afterwards applied to a strong and cumbrous two-masted vessel used in the Dutch merchant service.

(2). This word often occurs in the Dutch records as *chialoup* from the Portuguese *chalupa*. In the early Dutch naval wars it was a small sailing vessel with one mast, rigged "fore and aft," with the guns on its upper deck.

(3). This word also appears spelt *champan*, and is supposed to be of Malay origin. It was a kind of boat or skiff much used for small voyages and for the transport of provisions.—*Hobson-Jobson*.

sold and the money spent in the purchase of precious stones. The three vessels in all carried together about a hundred men, some of whom remained to serve the Dutch, and the others were thrown overboard, and escaped by swimming ashore.

On the 3rd September, 1602 Spilbergen sailed from Batticaloa for Achin in the island of Sumatra. Before doing so he set fire to two other Portuguese ships laden with arecanut which had fallen into his hands.

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## CHAPTER III.

### THE TRAGEDY OF SEBALD DE WEERD.

[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge van het Eyland Ceylon*, cap. VII., pp. 18-21. Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken van Ceylon*, pp. 107-109. Idem, pp. 141-142, where Adriaan van der Meyden in his Report to the Council of India in 1660, throws light on some of the events which led to the tragedy. See also *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezug over Ceilon* by W. van Geer, pp. 15-17.]

On the 28th November, 1602, a short time after the departure of Spilbergen, three other Dutch ships arrived at Batticaloa. They were a contingent of a fleet of fifteen vessels equipped by the United East India Company and were under the command of Sebald de Weerd, a naval captain high in the estimation of the Directors of the Company.

Being well received by the Chief of Batticaloa, de Weerd hastened to pay his respects to the King at Kandy, where, after a tedious journey in bad weather, he arrived at the end of fifteen days. Although unexpected, a cordial reception similar to that accorded to Spilbergen was given to him by the King, who was soon convinced of his honesty, especially by his quick recognition of the portrait of the Prince of Orange, presented by Spilbergen, which the King had hung up in his chamber.



Several interviews followed, with the same state and ceremony, and the same tokens of personal friendship as on the former occasion. De Weerd presented a letter from Prince Maurits as his credentials and informed the King that he had come in order to trade in the Island and to offer him the friendship and alliance of his Prince and the States General of Holland, who, he said, had for twenty years been waging war against the King's enemies, the Portuguese. The King, delighted at the prospect of assistance against his enemy, embraced de Weerd and informed him that if the Dutch would come to Ceylon and trade there, all the silk, pepper, cinnamon, and other products of his country would be reserved for them. He would also place all his forts in the hands of the Dutch, as he felt sure they would be better able to garrison and defend them than his own forces.

The King then begged of de Weerd for his help against the Portuguese, whose strongholds he was himself ready to besiege on the land side if de Weerd would harass them on the sea and prevent their getting supplies from Goa. To this de Weerd replied that having come in order to trade, and incurred great expenses in the long voyage from Holland, he was not then in a position to afford the assistance required. But if the King would provide him with the merchandise he had come for, he would be prepared in return therefor to render all the help in his power.

It was then agreed that de Weerd should proceed with his ships to Achin whence he was to procure more ships and a larger force to enable him to accomplish the service required of him.

He then took leave of the King, who presented him with quantities of cinnamon and pepper, and he returned to Batticaloa, whence he set sail for Achin on the 5th February.

Within three months, viz., on the 25th April, 1603, he returned to Batticaloa with six ships and sufficient men for the work he had undertaken. While at Achin he received intimation of his appointment as Vice-Admiral of the Fleet under the Admiral Wybrandt van Waarwyck, and he also had an opportunity of meeting Spilbergen, who accompanied him in a ship for part of the way.

Among those whom de Weerd had on board was an ambassador of the King of Kandy whom he was conveying back to his country. This person, as we shall see, was destined to exercise a baneful influence on the events which followed. He had taken offence at what he considered to be a slight cast on him by de Weerd during the voyage, believing that by being placed at the lower end of the table at meal time, while some Portuguese captured in the voyage were placed at the upper end, a deliberate indignity was offered to him as Ambassador of the King. With this grievance rankling in his mind he became a bitter enemy of the Dutch Vice-Admiral, on whom he was determined to wreak his vengeance.

De Weerd was again welcomed by the Chief of Batticaloa with the usual interchange of courtesies, while both he and his men received every token of friendship from the inhabitants. The Dutch would seem, however, on one or two occasions, to have offended the religious and

superstitious sensibilities of the natives by too little regard for some of their feelings and prejudices ; for instance, the seizing and slaughtering of cattle for food.

In the meantime, while riding at anchor off Batticaloa, de Weerd attacked and captured four passing vessels of the Portuguese, who surrendered on the promise of quarter. The cargo of these ships was not of great value, but it was taken over ; while the crew, in terms of their surrender, were set at liberty and were allowed to depart in two of the ships.

The King's envoys had by this time arrived on the spot with letters and friendly greetings from their master, who waited in state to receive de Weerd at Bintana (Alutnuwara). The letters reiterated the request made previously that de Weerd should at an early opportunity proceed to Point de Galle, and attack the fort from the sea, while the King laid siege to it on the land side. In return for the capture of Galle the Dutch were promised a yearly shipment of 1,000 cwt. of cinnamon and 1,000 cwt. of pepper. De Weerd was eager enough to carry out his part of the compact and proposed to set sail for Galle at once without advancing to meet the King, requesting His Majesty to invest the fort on the land side with 2,000 or 3,000 men.

The King's Mudaliyar, Emanuel Dias, having in the meantime got knowledge of the capture of the Portuguese vessels, came to Batticaloa and claimed some of the vessels and their crew for his master ; but de Weerd, who considered himself pledged in honour to keep faith with the captives, expressed his inability under the

circumstances to comply with the request. And when the King himself hastened to the coast as soon as he was apprised of the capture, he was met on arrival by the news that the Portuguese captives had been set at liberty. His indignation with de Weerd, and his own disappointment at the conduct which he could not account for on the part of the Dutch Vice-Admiral, who professed himself his friend and the enemy of the Portuguese, was very great. It was clear that he could not appreciate the chivalric obligation under which de Weerd was compelled to set his captives free. This circumstance only filled him with suspicion, which was soon fanned into flame by his Ambassador, who now seized his opportunity to poison the King's mind against de Weerd.

The account of what followed has been given in different ways. According to one of these stories, de Weerd first invited the King to visit him on board, which being declined, he asked that His Majesty would come to the shore, where a finely decked tent had been prepared for him, and view the ships from there. But the King, who had been already made suspicious of his visitor, refused to accede to this second request also, saying that his courtiers were not in favour of his going. Now de Weerd was of a hasty and passionate disposition, and irritated by the King's stubbornness to comply with either of his proposals, he bluntly told him that if he was so ungracious as to refuse both these requests of his so courteously made to him, he on his part was not prepared to render him the help he needed against the Portuguese. This angered the King greatly,



but controlling himself, he reminded de Weerd of his promise to take his ships to Galle. He himself, he said, would be there shortly with his men on the land, but for the present he had to go to Kandy where the Queen had been left alone.

It has been said that de Weerd had been drinking heavily, and at this speech of the King he recklessly and very rudely insulted His Majesty by making an unseemly remark about the Queen. This so exasperated the King, who was also of a hasty temper, that he cried out to his men in a burning rage: "Bind that dog." It would seem that after saying this he withdrew; since, according to the story, he was not present at what followed.

Four of the King's men laid hold of de Weerd and tried to bind him, but, as he attempted to draw his sword, one of them from behind seized him by his hair and cleft his head with a broadsword, laying him dead on the ground.

The occurrence when related to the King is said to have disturbed him greatly. He exclaimed: "Why did you not bind him as I commanded you to do?" Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to order the instant slaughter of all de Weerd's men who were on shore, fifty in number, saying, "He is dead, now slay also all his followers and let them have a like reward as their master."

This is the story given by the King's courtiers, who were the only eye-witnesses of what occurred. The historian Baldeus, writing half-a-century later, recorded it, and the writers following him repeated it. But that the high Dutch authorities of the time gave it little credence is manifest



from some of the reports submitted to the Council of India. In these the assassination of de Weerd is characterized as a treacherous murder, in which the King is by no means held to be guiltless.

Much prominence has been given in these documents to the machinations of the King's Ambassador whom de Weerd had conveyed in his ship from Achin. That this man, aggrieved at the real or imaginary slight which he had received from the Dutch Commander, had been trying systematically to poison the mind of the King against de Weerd, is apparent from all the accounts. He had no doubt learnt during the voyage of de Weerd's intention to invite the King on board his ship, and, using this knowledge, he suggested to His Majesty that de Weerd's object was to seize the person of the King by enticing him on board. He also assured the King that the Dutch Vice-Admiral was in fact a friend of the Portuguese, and had been deceiving the King in order to make himself master of the country: all of which was manifestly false.


The King lent a willing ear to these insinuations; so that when he and de Weerd met, his mind was already prejudiced against the latter. The liberation of the Portuguese captives, the invitation to go on board, the Dutch Commander's insolent manner, and other circumstances, only served to increase the King's suspicions and to incense him against the Dutchman. This, therefore, was the frame of mind in which the King received de Weerd.

There are also circumstances in the story which require explanation, the absence of which

may justly throw doubt upon it. No reason has been given for the King's desire that de Weerd should send his followers back to the ship, while he remained the night ashore unattended. It is a fact that when the assault took place there was not one of de Weerd's men present to defend him. It is also significant that the men who assassinated de Weerd, in spite of the King's order only to bind him, should have received neither punishment nor censure. That an Oriental potentate, whose word was law, should thus calmly submit to his commands being disregarded is hard to imagine, especially when the consequences of the act involved grave issues. The slaughter in cold blood of a number of innocent Hollanders, for the only reason that they were the countrymen of de Weerd, suggests an inference which is not borne out by the story as related by the Sinhalese.

After the tragedy the King at once repaired to Kandy and from there, secure in his hill fortress, he wrote a letter in Portuguese to the ship's authorities at Batticaloa. Its terms, brief and concise, were as follows: "He who drinks wine comes to no good. God has done justice. If you desire peace, let it be peace; if war, war."<sup>(1)</sup> And with this explanation of the foul murder, in breach of every law of hospitality, of an able and valued commander in their service and of a gross outrage and indignity offered to their nation, the Dutch authorities considered it prudent for the time to be content.

(1). "Que bebem vinho noa he boa, Deos fes justicia, se quiseires pas, pas, se quires guerra, guerra."—Baldeus, *Beschr.*, v., h. *Eylandt Ceylon*, p. 21; Valentyn, Vol. V., *Byzondere Zaaken*, p. 109.



DUTCH SHIPS AT ANCHOR.

## CHAPTER IV.

### NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE SINHALESE.

[AUTHORITIES.—The account of Marcellus de Boschhouwer's mission and his subsequent movements will be found in Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. h. Eyland Ceylon*, pp. 23-46; and in Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*, pp. 111-116. The latter events referred to here up to 1638 are recorded in Baldeus, *Beschryvinge, etc.*, chaps. XVII and XVIII; in Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken*, pp. 117-118; and in *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia anno 1637*. See also van Geer, *De Opkomst v. h. Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon*, pp. 30-38.]

Undeterred by the inauspicious events of their recent expedition under Sebald de Weerd, the Dutch were still anxious to advance their commercial interests in the Island. They were not inclined therefore to disregard the overtures of friendship which the Sinhalese King continued to make. A twelve years' truce had been entered into in 1609 between the Dutch and the Portuguese in Europe, but that did not hinder the States General in the meantime from making treaties with native princes in the East.

So, in 1612, Marcellus de Boschhouwer, an onderkoopman in the service of the Dutch East India Company, arrived here with letters from Their High Mightinesses<sup>(1)</sup> and the Prince of Orange, and with authority to enter into an agreement with the King Senerat, the successor

(1). "De Edele Groot Mogende Heeren," the States General of Holland.



of Vimala Dharma, on behalf of the Dutch Company. A treaty was accordingly concluded between them, in which it was stipulated among other things, that a lasting friendship was to be maintained between the Dutch and the Sinhalese, who were to help each other against their common enemy; that the Dutch were to be allowed to build a fort at Kottiyar, the materials being furnished by the King, that they were also to be permitted to trade freely with the Sinhalese in all parts of the King's dominions; that the King was to supply them with yearly shipments of the best cinnamon at a set price to be fixed between them; that no other Europeans were to be allowed access to the Island; that the King was to furnish the Dutch with the timber required for building ships; that all property taken in war was to be equally divided between them; and that prisoners captured were to be held out to ransom and not put to death. Stipulations were also made restricting the coining of money, and providing for the fixing of tariffs at the expiration of three years.

As soon as the Treaty was signed, Boschhouwer proposed to depart for the coast of India to make a report of the transaction to the Dutch authorities who were established there; but the King was averse to this, and by mild threats and persuasion compelled him to remain in the Island; so he resided here for three years. During this time he was loaded by the King with high honours and dignities, and was taken into the closest counsels of the State. Among other titles conferred on him was that of Prince of Mingone, which gave him some territorial authority and raised him to the rank of the highest

nobles of the land. He was thus brought into intimate relations with the Court and the Royal Family, and he took part with the native courtiers in the most solemn and important State functions.

The Portuguese were all this time watching the movements of the Dutch. Having obtained information of the building of the fort at Kottiyar, they succeeded in reaching the spot by a secret route with a large force of European and Native troops, who attacked the works and slew the Dutch of Boschhouwer's party who had been left there. They then hastily retreated to the Seven Korles, but were pursued by the King's army, which put them completely to rout.

After this hostilities were carried on between the Portuguese and the Sinhalese for some time. In these Boschhouwer took part, and matters progressed with alternate successes and losses on both sides, till 1615, when Boschhouwer at last found his opportunity once more to press for permission to depart. He succeeded in prevailing on the King this time on the plea of obtaining further help against the Portuguese.

Armed with letters from the King, who made him his ambassador and plenipotentiary, and with power to enter into contracts with all princes and rulers in the interests of His Majesty, he left Ceylon on the 9th May, 1615. He proceeded first to Mazulipatam and then to Bantam; but finding that circumstances there were not favourable to the furtherance of his mission, he was induced to sail to Holland and to submit his proposals to the States General. But, with his head turned by the honours and dignities



which he enjoyed in Ceylon, he conducted himself in so arrogant and offensive a manner before the Directors of the Company that they would have nothing to do with him. Disappointed and full of chagrin, he then forgot his duty and his loyalty and went over to the King of Denmark. With him he entered into an agreement on behalf of the Sinhalese King, and the Danish East India Company fitted out ships and men with which he again set sail for the East.

A number of families accompanied him on this voyage, and among them were his own wife and son. The former was by his orders styled Princess of Mingone. But this expedition was from the first attended by a series of calamitous events. Boschhouwer himself did not live to reach his destination ; for he died on the voyage before the fleet arrived at the coast of India, as also did his little son, to whom the King of Denmark had stood sponsor. When the ships arrived off the coast of Coromandel a large number of the crew deserted and the ships then got separated. After twenty-two months' wandering, some of them put in at Batticaloa and some at Kottiyar.

These ships were afterwards again united, and Oeve Giedde,<sup>(1)</sup> the Captain on whom the command had devolved, presented himself before the King ; but the latter, alarmed at the cost of the expedition which he was expected to defray, refused to ratify the treaty which Boschhouwer had entered into on his behalf with the King of

(1) This is no doubt the correct form of the name. It so appears in *The Diary of Oeve Giedde*, published at Copenhagen in 1777 : the Dutch authorities give the name as " Gule Gedde."

Denmark, saying he had given no orders in the matter. The Danes were much troubled about this, and finding they could obtain nothing in payment for the expenses incurred by them, got into disputes with the Kandyan Chiefs. Oeve Giedde was disposed to lay all the blame on the deceased Boschhouwer, whose property he declared forfeit to the King of Denmark. And, to obtain some solace for his loss and disappointment by a posthumous revenge, he ordered that the body of the unfortunate Boschhouwer, which still lay on board, was to be buried without the honour or respect which was customarily due to it.

The unhappy Princess of Mingone, who had lost both her husband and her son in this voyage, had little left to her of her husband's property, except what she had carefully managed to secrete. She was conveyed to Kandy with some of her lady attendants and resided there seven years, at the end of which she obtained permission from the King to remove with her attendants to the Danish Settlement at Tranquebar.

Oeve Giedde was at last compelled, owing to the King's refusal to come to terms with him, to return to Denmark with his mission unfulfilled. He had lost some of his ships, had been deserted by a great part of the crew, and had received nothing for the expenses incurred in the expedition.

The Portuguese were now again free to carry out their own devices. Without much opposition, they were able to build a fortress at Trincomalee, and another at Batticaloa, and to take possession of most of the harbours. Several

conflicts took place between them and the King's folk, in which they were sometimes victorious, but they also met with more than one disaster.

The old King Senerat had in the meantime died, and after a few years' dispute among his heirs, his youngest son Raja Sinha assumed the sovereignty. He was a man of masterful character, courageous and haughty, but, at the same time, crafty and cruel. During a lull in the hostilities, while discussing proposals of peace with the Portuguese, he decided on making overtures to the Dutch, and he sent to the Governor of Coromandel a letter in which, after introducing himself in the most bombastic terms by his numerous titles and dignities, and recounting his exploits against the Portuguese, he offered to be a "brother-in-arms" to the King of the Hollanders, "so long as the sun and the moon shall endure."<sup>(1)</sup> He invited the Dutch to come over and build a fort at Kottiyar or Batticaloa for which he would provide the materials. Five ships, he said, would be sufficient to resist the present strength of the enemy, and he would himself render all the help in his power. He would give up to the Dutch all the booty and artillery taken and would also pay all the expenses of the fleet. If the Governor of Coromandel approved of the proposal he was to send a vessel to Trincomalee or Kottiyar to confer with his ambassadors.

This letter, which was entrusted to a Brahmin, did not reach its destination till six months

(1). "Daarom hebbe ik beslooten, zoo lange als Zonne en Maan duuren zullen, dat ik my in Wapenen zal maken een Broeder van den Koningh der Hollanders."—Baldeus, *Beschr. v. h. Eylandt Ceylon* p. 46.

later, the bearer of it having fallen into the hands of the Portuguese. It was eventually delivered to the Governor of Coromandel, Karel Reyniersz, by whom it was forwarded to the Dutch authorities at Batavia. The Governor-General, Anthony van Diemen, and the Council of India were glad enough to receive the proposal of the Sinhalese King, as they had just then been considering how they were to obtain some share in the cinnamon trade of the Island. They therefore instructed Reyniersz to communicate with the King.

The envoy whom Reyniersz chose for the mission was Jan Thyszoon Pyaart, a skipper in the Company's service, who had previously been in Ceylon as a prisoner and was well acquainted with the country and its people. Pyaart, or Thysz, as he was usually called, set sail from Pulicat on the 21st October, 1637, accompanied by the Koopman Andries Helmond, and they took with them a letter to the Sinhalese King from the Governor of Coromandel.

In this letter Governor Reyniersz informed the King that the Dutch authorities were aware of the great trouble which the Portuguese had brought upon his country and his subjects, and of the faithless manner in which they had broken their treaties with him. They commended his intention of getting free of his enemy, and would be glad to render him assistance with arms, guns, ammunition, etc., if he would grant them the cinnamon trade of the Island. They would be glad to have a shipload or two by the month of May. The Dutch, he assured the King, would deal with him in all sincerity, as they had been wont to do with other princes and people. Their



fleet was at that moment before Goa, the chief stronghold of the Portuguese, which it had beset and completely surrounded, and if His Majesty agreed to this proposal, the envoys who were entrusted with this letter were authorized to communicate with the Admiral of the Fleet, Admiral Adam van Westerwold, who would be asked to despatch as many ships as he could spare, both to take away the cargo of cinnamon and to render the King the assistance which he required.



REYNIERSZ.

The King having read the letter, had several conferences with the envoys, and having satisfied himself of the ability of the Hollanders to serve him, now addressed himself to the Admiral at Goa, to whom he sent deputies who were to enter into a treaty with him. These conveyed a letter in which His Majesty asked that five ships might be sent for the capture of the fortress of Batticaloa and to take away all the cinnamon which was there. He had learnt, he said, that the Admiral would be leaving Goa for Batavia



in April, passing Colombo on his way, from whence he proposed to send three ships for the attack on Batticaloa. His Majesty would himself proceed to Colombo, and if it pleased God to give them the victory, he assured the Admiral on his royal word that the right to the city would be equally shared between them, and he would make a satisfactory agreement for the delivery to the Dutch of all the pepper and cinnamon in the Island. He therefore thought it best that the Admiral should come with his whole force, so that a treaty might be concluded between them.

Westerwold's reply, handed to the Sinhalese envoys, was that he would come with three ships for the attack on Batticaloa by the end of April, if his operations at Goa were concluded by that time. The King was in the meantime to hold himself in readiness for the attack and also to have ready for him three shiploads of cinnamon.

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## CHAPTER V.

### THE SINHALESE TREATY WITH WESTERWOLD.<sup>(1)</sup>

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#### THE DUTCH TAKE BATTICALOA AND TRINCOMALEE.

[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge, etc.* pp. 55-59 (containing the full text of the Treaty); Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken*, pp. 118-119; Letters from Willem Jacobsz Coster to the Council of India, 1638, *Ceylon Literary Register*, vol. II, pp. 52-54; Extracts from the Journal of Anthony Caen *re* Capture of Trincomalee, translated by F. H. de Vos, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, C.B.*, Vol. X, pp. 123-140; Despatch from the Council of India to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company, 1639, *Ceylon Literary Register*, vol. II p. 116. See also *De Opkomst v. h. Ned., Gezag over Ceilon* by van Geer, pp. 38-48; and *Journal of the Dutch Burgher Union*, Vol. XIV, article "Adam Westerwold."]

We have now arrived at the period when the Dutch began to establish themselves in the Island. This was effected after a series of conflicts with the Portuguese, in which the Sinhalese more or less participated.

The ships which conveyed the King's envoys who returned to Ceylon with the reply of Westerwold were under the command of Willem Jacobsz Coster. Having arrived on the 3rd April, 1638 at Trincomalee, where he landed the ambassadors, Coster proceeded to Batticaloa, and there, while awaiting the arrival of Westerwold, he set about putting things in order for the attack on the fort. Westerwold joined him on the 10th May

(1). This is the spelling of the name in Baldeus and Valentyn, but it also appears in certain places as Westerwolt or Westerwoldt.



*From an old Engraving*

ADAM WESTERWOLD





with five ships and a contingent of men, and proceeded at once to invest the fort. Landing with their whole force and with six pieces of ordnance, which were quickly directed against the battery, they were able under cover of these guns to convey their men to the island on which the fort stood. The fort capitulated on the 18th May with its garrison of 500 well-armed soldiers, after the Dutch had kept up a continuous fire for about four hours, suffering but little damage from the enemy. The following were the terms of the surrender: the fort was to be given up at once; the men were to march out without arms, bag or baggage; the Portuguese and *Mistieses*,<sup>(1)</sup> 108 in number, were to be conveyed to Negapatam in one of the Dutch yachts; of the natives, 50 of the principal were to be handed over to the King, those who had caused the death of one of the King's nobles were to be set up on stakes with a spike through their bodies, and made to die a lingering and painful death as an example to others, and the rest, with their wives and children, were to be divided among His Majesty's courtiers to be employed as slaves.

The King, who had arrived at Batticaloa with his army on the 14th May, had in the meantime several interviews with Westerwold, and after the fort was taken, they entered into a treaty by which the King and the Dutch entered into a firm alliance against their common enemy the Portuguese. This Treaty, which was made

(1). *Mistiesen* or *mysticen* as used by the Portuguese does not apparently signify the same class which the Dutch designated *mixtis* or *mixties*. The latter term was applied to the legitimate offspring of a European father and a native mother, who formed a section of the *Hollandsche natie* in Ceylon, and some of these rose to high office in the Company's service.



the basis of all the future relations between the two parties, was signed at Batticaloa on the 23rd May, 1638 by His Majesty Raja Sinha on the one part and Adam Westerwold, Commander of the Dutch Naval Forces and William Jacobsz Coster, Vice-Commander, on behalf of the Dutch East India Company, on the other part. It consisted in substance of the following Articles :—

1. The King of Kandy and his subjects acknowledged and accepted the Dutch as their friends and allies, and the protectors of their country against the Portuguese. The Dutch were to help the King in defending his lands which were usurped by their common enemy.

2 That when any forts and strongholds, such as Batticaloa or any other place, was taken by the Dutch with the help of the King, either by treaty or by force, all the booty and goods found therein were to be equally divided between the two parties.

3. That in the event of any forts or strongholds being taken and occupied by the Dutch and the King in manner aforesaid, these forts should be garrisoned with officers and soldiers and supplied with ordnance and ammunition of war ; and if the Dutch considered the defences insufficient, His Majesty was to strengthen and fortify the same to their satisfaction.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1). A dispute arose between Raja Sinha and the Dutch in regard to the wording of this Article. The King maintained that in the original Treaty it was stipulated that the forts in question were to be garrisoned with Dutch soldiers if the King were so disposed. This special stipulation appears to have been omitted by mistake or fraud in the Dutch copy.

4. The King was also bound, when any forts or fortresses were garrisoned by the Dutch officers and soldiers, to pay them their monthly wages.

5. The King was also bound to allow the Dutch suitable places for storing their goods and merchandise, and, as soon as possible, to cause to be built storehouses, approved by the Dutch, which would ensure the safety of the goods against fire and other accidents and disasters ; and likewise to build a gunpowder magazine for the preservation of the gunpowder, munitions of war, and other appliances.

6. The King, when desirous of attacking the Portuguese, or undertaking anything against them, was previously to consult with some of the principal Dutch military officers, and to aid them both by counsel and by deed.

7. The King was to have some frigates with oars built in his country, as speedily as possible, manned by rowers of his own people, to be provided with soldiers and ammunition by the Dutch, for the protection of His Majesty's river outlets and harbours.

8. The King was also, in terms of the promise and undertaking made by him to the Governor-General and Council of India, to pay the yearly expenses, as well as to bear the cost of the present equipment of the ships, yachts, and smaller vessels, and of the crews, officers, soldiers, ammunition, and all requirements which the Dutch Company sent in his service, to be recouped in cinnamon, pepper, cardamom, indigo, wax, rice, and other valuable products of his country, except wild cinnamon.

9. The King, in return for the friendship and alliance of the Dutch, was to allow them full permission to carry on trade and commerce throughout his dominions with his subjects, including inhabitants of all towns, villages, and hamlets ; to allow them to go to and fro with their ships and other vessels by all streams, rivers, and harbours without hindrance ; to traffic with His Majesty's subjects free from tolls, taxes, or other duties of any kind whatever ; and His Majesty was to forbid any of his subjects of whatever state or quality to sell to anyone cinnamon, pepper, wax, and elephant tusks. The elephant being his sole property he was to deliver to the Dutch 4 or 10 or 20 of the animals when he sold a like number to anyone else.

10. The King and his subjects were to resist to the utmost any attempt on the part of any other European nation, such as the English, French, or German, or any Oriental nation, to trade in the country, and to prevent any of their ships or yachts entering the harbours of Ceylon. The produce of the country was to be delivered exclusively to the Dutch East India Company ; provided only that the people of the neighbouring country, Travancore, were to be permitted to come and go unmolested in their vessels with provisions and paltry commodities.

11. The King was to send to Batavia yearly at least one or two shiploads of cinnamon, pepper, cardamom, indigo, wax, and other valuable merchandise, in payment of the expenses incurred in the equipment and upkeep of the vessels sent here in his service, the Company undertaking to reimburse His Majesty in merchandise, articles

or cash, according to his pleasure, any excess in value of the yearly expenditure which the shiploads amounted to.

12. The King was to permit any factors or merchants of the Dutch to travel freely over his country for the purpose of trade and commerce with the inhabitants, and to remove any merchandise purchased by them without molestation; and the inhabitants were to be bound to provide on payment of expenses, beasts of burden for the transport of such goods and merchandise, and to convey the same to the Dutch Headquarters or on board ship.

13. No person trading with the Dutch was to be at liberty to deliver any articles reserved for them by the Treaty to anyone else, on penalty of being arrested and imprisoned. Any person indebted to the Dutch for a large amount was to be dealt with in the same way; and if such person was a subject of the King, notice thereof was to be given to His Majesty.

14. No one, of whatever class or condition, was to be permitted to coin, make, or circulate money, unless he were appointed thereto by the King and by the Dutch, on pain of corporal punishment and forfeiture of property.

15. All fugitives from justice from the Dutch seeking refuge in the King's territory were to be delivered up by His Majesty and his subjects, and any like refugees from the King's dominions were to be delivered up to His Majesty.

16. Neither the King nor any of his subjects, in terms of this contract, was to carry on a correspondence openly or secretly with the Portuguese,



or enter into any contract with them, or have any dealings with them whatever, commercial or otherwise. And any subject of the King selling to the Portuguese any merchandise or other article was to receive corporal punishment.

17. The King was not to tolerate any Roman Catholic priests, monks, or other ecclesiastics, but was to do his best to exterminate them, they being the cause of all commotion, dissensions and disturbances, wherever they were, who also set up the inhabitants of a country against the King.

18. Any prizes made by the Dutch ships in the service of the King on their homeward or hitherward voyage was to be the exclusive booty of the Dutch; in like manner all losses in these expeditions were to be borne by the Dutch.

19. Any ordnance from the Dutch ships placed in the forts or fortresses for the service of the King were to be at the disposal of the Dutch, to be removed by them on board their vessels whenever considered desirable by them

20. All vessels departing hence with passports from the King were to receive the aid and assistance of the Dutch.

The Treaty having been signed, Westerwold left Batticaloa on the 4th June, leaving Coster in command of the fort. Three days later the Portuguese prisoners, 79 in number, including women and children, were conveyed in ships to the coast of India. The garrison now consisted of 105 men, and a supply of ordnance with a good quantity of gunpowder and arms was



provided from the ships. But there was a good deal of sickness among the soldiers on account of the insanitary condition of the place. This, the Dutch at once set about to remedy and to repair, and to strengthen the fort. The Sinhalese, in terms of the treaty, provided a plentiful supply of victuals.



VIEW OF BATTICALOA.

The time seemed opportune for the prosecution of hostilities against the Portuguese, who had had several setbacks and seemed just then least able to offer any resistance. They had recently met with a complete defeat from the Sinhalese in the neighbourhood of Kandy, when their General was slain and the whole army massacred; six ships and a yacht bringing a new General with reinforcements were stranded between Colombo and Negombo and fell into the hands of the King; while 300 soldiers sent from Colombo to their rescue were intercepted and most of them slain. Raja Sinha's chief object about this time was the capture of the castle of Colombo, and

he had been keeping a large force in the vicinity for this purpose, with which he had several encounters with the enemy. The Dutch, on the other hand, had made Point de Galle their objective; as they hoped by taking it to find a good roadstead and harbour for their ships and a convenient centre of operations. In pursuance of this plan, Antonio Caen, a Councillor of India, was sent from Batavia as Commander of the Fleet, with whom Coster was to co-operate at Goa, the place of the latter at Batticaloa being temporarily filled by the Head Factor Jacob van Compostel. The centre of authority was to be at Pulicat, where Arent Gardenys was stationed as Governor of the Coromandel Coast. Coster in the meanwhile had not been unmindful of the chief interests of the Dutch East India Company. The ships which left with the Portuguese prisoners took 200 bales of cinnamon, and the Council at Batavia acknowledged to have received in all 570 bales of cinnamon, 87 picols of wax, and 3059 lbs of pepper, all of which were valued at f.720. 7. 8., a sum which went but a very little way to meet the expenses incurred by the Dutch. But Raja Sinha seemed to be slow in fulfilling his promises, although quantities of the required products were to be had in plenty. Seeing that none was coming, even in response to reminders sent to him, Coster decided on having an interview with the King. So he presented himself at Court on the 17th August and took the opportunity to remind His Majesty of his promise and of the terms of the Treaty made with Westerwold.

The King kept on urging the attack on Colombo. With a view to meeting his wishes, Caen, with Costeras Vice-Commander, sailed from Goa with his whole fleet of 12 ships, and dropped anchor before Colombo on the 12th March 1639, expecting to be supported in an attack on the fort by the King's forces operating on the land ; but, finding no signs of Raja Sinha's troops, the Dutch Admiral in disgust sailed to Trincomalee. He arrived at the Bay of Kottiyar on the 18th April and immediately prepared for an attack on the fort. Having cautiously reconnoitred the approaches to the fortress, aided by the Vice-Commander Coster and Major Marten Scholten, he chose a suitable spot on which they erected four batteries which were fortified by ordnance drawn from the ships, being constantly disturbed in their work by the fire of the enemy. The preparations being completed by the 30th April, the bombardment began. When it had lasted three hours, and it appeared from the breaches made that the Portuguese power of resistance was gone, the Dutch Admiral offered favourable terms of surrender, threatening if they delayed, to spare no one, but to hand them all over to the mercy of the Sinhalese. These proposals being rejected, the attack was continued till the morning of the 2nd May, when a Roman Catholic Priest came from the fort with a man bearing a white flag of truce. The fort was then surrendered with all the arms and ammunition. The Portuguese and Mistieses were allowed to leave for Tranquebar or Negapatam within a year, but the natives were to remain in the fort and serve the Dutch. The Dutch had been scarcely two hours in the fort when the King's Mudaliyars

arrived with about 3000 men, sent by Raja Sinha as reinforcement for the capture of Trincomalee. There was a strong suspicion that they had been all the while in the neighbourhood, awaiting the end of the conflict.

The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on the 27th May, Gerard Herbers being left in command of the fort. Three ambassadors from Raja Sinha to the Council of India joined the fleet at Batticaloa. The King again pressed urgently for a force to attack Colombo, and the Council, though by no means assured of the trustworthiness of his promises, decided on complying with his wishes, determined that he must be made to enter into more binding agreements, and that every place taken was to be occupied by Dutch forces.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### THE CONQUEST OF NEGOMBO AND GALLE.

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#### THE MURDER OF COSTER.

[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. 't Eyland Ceylon*, p. 59; and Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken*, pp. 119, 120, give but a meagre account of the conquest of Negombo and Galle, by Philip Lucasz and Willem Jacobsz Coster, respectively. The Dutch authorities for these events have been mainly a series of letters—from Lucasz to the Governor-General and Council at Batavia, 9, January, 1640; from Thysz to Arent Gardenys, Governor of Coromandel, 1, April, 1640; and from the Governor-General and Council to the Directors of the East India Company, 9, September, 1640—published from time to time in the *Ceylon Literary Register* Vol. II. A Portuguese account of the events will be found in Ribeiro, *Fatalidade Historica da Ilha de Cellao*, Liv. II, cap VII, pp. 95-98, Lisbon, 1836. (Pieris' Translation, pp. 242-245). Full details of the battles and sieges and the casualties on both sides are given by De Queyroz, *Conquista de Ceilao* Liv., V caps II-VIII, folios 361-375.

Reference is made to the murder of Coster and the circumstances connected therewith in letters reproduced in the *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. II. from W. J. de Jonge, Ispahan, to the Directors of the East India Company and from Paul Croocq, Souhalje, to Jan Thysz. Full particulars of the incidents of the murder will be found in the *Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia* (van der Chysz), 1640-41, pp. 92-101. An article on Willem Jacobsz Coster by F. H. de Vos appears in the *Ceylon Literary Register*, vol. III., p. 159. *De Ophomst v. h. Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon* by Van Geer gives a clear and concise account of all the facts.]

The conduct of the next expedition was entrusted to Philip Lucasz, Councillor of India and Director-General of the Forces, with Coster as Vice-Commander. The fleet, which carried 2,000 men, including soldiers, sailors, and natives, left Batavia on the 25th September 1639, but



did not reach Trincomalee till the 2nd December. There they found the garrison suffering great privation from sickness and want of food ; for Raja Sinha, who was to provide them with the necessaries, not only failed to do so, but had given orders to his subjects not to supply anything. Lucasz relieved their needs as far as he was able, and then left Trincomalee with the fleet for Colombo, having first sent a message to the King to march there with his forces by land. But when he arrived before Colombo early in January the King's forces were not yet there. Finding that he could not attack the fort from the sea without assistance from the land side, he proceeded farther north and anchored at Kaymel, five miles north of Negombo. The Sinhalese army came to him there on the 29th January, together with the Dutch forces from Batticaloa under Jan Thysz, making in all 15,000 strong. After an encounter with the Portuguese forces from Colombo, which they defeated, the allied army proceeded to Negombo and attacked the fort there, which they eventually took by storm on the 9th February with the loss of but one man, a carpenter. Of the Portuguese, a number were killed, 30 were taken prisoner and sent to Batavia, and those who took to flight were massacred by the Sinhalese. The fort was taken possession of and garrisoned by the Dutch, who also proceeded to repair all the damage caused by the attack. The King however wanted it surrendered to him with a view to having it demolished, a proposal to which the Dutch General was not then disposed to agree. In consequence of this a difference arose between them, and Raja Sinha in dudgeon marched away with his army into the country.

Fearing that his intention was to turn against them and attack the fortresses at Batticaloa and Trincomalee, Lucasz sent Jan Thysz back to Batticaloa by sea to warn and prepare the garrisons there. He himself, who had been ailing for some time, had now become so ill that he could no longer continue to direct affairs. So he sailed for Batavia on the 21st February, but did not live to reach his destination, dying on the voyage, on the 5th March.

The chief command now devolved on Willem Jacobsz Coster, with Adriaan Anthonisz, a valiant and experienced soldier, as second in authority<sup>(1)</sup>. Coster's first action when he took command was to conciliate Raja Sinha, with whom he came to a fresh understanding. The fortress of Trincomalee was to be handed over to the King to be dismantled, and this was actually done. When the Portuguese had been completely driven out of the Island, and matters settled between the Allies, the Dutch were to hold only one fort, but in the meantime all those taken by them were to remain in their occupation until the expenses of the war had been defrayed by the King. Colombo was to be demolished as soon as it was taken, unless the King desired that it or any of the forts should be garrisoned.

(1). Coster and Adriaan Anthonisz parted company shortly after the conquest of Galle, when the latter was sent in command of the expedition against Malacca, which he won for the Dutch in 1640.—See Valentyn, *Malacca*, p. 340 and *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. II, p. 119.

In that case it was to be done by Dutch soldiers. The booty and prisoners taken were to be divided between Raja Sinha and the Dutch equally.

Finding the time opportune for the further prosecution of their aims, the Dutch fleet set sail from Negombo, leaving Paulus Pietersz with 128 men in charge of the fort. It arrived at Galle on the 8th March, and Jan Thysz the same day returned from Batticaloa and joined them



COSTER.

there. Two thousand men were landed from the ships close to Unawatuna, and were marched forwards to Magalle, within two miles of the fort, where they entrenched themselves. The Captain of the fort, Lorenzo Ferreira de Brito, was quite unprepared to meet the attack of such a force, as the garrison only consisted of 80 citizens of the town, 30 men of the train band and 300 Sinhalese soldiers or lascarins. Powder and shot were also scarce, and the arms indifferent. The Portuguese General of Colombo therefore sent a force of 323 Portuguese in 12 companies, under the command of








*From Baldeus*

THE STORMING OF GALLE.

Capitan Moor Franciso de Mendosa Mannuel, to meet and intercept the enemy. He was joined by four Dessaves with 1600 lascarins, besides 200 Kanarese musketeers and 100 Kaffir archers. But his advance was not quick enough to stop the Dutch from commencing their bombardment, which took place as soon as they arrived. Their



PLAN OF ATTACK ON GALLE.

land force had also taken a good position at Pittigala in the bazaar by the time the Portuguese Capitan Moor came up with his men. A good deal of desperate fighting took place in which the Dutch suffered severely, losing 900 men; but the death of the Portuguese Commander, who was hit by a bullet in his head, appears to have turned the scale of the battle, and the Dutch now directed their forces against the three bastions of the fort, which they surrounded by land and sea, and a furious attack was kept up against the bastion St. Jago which was the



nearest to the harbour. On the 11th they obtained reinforcements from three ships, which landed 600 musketeers ; and the following day the Dutch sent to ask if the fort would surrender ; but the messenger with the white flag was fired at from the walls. This stiffened the purpose of the Dutch,



MUSKETEER.

who continued the attack with redoubled force, resolved “to conquer or to die.” Making an attack on the bastion St. Cruz, which was on the seaside, to divert the attention of the enemy from their chief objective, they succeeded in scaling the walls by ladders placed against the bastion St. Jago which they battered ; and, having cut off from it the bastion Conceicao by a breach

through the curtain, the Dutch entered the fort. Some scattered parties of Portuguese offered a resistance but were soon compelled to surrender. Several brave Portuguese commanders died at their posts, and many citizens of the town also lost their lives. The Dutch had, however, to pay very dear for this victory, for many of their own men were among the dead. The streets of Galle, it is said, were strewn with the bodies of both the Dutch and the Portuguese. In the account which has been given, by the Portuguese historian, of the events which followed, the Dutch do not appear to have come out with much credit for humanity or magnanimity towards their conquered foe. But a story related by the Portuguese Captain Joao de Ribeiro may be mentioned as a pleasant episode in the scene of carnage and devastation which prevailed. Lorenzo Ferreira de Brito, the Captain of the fort, was a married man, and his wife, who was devoted to him, never left his side during the siege. He was severely wounded in the last night attack and was thrown on the ground with a broken thigh and other injuries. Some Dutch soldiers seeing him fall were going to kill him, when his wife threw herself on his body and entreated them to spare his life or to kill her first. Her cries reached the ears of a Dutch officer, who immediately ordered the soldiers away, raised her up, and promised her safety and the life of her husband, if his wounds were not mortal. The matter was also reported to the Dutch General who sent his own surgeon to attend to the wounded man; and when, a few days later, the surgeon pronounced the case out of danger, he was removed to a comfortable cabin in one of the best frigates



in the harbour, and conveyed with his wife to Batavia, where he was received with great cordiality and was well treated during fourteen months' residence at the Dutch Headquarters. The story was told to Ribeiro by de Brito himself, when they met subsequently in Colombo.

Galle fell into the hands of the Dutch on the 13th March, 1640. Those of the enemy to whom quarter was given were sent to Batavia. Besides these there were a number of Kaffirs and Kanarese who were made to remain to repair the ramparts. The Sinhalese who were taken prisoner were handed over to the King. Neither Raja Sinha nor any of his people rendered any assistance to the Dutch in the conquest of Galle ; but, as soon as the place fell, the men came to plunder ; and the King's Mudaliyars demanded and obtained a full half share of all the booty<sup>(1)</sup>.

The conquest of Galle marks an important epoch in the history of the Dutch in Ceylon. It was their greatest achievement so far, and by it they secured a firm footing in the Island. When, therefore, the news of the event was conveyed to the Council of India there was great rejoicing in Batavia over the victory. The Dutch were now in possession of three important fortresses, Batticaloa, Negombo, and Galle. Trincomalee, which they had also conquered, had been given up to Raja Sinha, according to promise, to be demolished. To administer the affairs of the Colony thus established, Coster was appointed President

(1). See *Galle Dutch Records* Vol. II., Government Archives, Ms. fol. A.; *Journal C. B. R. A. S.*, Vol. XVII. p. 370.

of the Council with his Headquarters at Galle. He has therefore been recognized as the first in the long list of Dutch rulers in Ceylon.

Meanwhile Raja Sinha was holding back the promised repayment of the expenses which the Dutch had incurred in their several enterprises. To Coster's friendly appeals he made no response, but seemed to intimate that he now had all the help he needed from the Dutch and would have nothing more to do with them. But this did not serve the purpose of the Dutch, who still looked forward to the profits they hoped to realize from the rich harvests of the Island. Coster having his suspicions aroused by this attitude of the King, and by the conduct of his officers, which showed a marked unfriendliness, determined to seek a personal interview with His Majesty. Accordingly he set out from Galle on the 4th July, accompanied by his Secretary and a retinue of men. When the interview was at last obtained he laid before the King the following particulars embodied in a letter in Portuguese: the heavy expenses which the Dutch had incurred in the course of the last three years in the prosecution of their design of driving the Portuguese out of the Island at the behest of the King; the very inadequate return made by him so far in supplying cinnamon and other products of the Island according to promise; the difficulties thrown in the way of the Company's servants trading with His Majesty's subjects; the hostile action of the King's Dessaves and other officers towards the Company's servants sent out to procure provisions for the garrison. He concluded by asking permission to occupy

some villages and gardens adjoining the fortress of Galle to within a cannon's shot from the walls, with a view to obtaining the needed provisions, a privilege which he said they might claim under the rules of war. To this the King furnished a reply in Dutch to the effect that he had not forgotten the expenses which the Dutch had incurred, and would repay them when the fort of Batticaloa was surrendered to him. He conceded all the other points, but clearly indicated that he would not be responsible for the cost of any reinforcements. It was apparent to Coster during this interview that, while the King himself seemed disposed to be friendly, there was an atmosphere of animosity towards him in the Court of His Majesty. Mischief-makers appeared to have been at work, secretly traducing the Dutch and endeavouring to create distrust and suspicion of them in the mind of the King; and His Majesty's Mudaliyars made Coster clearly understand that it was believed he had come with murderous designs against the King's person. These and other indignities offered to the stout-hearted, blunt sailor exasperated him, and it may well be believed that he protested vehemently, and perhaps violently, against this treatment. After being detained three weeks at Court without obtaining any tangible proof of the King's intention to fulfil his promise, he at last obtained permission to depart. On the return journey Coster was separated from his Secretary, who, with the baggage and about eight of the men, took the road by Ruanwelle. He himself with eight Dutchmen and some natives travelled through Badulgama, where he was met by a Mudaliyar with about 400 or 500 armed men ostensibly



with the object of escorting him. He accompanied them without any suspicion, as they showed friendly ; but the next day, arrived at the village Niligala, when he was in the act of entering a hut for rest and refreshment, he was suddenly and stealthily attacked from behind with some two score lances and spears. He fell, and then one of the men cut off his head. Those of his *suite* who attempted to defend him were also killed, eight persons in all, including the surgeon. The rest were disarmed, stripped, bound, and cruelly beaten. They were eventually released and sent over to the Dutch in Batticaloa<sup>(1)</sup>.

Thus died Coster, a brave and victorious general and an able administrator, the victim of treacherous and murderous assassins. It is difficult to conceive how such an act could be justified even by the pitiful attempt to prove that his temper was violent and his character open to question. But Coster deserved a better fate at the hands of the Sinhalese. He had given up Trincomalee to the King, although it had been conquered without his help, and he transferred to him his rights to the lands surrounding Galle and Matara, which he might have retained by right of conquest.

(1). The Dutch account of the murder, which is the only reliable and detailed report of the actual incident, available to the historian, is to be found in the *Dagh-Register* of the Castle of Batavia. It is as follows : " Des middaghs in seecker dorp, genaempt Nilegale daar eenige weyninge cleyne huyskens staen, gecomen synde ende willende syn E. in seecker laegh huysken om wat te eten ende te rusten, is int nederbucken, alsoo de deur niet hoogh was, verradelucken van achteren met 41 pylen ende soo veel piecken gelyckelyck geschote ende gesteecken geworden, sonder eenigh gewagh, woort ofte wederwoort, den welcken daervan voor overstortende, was een van gemelte gasten toegesprongen ende heeft syn E. voorts den keel afgesneden."—*Dagh-Register v. h. Casteel Batavia*, 1640-41 p. 100. See also my paper on the "Murder of Coster" in the *Journal of the Dutch Burgher Union*, Vol. XV. pp. 17-31.



He had also been always ready to treat reasonably with the King in matters relating to their mutual interests.

After this the King wrote a letter to Thysz, who was at Batticaloa, in which His Majesty denied any knowledge of, or participation in, this deed, desiring that, notwithstanding what had occurred, the treaty made by him with the Dutch Company should be observed. It is, however, abundantly clear that the Dutch authorities were by no means convinced of his blamelessness; that, on the contrary, they were firmly of opinion that the crime was perpetrated at his instance, though perhaps on the instigation of his courtiers. This appears to have been the general view of the matter and is borne out by the Portuguese historian De Queyroz, who states that Coster was assassinated on the orders of the Sinhalese King.<sup>(1)</sup> But for the second time in the history of their relations with the Sinhalese, the Dutch authorities calmly submitted to a loss, insult, and indignity which their national pride and honour ought to have made them forcibly resent. Yet so intent were their minds on their commercial interests and the hope of reaping rich profits from the Island, that it is not possible to say what sacrifices they were

(1). In the following passage the Portuguese historian's notion of Coster's object in going to Kandy is at variance with what we know, but he seems to have no doubt of the guilt of the King:—  
 "Soubese tambem, q.'o Capitaõ Olandez de Gale fora a Candea incitar o Rey Chingala pera decer sobre Columbo, acompanhando 10 ou 12 Olandezes; e pr. q'. era ja grande a insolencia desta nacao, e o Rey lhe nao defirio na forma q'. queria; sem reparar no lugar em q'. estua, de tal modo se descompoz com ele, e com os de seu concilho, q'. em sahindo de sua presenca, o mandou a lancear, e aos, ms. de sua companhia."—De Queyroz: *A Conquista de Ceylao*, Liv. 5 cap. 8 fo. 377.

not prepared to make in the pursuit of their objects. A circumstance with regard to Coster which imparts an additional element of sadness to the tragedy is the fact that he had been but recently married, and had only come out to Ceylon at the urgent call of duty, and that he had been awaiting the time when he would be relieved to rejoin his wife at Batavia.

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## CHAPTER VII.

### THE LOSS OF NEGOMBO.

#### SKIRMISHES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF GALLE.


#### UNCERTAIN RELATIONS WITH RAJA SINHA.

[AUTHORITIES.—Here, as of the events of this period generally, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon* by W. van Geer gives the best concise narrative, and his valuable appendices, reproductions of documents in the Ryks Archief at the Hague, provide the best authentic sources of information. The authorities available to the English reader are the following; Resolutions of the Council of Galle from 8 August, 1641 in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, C.B.*, Vol. XVII. p. 259 *et seq.*, being the translation of G. D. Vols. I and II of the Ceylon Govt. Archives; the *Dagh-Register v. h. Casteel Batavia*, anno 1640-41, of which the portions relating to Ceylon, translated by F. H. de Vos, appear in the *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. II.; and a letter from Jan Thysz to Arent G Gardenys, Governor of the Coromandel, 14 September, 1641, reproduced in the *Ceylon Literary Register* Vol. II p. 6.]

On the death of Coster the chief command devolved on Jan Thysz, who had been present with the forces at the attack on Galle, and, after the conquest of that fort, had been placed in command at Batticaloa. Thysz's full name was Jan Thysz (Matthyszoon) Payaart, although the shortened patronymic was the name he generally used and was known by, according to a practice not uncommon in those days. His connection with Ceylon dated, as we have seen, from an earlier period; for he had been a prisoner here some time before the advent of Westerwold, and had thus acquired an intimate acquaintance with the Island. He was a bluff sailor, but possessed of much foresight and judgment, and his rule here as President for a period of







*From Baldeus*

THE FORT AND ENVIRONS OF GALLE.

six years was marked by vigour as well as discrimination, except for a single error of judgment to which reference will be made later.

When the news of Coster's death reached Batticaloa Thysz immediately set out for Galle. He was not a moment too soon, for he found on his arrival there on the 29th September that Captain Walraven de St. Amant, who, during Coster's absence had been placed in charge of the fort, had gone over to the enemy at Colombo with two Dutch soldiers and some Kanarese and Kaffirs, in all about 12 or 15. This caused much alarm and tumult in the garrison, but quiet was restored by the courage and promptitude of a Lieutenant, Christiaan Swaart. St. Amant's conduct seemed inexplicable, but it was supposed to be due to his intimacy with a Portuguese woman. Thysz feared that the enemy would seize the opportunity to make use of the treachery of St. Amant and the knowledge possessed by him to their advantage; so, with the assistance of the Opperkoopman Marten Vinck, who had come with him from Batticaloa, he took speedy measures to secure the fort against any attack. He found that he could rely on the fidelity of the garrison and on the strength of the walls and bulwarks, and that he had no cause for anxiety in regard to Galle; but he could not entertain the same confidence in regard to Negombo. His fears for the safety of this fort were soon realized. The arrival of a new Viceroy at Goa, Joao da Silva Tillo Menezes, Count of d' Aveires, was the occasion for renewed activities by the Portuguese to recover their former position in Ceylon. On the 16th October 1640 appeared before Colombo a fleet of 16 vessels under the command of Don

Philip Mascarenhas, who was to succeed his brother Antonio as Captain-General at Colombo. The Dutch yachts were not in time to offer any resistance to the fleet which entered the harbour safely and landed 400 soldiers. These, with 250 men from Jaffna and the strong garrison of Colombo, formed a united army of such strength that Mascarenhas was able to send a great force under Antonio de Motta Galvao to attack Negombo. This force which numbered from 1300 to 1400 men, laid siege to the fort on the 1st November 1640. The Dutch were quite unprepared for an attack and were scantily supplied with ammunition provisions, and necessaries. The enemy, who are said to have been instigated and advised by the traitor St. Amant, during the siege, adopted various artifices to corrupt the Dutch garrison. Letters in French and Dutch were shot into the fort at the point of spikes and spears offering inducements to the soldiers to desert their post, promising each man who went over 300 reals of eight<sup>(1)</sup> and a good position under the Portuguese. These had the effect of making three French soldiers spike a gun and desert to the enemy on the evening of the eighth day of the siege, and their conduct so discouraged and disheartened the Dutch soldiers, that through great doubt and fear they lost all power of resistance. The fort surrendered on the 8th November. It was agreed that the vanquished Dutch were to be furnished with a vessel and a pilot to enable them to depart to any port they

(1). The real of eight was a Spanish coin which was popularly reckoned by the Dutch at this time as equivalent to the rix-dollar. For a full description and the relative values of the coins in use during the Portuguese and Dutch times see Codrington's *Ceylon Coins and Currency*, 1924.



pleased except Galle, while the Boekhouder Anthony van der Ondermeulen and the Ensign Jan van Westrenen were to remain as hostages. Contrary, as it seems, to the terms agreed on, the Dutch were forced to put out to sea in two miserable, unseaworthy boats, without a pilot or provisions, which rendered them liable at that season of the year to drift to the Maldives, or to fall into the hands of the Malabars on the Coromandel Coast. To save their lives therefore they had to make for Point de Galle as their only resource. They reached the port on the 22nd November, 80 in number; 30 others, corrupted by St. Amant, remained with the enemy. Yet when the question of the release of the hostages arose, the Portuguese Captain-General Mascarenhas pleaded violation by the Dutch of the terms of the agreement.


With the conquest of Negombo the enemy regained possession of the Four and the Seven Korales, together with a large quantity of cinnamon, and also the low lands, which, after the conquest of Galle by the Dutch, had been restored to the Sinhalese. Don Philip Mascarenhas now entertained the hope of also taking Galle, but he found the place too well protected by fortifications which were being daily strengthened by Thysz. Four ships sent from Batavia, which arrived on the 25th December, 1640, made the place perfectly safe on the sea side. With the men who came from Negombo, Thysz had now 400 soldiers under him, and provisions had been received from Arent Gardenys, the Governor of Coromandel. Yet the situation was by no means an easy one for the Dutch. Don Philip, seeing he was powerless to take the fort, made



no futile attempts to do so, but he was able to harass the Dutch in other ways. His bands of soldiers overran the whole country surrounding Galle, laid waste and plundered the villages about Matara, and drove all the inhabitants away. Thysz could do nothing to prevent them ; because, for fear of a sudden attack on Galle, he dared not remove from the fort a sufficient number of men to drive the Portuguese away. To send out small bands for this purpose would have been both useless and perilous. The Portuguese, by their superior knowledge of the lay of the land, were better able than the Dutch to gather such produce of the land as was to be had ; and they could, without exposing themselves, fall unexpectedly on any party sent out from the fort. Such an occurrence took place on the 9th August, 1641. Not having been able to get any fresh victuals for four months, and nothing having been supplied by Raja Sinha, the garrison had been reduced to live only on their rations of salt meat, bacon, vinegar, oil, etc., and, in consequence, the men suffered severely from dropsy, beri-beri,<sup>(1)</sup> swollen legs, etc. Of 358 men left in the garrison, 80 were unable to do anything. In these circumstances Thysz sent out an expedition of 80 men under the command of Captain Walraven de Riviere to reconnoitre on the banks of the Gindura river with a view to obtaining some necessaries. At Wakwelle, about 1½ hours journey from Galle, they were suddenly attacked by

(1). *Beri-beri* was an acute disease, obscure in its nature and pathology, generally, but not always, presenting dropsical symptoms, as well as paralytic weakness and numbness of the lower extremities with oppressed breathing. In extremely severe cases the patient sometimes died in 6 to 30 hours. The word has been alleged to be Sinhalese, *beri*, debility, the reduplication being a common Sinhalese practice.—See *Hobson-Jobson* (Yule and Burnell), new edition, 1903

the enemy, who had concealed themselves in a narrow path, and were completely put to rout. The Dutch lost 27 men, including two officers, Captain de Riviere and Lieutenant Gens. It appeared that the officers, who were in the van, had not been assisted by the men, many having thrown away their guns and taken to flight in the panic caused by the sudden slaughter of their leaders. After this the Galle garrison was reinforced by 30 men from Coromandel, 10 from Batticaloa



*4 Miles to inch*

and 25 from Batavia, and was again raised to 400, which was the strength needed to safeguard the fort.

Thysz meanwhile was solicitous about procuring the promised cinnamon for shipment in the vessels which were awaiting cargo. Of 1000 bhars, equal to 480,000 lbs. fine cinnamon, which had been promised by Raja Sinha for Batticaloa, only 165,720 lbs were delivered, and 800 bhars, which the King's Mudaliyar was ready with at Alicam, were plundered by the Portuguese just

before the arrival of the Dutch vessels which came to take them over. A boat from one of these vessels with eight men, which reached the shore, was suddenly attacked by some Portuguese, and five men were killed and three taken prisoner to Colombo. The Dutch were in hopes that on receipt of the 1000 bhars promised they would be able to give over Batticaloa to the King and withdraw the garrison to Galle. The retention of that fort was no advantage but rather a burden and danger to the Company. Its bulwarks were weak and in a dilapidated condition, and there was constant fear of its being attacked and re-taken by the Portuguese. Yet the Company was compelled to hold it as security for the expenses incurred in its capture. In defence of Raja Sinha's refusal to continue to pay the expenses of the garrison, it had been urged that there was a stipulation in the treaty with Westerswold that the forts and fortresses to be conquered from the Portuguese should be garrisoned with Dutch soldiers, *if the Kandyan King were so pleased and thought fit*. But this special stipulation was by mistake or fraud omitted in the Dutch copy.<sup>(1)</sup> The fort was eventually given up to the King and demolished by him in 1643.

During the early part of the year 1641 the relations between the Dutch and Raja Sinha were of a more or less uncertain nature. The King had repeatedly sought to place in the fort of Galle 400 or 500 Sinhalese soldiers, for a protection, as he said, against the Portuguese; but Thysz, who suspected that his design was to make himself master of the place, courteously refused all these proposals. Anticipating

(1). See ante p. 38 note.

disagreements with the King, he recommended to the Council at Batavia the need for keeping European garrisons in the conquered forts. And to find the means of maintaining these, it was his plan to obtain the produce of the lands about Galle, Matara, and Alicam. These lands yielded 4000 ammunams of arecanut yearly, which by purchase from the inhabitants at a certain rate could be sold at the coast for a profit of about 9 or 10 per cent. The coconut produce, which was also considerable, he proposed to rent out. He saw little prospect of local trade, as the Sinhalese were not disposed to pay adequate prices for the goods they bought, and the Moors, who frequented the Island from various parts, monopolized nearly all the business. Meanwhile the Dutch Company was kept out of pocket of the expenses it had incurred on behalf of the King. Whether he was not disposed to defray these, or was prevented from doing so by the Portuguese being still masters of the field, Thysz was of opinion that some patience ought to be exercised until the Portuguese were completely driven out of the country.

On the 2nd January, 1641, an embassy in charge of Marten Vinck, Opperkoopman, set out for Kandy, conveying a letter to the King from the Governor-General and Council at Batavia; in which a statement, asked for by Raja Sinha, was furnished, of the Company's expenses. But the King would come to no settlement with the Ambassador: instead of doing so he made pretexts, and proposed another embassy from himself to the Governor-General and Council. Meanwhile his relations with the Portuguese had become extremely bitter and inimical. On the 21st



December, 1640 Don Philip Mascarenhas had addressed Raja Sinha in the following insolent terms: "Know you, King of Kandy, that I have come here solely to punish the Dutch, as is done to all those who do not pay homage to their lord the King of Portugal. To the help of these Hollanders there go some people from Kandy whom I shall slay, as well as all coming from the hills: they are so worthless as to go to the help of those who have no thought but to avenge the death of their Captain at Galle, and those whom the King Don Joan caused to be killed. You must send me the friars or monks and the Portuguese as well as the renegades or Christian deserters. If you do this not, I swear by the life of the King of Portugal that I shall make the Prince of Uva King of Kandy." Here, as well as in a letter or two addressed by him to Thysz, Mascarenhas certainly shewed himself a master of bravado and insolence; but it is doubtful if these epistolary threats ever succeeded in creating awe in the breasts of his opponents. The following is a letter to Thysz dated, Colombo, 27 May 1641: "I bear in mind that you had sent me a letter by the yachts which cruised along this coast, in which you promised to visit me soon and it gave me pleasure to learn therefrom that you were my friend. These are indeed expressions for which I am much obliged. I am myself desirous of visiting you as I have before promised. In fulfilment of my promise I have already visited you in the persons of those I have previously sent to inspect the fort, and I shall not long delay to come there myself. As I am obliged to you I consider it right to tell you that it is best

to confirm one's words by deeds, that it would in honour and comfort the more redound to the security of your person to take this advantageous resolution. For I shall undoubtedly bring you under obedience to your lawful lord and King. Therefore surrender this place, and show yourself an honourable and dutiful subject without losing any credit thereby, ere I come to demolish the same with cannon. Great gifts may be expected from His Majesty who has always been accustomed thus to reward those who render him important services. For my part I promise you in his name 20,000 crusados<sup>(1)</sup> to be distributed among those you like; and if you so desire it, to retain you as Captain of the fort, and to grant you profitable villages if you remain in the Island. And if you are still drawn towards the nobility of the daughter of Dona Marianna who has arrived here, I shall procure her for your bride, and shall be much pleased to increase her bridal portion, wherein I act not only as a cavalier and soldier but also on behalf of my Lord and King. I advise you not to reject this kind courtesy in an uncivil manner, as it will not be well for you, as it fared with those at Negombo, who declined the offer made to them. If you desire to communicate with me privately on the subjects I have written about, please do so through Michael Santaman (Walraven de St. Amant) who is in the camp.

Your good friend, Philippo Mascarenhas."

(1). The *cruzado* was a Portuguese coin of a somewhat high value—equal to about 400 *reis* (reals). See Codrington, *Ceylon Coins and Currency*, p. 91 *et seq.*

Thysz's indignant reply to this was characteristic of the sturdy and intrepid soldier. Having met the Portuguese Captain-General's mock courtesies in the same strain, he proceeded to point out that Galle could not be bought for any money; but if the Portuguese desired to have it, they must come and take it by force of arms as the Dutch had done. He would therefore advise Mascarenhas to expend the 20,000 crusados he promised him in recruiting soldiers. There was no need to offer him the captaincy of Galle as he already had that honour. The daughter of Marianna, whom he was so generous as to offer him, might be given to some Portuguese horned beast. And, he added, "If you, Sir, should send me any more such letters as these I shall wreak my vengeance on you by hanging the Father Antonio d'Elagado, who is here." The letter was subscribed "Never your affectionate, Jan Thysz."

It will be seen that all this while Raja Sinha's great desire was that Colombo should be taken, and he had been urging this on his Dutch allies from time to time. They on their part were quite alive to the importance of the object and needed no persuasion, but found they had to bide their time. Quite independently of the Kandyan King, the Supreme Government at Batavia had decided to send reinforcements to Ceylon to carry on vigorous hostilities against the Portuguese. In the beginning of the year (1641) the Governor-General and Council had applied to the Directors at home for 6000 men to be sent as soon as possible, of whom 4000 were to be soldiers: but these could not be expected for at least a year. In August

and September 1641, two squadrons of 16 ships left Batavia; one, of 10 ships with 1147 men for Goa, and the other, of 6 ships with 455 for Ceylon. The former was to join the latter after accomplishing their object on the coast of India. The time seemed a favourable one for striking a blow, as, in all probability the Portuguese would not get much help from Europe in consequence of the war with Spain, which was then going on, and which required their whole fleet and all their efficient soldiers to be employed in Europe. Thus, with Goa blockaded, the superiority of the position of the Dutch in Ceylon seemed secured.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

### RAJA SINHA'S EMBASSY TO BATAVIA

[AUTHORITIES.—*Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia* (van der Chys) anno 1640-41., pp. 395-98, 406-18, and 442-44. F. H. de Vos's translation of these portions appears in the *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. II. See also *De Opkomst v. h. Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon*, by van Geer pp. 72, 73.]

In the middle of the year (1641) Raja Sinha decided to send two ambassadors with letters and presents to the Governor-General and Council at Batavia. They were conveyed in the Dutch warship "Amboina" under the command of Dominicus Bouwens. The fleet also took 10,030 lbs wax, 5234 lbs pepper, and 3 elephants with tusks, all amounting in value to fl19,860. 11. 3. They arrived at Batavia on the 26th August, 1641, and the letters and presents were duly presented to the Council. In the first letter Raja Sinha acknowledged receipt of several letters from the Governor-General and Council and excused himself for not replying to them earlier. He expressed his determination to abide by the Treaty made with Westerwold, and he dwelt on the subject of the murder of Coster, exonerating himself and his men from all blame in the matter, and attributing the calamity to the conduct of Coster himself. According to his version, the Admiral's men were the first to use arms against the King's lascarins, and these acted in self-defence. He had, however, caused the actual slayer of Coster to be hanged.

It may be mentioned that this story is in entire disagreement with that which the Dutch writers have handed down, it being firmly believed by the Dutch authorities that the King himself had authorized the assassination, and the Portuguese writers confirm this.<sup>(1)</sup> On the 2nd September 1641 the Ambassadors were admitted to audience, and a letter from the King consisting of replies *seriatim* to 31 Articles contained in the letter presented by Marten Vinck at the Embassy made by him to Kandy the previous January were considered. These articles and replies are of sufficient interest to be given here as literally as possible:—

*Article 1.*—(Exchange of courtesies).

*Art. 2.*—The King is informed of the death of the Director-General Philip Lucasz at sea on the 5th March (1640) and of the Minister Nicolaas Molineus.

*Answer.*—Raja Sinha expresses regret at the calamity. He was aware that Admiral Lucasz was very ill, and he had showed him some kindness, taking pains to procure medicines and physicians for him as long as he remained on land. But he complains of Lucasz's conduct with regard to the fulfilment of the terms of Westerwold's Treaty, which he believed would have been violated by him.

*Art. 3.*—The Governor-General and Council had learned from their commanders of their experiences and of all they had accomplished in the service of His Majesty. They believed

(1). See *ante*, p. 58.

that they would have met with greater success if their efforts had not been hindered by distrust created in the mind of the King by evil counsellors.

*Ans.*—The King attributes the want of greater success to the bad advisers of the Admiral. He (the King) had not approved of his conduct at the conquest of Negombo and therefore retired with his army. At the conquest of Galle, Admiral Coster promised to wait 12 days for his (the King's) army to come up; but reaching the place in 9 days by sea he commenced the attack by night, while the King's Captains were made to understand that it would be done in the morning. It was in consequence of this that so many Dutch soldiers had lost their lives.

*Art. 4.*—With all their splendid reinforcements the Dutch could do nothing more than capture the forts of Negombo and Galle with the loss of many officers and men.

*Ans.*—This is answered by reply to Art. 3.

*Art. 5.*—A large ship with considerable cargo for Surát and Persia was wrecked on the rocks at Negombo, and no sufficient compensation for the loss was obtained out of Negombo and Galle.

*Ans.*—This is true as regards Negombo, but nothing could be expected from such a small fort in the close vicinity of Colombo. But the King had full information of all the benefits which the Company derived at Galle.

*Art. 6.*—The only return obtained from His Majesty for all the assistance rendered during 3 years was 10 elephants, which were sold at

Palliacotta for less than 4000 pagodas<sup>(1)</sup>. For this Trincomalee was handed over to His Majesty's Commissioners.

*Ans.*—He had already explained in the letter in which he referred to the death of Admiral Coster that the collection of the great quantity of merchandise required for defraying the expenses had been put off till it could be obtained from Colombo, the low lands there being fruitful enough to gather the supplies. He (the King) had come to his city of Kandy for a perahera. Since then Don Philip Mascarenhas having obtained reinforcements had succeeded in re-capturing Negombo. Here one of his Captains, Hina Corala Bala, a man of consequence and well known in Batavia, lost his life, as well as 4 Arachchies and some Lascarins. The disordered state of the country in consequence of this is an explanation why he could not defray the expenses as he would wish to do. What he has paid up to date is as follows: in May 1638, 114 bhars of cinnamon,  $44\frac{1}{2}$  bhars wax,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  bhars pepper; in March 1639, one elephant with tusks,  $6\frac{1}{2}$  cubits, another  $6\frac{1}{4}$  cubits, 5010 lbs. wax, 44000 lbs cinnamon; in May in the same year, 2 elephants with tusks, one cow-elephant and 2 bulls; in March 1640, 11400 lbs good cinnamon, 712 $\frac{1}{2}$  ammunams arecanut; in November 1640, 430 ammunams arecanut, 3000 lbs wax. Of these 5 elephants with tusks and 5 without were given on the 12th April for the surrender of the fort of Trincomalee: the other goods were on account of expenses incurred by the Company.

(1). The value of the *pagoda* varied from time to time. At this period it appears to have been rated at 120 stuivers or 2 reals. See *ante*, p. 62, note.



*Art. 7.*—The Governor-General and Council are not prepared to render the King any further assistance, and they understand His Majesty is resolved not to apply for it before the expenses are paid.

*Ans.*—The King intended this year giving the supplies that could be collected, but the loss of Negombo and the disturbed state of the country made this impossible. If the Company would send reinforcements for the conquest of Colombo this year he would make satisfaction.

*Art. 8.*—The Governor-General and Council would wish the cinnamon, wax, pepper, elephants, tusks, etc. assessed at a reasonable rate.

*Ans.*—The King's Ambassadors will furnish a memorandum of the prices at which he will supply the commodities. He is not prepared to reduce these charges, but would rather reimburse the Company in cash. If the Portuguese had bought cinnamon at a lower price they did so from the villagers by force. He (the King) was however prepared to take less than he did from the Portuguese, as he fully appreciates the services which the Dutch had rendered him.

*Art. 9.*—It is hoped the 1000 bhars cinnamon promised for Batticaloa will soon be delivered at Negombo or Galle. The fort will then be surrendered to His Majesty.

*Ans.*—The reason why the 1000 bhars cinnamon were not delivered has already been stated. It is for this reason that what was collected at Matara has been delivered, and it is hoped as soon as the 1000 bhars are made up Batticaloa will be given over.

*Art. 10.*—Orders have been given for the removal of the military from Negombo if the King should ask for the fort ; but, provided as before that all disbursements are paid.

*Ans.*—This has already been replied to.

*Art. 11.*—It is understood that His Majesty considers it more advantageous to employ Dutch soldiers for the protection of his forts in Ceylon.

*Ans.*—The King realizes that so many soldiers are maintained in the Island for no other purpose than to be of service to him. It is true that the Dutch Company had up to date profited little by their employment ; but he will make due compensation, and will inform the Prince of Orange by Ambassadors acknowledging all the service rendered to him.

*Art. 12.*—The Company maintains more than 400 soldiers who pray to be relieved, and complain that they do not receive proper rations. So much so that many in Trincomalee and Negombo died from want of sustenance.

*Ans.*—All this was due to soldiers being quartered in some forts contrary to the King's order. He is prepared to maintain those garrisoned with his consent. The privations in Trincomalee were due to this cause, and in Negombo to the lands being so devastated as to leave nothing to be obtained for money.

*Art. 13.*—The Company would wish to be reimbursed their expenses in terms of the Treaty with Westerwold, and His Majesty could then deal with the conquered forts as he pleases.

*Ans.*—The King is pleased with this assurance. He will then grant to the Company a fort according to his judgment and will provide for it at his expense.

*Art. 14.*—It grieves the Governor-General and Council that the King should characterize the Dutch as “faithless breakers of treaties” (trouloose contract-breeckers) for having garrisoned Trincomalee and Negombo contrary to Art. 3 of Westerwold’s Treaty. Had the expenses incurred by the Dutch Company been promptly paid, such garrisoning would of course have been contrary to the Treaty; but seeing that up to date no profit has been gained, or satisfaction received for all the assistance given, there was no alternative but to act as they had done.

*Ans.*—The article in question does not state that when a fort was conquered it should remain as a hostage till the expenses were paid, or that the King should at once make satisfaction for the same. The Company does not want reimbursement in cash, but in merchandise; and this cannot be collected at once, except once a year. If payment in cash had been stipulated for there would be justification for this action, but none whatever in the existing circumstances. At any rate, when Colombo is conquered the property found there shall be equally divided and the city destroyed, as it has been the origin and mother of all the evils that have come upon this Island and on the natural kings of the same.

*Art. 15.*—The 7th Article of the Treaty has not been fulfilled by the King. (This provides for a few frigates to be built by the King, manned

by rowers, and provided with soldiers by the Dutch, for the protection of the river outlets and harbours.)

*Ans.*—The losses sustained at the hands of the Portuguese prevented the King from dealing with the merchandise and from sending out boats to export the same. This will explain why the terms of Art. 7 could not be complied with. The inability to carry out this requirement does not constitute a breach of the Treaty.

*Art. 16.*—If His Majesty desired that the Dutch Company should trust him, he should trust them on his part. They must be dealt with as honest Allies and not as slaves, if they are to be encouraged to employ their forces for the protection of His Majesty.

*Ans.*—If the King had not trusted the Dutch he would not have asked them, of all nations, to come to his help. This is indicated by his having used their assistance and treated them as friends ; although, owing to evil counsellors at the time the negotiations for the conquest of Colombo were going on, it reached the ears of the Dutch that he (the King) distrusted them and treated them as slaves.

*Art. 17.*—The Company desire that the King should supply them with the produce of his land at reasonable rates, and also permit them to trade freely in his dominions in terms of the Treaty. This has not been allowed so far, as foreigners are permitted to trade and to deprive the Company of benefits they are entitled to.

*Ans.*—The King's Ambassadors will present a memorandum of prices, but no fixed scale can be furnished as the prices must depend



on times and seasons. As regards the license to trade with the Dutch, the King has proclaimed an order giving every one liberty to trade with the Dutch without being subject to any impost. If reports had reached the Governor-General and Council that any tolls had been levied they were false. Foreigners are allowed to trade in the Island subject to the payment of harbour dues and tolls.

*Art. 18.*—The Governor-General and Council approve of the King's intention to destroy Colombo.

*Ans.*—His Majesty is pleased at this, as this city has been the mother of all the evils from which the natives of the Island have suffered.

*Art. 19.*—The Governor-General and Council appreciate the King's good-will in allowing them to possess a fort in his kingdom. They hope it will be a source of profit and advantage to the Company.

*Ans.*—The King claims the right to choose the fort which the Dutch should hold, and will see that it is such a fort as would conduce to their benefit.

*Art. 20.*—The King having granted the Company the liberty to trade everywhere in his dominions, it must be understood that the goods of their masters will have to be stored in a safe place and under proper custody, to protect them from attacks by the Portuguese who will harass the coast in small vessels.

*Ans.*—The King will see that it is a place to which the Portuguese frigates cannot come and which is secure from their attacks, and also see it placed under tolls and watched by his Dessaves to prevent any damage by the enemy.

*Art. 21.*—The Governor-General and Council would advise His Majesty not to demolish all the Portuguese forts and thus leave his kingdom exposed to danger. They think that after the Portuguese are driven away from the Island, there should be 4 forts for the protection of the country, viz., Batticaloa on the east, Galle on the south, Negombo on the west, and Jaffnapatnam on the north. They could be garrisoned with the King's subjects, or with 500 Dutch soldiers whose rations would amount to 100,000 seraphyns<sup>(1)</sup> or 1500 bhars of cinnamon a year. The Company's merchants could then at the King's pleasure resort to these forts with safety.

*Ans.*—In the Treaty with Westerwold the King did not stipulate for the maintenance of four forts. It will be remembered that in the time of King Raja Sinha of Sitavaca the Portuguese held Colombo, but the King had no need of the assistance of other nations to protect his harbours from the enemy. In like manner when one fort has been garrisoned by the Dutch soldiers, the Island will be protected as in former times.

(1). The *seraphyn* (xerafm) was rated at 1 guilder. 1,500 bhars of cinnamon were equal to 72,000 lbs. Valentyn, Vol. V *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*, p. 56.

*Art. 22.*—The Governor-General and Council recommends to His Majesty, the adoption of the scheme proposed by Director-General Lucasz in amplification of the treaty with Westerwold.

*Ans.*—The King is disinclined to do this. He was prepared to carry out Westerwold's Treaty without deviation; but he is opposed to the subsequent proposals.

*Art. 23.*—What Admiral Coster had proposed in settlement of all questions left open by the Treaty and agreed to by the King must be held binding.

*Ans.*—Since the Admiral is dead his proposals cannot now be carried out. It will be necessary to nominate another qualified person to arrange matters to the satisfaction of the Company and the King.

*Art. 24.*—The Governor-General and Council entreat His Majesty to place confidence in them, as no good can come of his being distrustful of the Dutch. They would rather break off all negotiations and retire from the Island than remain under suspicion.

*Ans.*—The King denies having distrusted the Dutch. He deprecates the idea of their leaving the Island and giving up all the good work they had begun under the Treaty. He would then fail to enjoy the advantages he had hoped to gain by the Portuguese being driven out, and the three years' labour would be in vain. The Portuguese would have their desire; they would be in possession of the forts, and the King and the Dutch would be at variance.

*Art. 25.*—It is believed that the King was induced by some of his Portuguese creatures, at the time the Director-General Lucasz was in Ceylon, to forsake the Dutch army and quarter his forces in the woods, and thus give the Portuguese much satisfaction. Nevertheless, thank God, the Dutch were able to overcome the enemy.

*Ans.*—This information is not correct. The King did not retire into the woods, but only marched his forces to a healthy spot under the shade of coconut trees closer to Colombo; and this was done not under the influence of evil counsellors, but in view of the negotiations going on between his Ambassadors at Batavia and the Dutch.

*Art. 26.*—The Dutch Company only seeks from the King the same benefits from his lands which he had rendered the King of Spain and Portugal. They understand that the Portuguese obtained from the provinces of Matara yearly 1500 bhars of fine cinnamon, 4 elephants with tusks and 30 without, and that the price for a bhar of cinnamon at Galle was not more than 15 acherefyns<sup>(1)</sup>.

*Ans.*—The King of Kotte was a brother in arms of the King of Spain and he presented the latter with the land belonging to him. These having been taken by force by the Portuguese were used as it pleased them. At present these lands belong to the King of Kandy, who being

(1). It is possible that this word is the same as *aigrefin*, the name of a coin once known in France which is said to be a corruption of the Arabic *ashrafi*, applied by the natives of India to the gold *mohur*, which may roughly be taken at 15 to 16 rupees.—See *Hobson-Jobson*.



lawful King of the land, no reference need be made to the profits derived by the Portuguese. The King is prepared to treat with the Dutch for what they desire from his lands, and to sell for cash on favourable terms or to grant in a gracious spirit what he wishes.

*Art. 27.*—The Company will gladly and thankfully receive what His Majesty is prepared to furnish them with and be in readiness to be of service to him.

*Ans.*—This has already been replied to.

*Art. 28.*—The Governor-General and Council refer to a report they had heard of an application made to the King by the servants of one Chinanna Maleye for lands at Belligam, which they advise him to refuse.

*Ans.*—The report is false; but the King maintains his rights, without violating the Treaty, to give his lands to anyone he pleases.

*Art. 29.*—Having received no further supplies and no replies to letters sent to the King, the Dutch would have to go away.

*Ans.*—The reason why no replies were sent was that the King was not able to satisfy the expenses of the Dutch. He hoped to reimburse them this year by merchandise which he had ordered to be collected, which would have been of considerable quantity, but for the country being in a state of confusion. The quantity collected is to be shipped in two vessels at present in waiting; but if not ready in time will be delivered at Batticaloa and Galle.

*Art. 30.*—The Dutch Company, as loyal Allies of the King, are prepared to render him all further assistance which he may need. They consider it very necessary that the enemy should be driven out of Colombo next year. They await His Majesty's plans.

*Ans.*—This has been assured 3 or 4 times already. Kings of the position of His Majesty do not break their royal word. He will keep the promises made by him under the Treaty. He respects the Dutch a great deal.

*Art. 31.*—In the meantime the Governor-General and Council commend to the protection of the King all the Dutch who are resident within his kingdom.

*Ans.*—The King esteems the Dutch very highly and will help and protect them in everything; although he is ashamed to say he was not able personally to assist them during the attack on the fort of Negombo by the Portuguese. Yet this was not due to his neglect. He had gone to his city of Kandy for some feasts, and during his absence the Portuguese attacked Negombo. He had told the Sergeant of the fort that in the event of being attacked they should defend the place for eight days till he could come to their aid with his force; but they surrendered in less than eight days.

At a second audience, on the 18th September, the Governor-General addressed the Ambassadors to the following purport: By the Treaty made by Westerwold with the King the Dutch Company undertook to employ their forces in driving out the Portuguese from the Island, provided that the expenses incurred by them in the enterprise were made good to them by the King



BATAVIA IN THE 17TH CENTURY.

in merchandise to be obtained in the Island. In accordance with this undertaking the enemy had already been driven out of Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Negombo, and Galle at great expense, but little of these expenses had yet been paid, and the King had so raised the prices for the goods he has to supply that it would appear he has no intention to make compensation. For instance, 110 xeraphyns for a bhar of cinnamon,

3 larins<sup>(1)</sup> for a lb of elephant tusks, 12 larins for 24 lbs wax etc. were prices which the Company could not accept. The Governor-General then drew attention to the fact that all those who from time to time had been sent to the King on embassies or otherwise were not treated as friends and ambassadors of an allied nation, but were looked upon as enemies, suspected, and detained without being allowed to communicate with any one. No one could now be found willing to proceed on such a mission and it is probable no others would be sent. The President Willem Jacobsz Coster, who had frequently imperilled his life and made sacrifices in the service of the King had been shamefully murdered, because he had somewhat passionately fought for the rights of the Company. The plea by which the blame for this catastrophe had been put on Coster himself was only a pretext and a trick of the Portuguese creatures, of whom many are secretly with the King. They had calculated on the Dutch wreaking vengeance on the King for this deed and of thus getting the treaty broken. The Governor-General, however, trusts that this was not done through any revengeful spirit on the part of His Majesty but was induced by evil advisers. As regards the reimbursement of expenses, the Governor-General sees that His Majesty now endeavours to bring into account what he had ere this freely presented to Westerwold,

(1). Mr. Codrington says that in 1640 the Dutch rated the *larin* at 10 stuivers. This *larin* must have been a silver coin, as 5 were the usual equivalent of the piece-of-eight. The piece-of-eight, the equivalent of the rix-dollar or 1 shilling and 6 pence, was popularly called by the Sinhalese *patagaya* or *ridi paha*, and these native designations still survive applied to the sum of 75 cents.—See Codrington's *Ceylon Coins and Currency*, pp. 98, 152.



Caen, Lucasz, and others, in reduction of what was due to the Company. Notwithstanding all this the Governor-General and Council had resolved to send reinforcements to Ceylon. As no succour was apparently expected at Goa from Portugal, they intended breaking up the fleet sent to blockade that fort, and to send it to Ceylon for the assistance of the King of Kandy. In reply to several points in this address the Ambassadors said they had no orders to negotiate regarding a reduction of the prices for merchandise, but would bring the matter to the notice of the King. They persisted that the murder of Coster was due to his own impertinence and wantonness. They had the King's account of the expenses and would in two or three days satisfy the Council in regard to the matter.

After this, at the end of February 1642, a letter was received at Galle from Raja Sinha again, urging the Dutch to attack Colombo, offering to send three of his Dessaves with men to aid in the enterprise and to join the forces himself in a few days. But the fitting time for such an undertaking had then gone by, as perhaps the King well knew. Had he really intended to promote the Dutch plans, he could long before this have come down with his army, having had timely intimation of the presence of the fleet before the coast. It was, however, doubted, even had he done so, and the Dutch had effected a landing and disembarked their guns, whether the King's men would have kept their ground and not left them in the lurch on encountering the enemy. Only just recently they had given

an example of their cowardice, when, being attacked by the enemy at Kalutara with a few volleys of musketry, they, although standing on the opposite side of the river, immediately took to flight.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE.

#### INEFFECTUAL EXPEDITION OF THE DUTCH.

#### BOREEL'S MISSION AND ITS FAILURE.

[AUTHORITIES.—Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*, p. 120 ;  
*De Opkomst v. h. Nederlandsch Gesag over Ceilon*, van Geer, pp. 75  
-105.]

About this time certain political events in Europe interfered, more or less, with the warlike operations in Ceylon. The Spanish domination of Portugal, known as the "Sixty Years' Captivity" (1581-1640), was brought to an end by the restoration of the Portuguese monarchy under John, Duke of Braganza, as King John IV. One of the first steps taken by the new Government was to send ambassadors to Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, with a view to establishing peace with these nations. The news of a proposed ten years' truce for the suspension of hostilities between the Portuguese and the Dutch, reached the Supreme Government at Batavia just at the time the latter was most desirous of prosecuting the war in Ceylon. Seeing that one of the chief objects of the Dutch East India Company was to capture the trade of the Portuguese, the suspension of hostilities in India and Ceylon was by no means favourable to their purpose. For one thing, when peace was established, the

Company would be deprived of the monopoly in the cinnamon trade. The Supreme Government therefore considered that this turn of events at the particular moment was most inopportune, especially as they had, as stated, just decided to concentrate all their strength on an attack on the coasts of India and Ceylon, and there was every prospect of this being successfully carried out. Yet, as no official intimation had reached them of the proposed truce, they hoped there would be time to achieve something to the advantage of the Company before their hands were tied. Although it did not seem possible even with their combined forces to drive the Portuguese entirely away, they entertained a lively hope that in the early part of the year 1642 they would acquire a better footing in the Island. On help from Raja Sinha they did not reckon, yet the Governor-General and Council wrote to the King with regard to the proposed truce, assuring him that the matter need not disquiet him, as the Company was always prepared to assist him with troops and ships when needed, and expressing the hope that he would not omit, on his part, to have a good armed force for assistance on land.

On the 26th January, 1642, two ambassadors from the Viceroy at Goa, Diego Mendes de Brito and Fr. Gonsalo de Veloso, arrived at Batavia in the Company's ships to propose a temporary cessation of hostilities in view of the treaty of peace. The Governor-General and Council declined to treat with them on the whole question of the Peace on the ground that the Viceroy had no authority to treat with any European Power; but they agreed to a temporary halt in



the hope, that, before the necessary communications could be made to the various stations, the operations on the coast of India and Ceylon would sufficiently advance. On the 14th February, 1642, came the ships from Europe, bringing a copy of the Treaty for the Supreme Government at Batavia. It was dated 12th June, 1641, but was to take effect in Europe only after its ratification by the King of Portugal arrived in Holland, and all hostilities in the overseas dominions were to be suspended a year from that date after notification at each centre. The Governor-General and Council informed the Portuguese Ambassadors that in these circumstances they could not entertain any question even of a temporary cessation of hostilities. The Ambassadors were asked to wait till further instructions were received from Europe. But these instructions were so long in coming that one of the Ambassadors, the *Padre*, took his leave and returned to Goa, and only de Britto remained to await the publication of the Truce.

According to Article 12 of the Treaty the parties were each to remain in possession of whatever territory they held at the time when the cessation of hostilities was proclaimed at the centre of the district in question, and this publication could not probably be made before the latter part of the year 1642. The Dutch therefore calculated on retaining all the conquests they would make in the earlier part of the year. Hence their anxiety to proceed with their operations. On the 16th November, 1641 the Dutch Commander Bouwens appeared before Galle with five ships and these were soon joined by three others which had been cruising along the coast of Ceylon.

Meanwhile the Portuguese kept their army, consisting apparently of 400 white troops and 2,000 natives, in the neighbourhood of Galle, being of opinion that the Dutch fleet was not strong enough to take either Negombo or Colombo, the latter place especially having been greatly strengthened. As a preliminary measure Bouwens sent a couple of his ships towards Colombo to cruise there in order to prevent any help reaching the fort. With the remainder of his fleet he proceeded to Gintota, 2 miles north of Galle, where he landed 100 men, and burnt some fortified works of the enemy he found there. As soon as the Portuguese who were encamped about Matara were apprised of this, they, in alarm that their way to Colombo would be cut off, at once assembled their troops and retreated from the vicinity of Galle to Colombo. The Dutch were thus, without much trouble, rid of the enemy's presence where they had been a continual menace to them. After this Bouwens was joined by Admiral Blaen with some ships which had come from the coast of Malacca, and the Dutch now had a fleet of 12 ships before Colombo. The supreme command of the united fleet was given to Thysz, with Blaen and Bouwens under him. An attack on Colombo was the chief thought in the minds of these commanders, but they could not yet see their way to effect this object. They had now more than 1,100 men, but of this number not more than 600 were fit for service, the rest being disabled by sickness. The Portuguese garrison, on the other hand, was particularly strong. It was calculated that they had, at this time, after being reinforced by the troops which had returned from Matara,

no fewer than 1,500 white soldiers and a great number of natives. Thysz considered that he would want not less than 2,000 to effect a successful attack on the fort, and he could place absolutely no confidence on help from Raja Sinha. In these circumstances Negombo became the aim of the fleet. Seeing that it would take him more time to proceed there with his fleet than the Portuguese would take to march there by land, Thysz hit upon a plan for misleading the enemy. This was to cruise along the coast southward as if his intention was to land between Galle and Colombo, then sail out to sea and suddenly appear before Negombo and attack the fort. The Portuguese army on shore followed these movements and went south of Colombo; but when Thysz tried to turn to the open sea, he found the winds opposed to him. So long as he kept along the coast, the Portuguese were able to watch his movements from the shore, and he could not unawares appear before Negombo. This was his only chance of attacking the fort, and he did not wish his soldiers to attempt what he feared would be a fruitless enterprise. He therefore returned to Galle. It seemed there was nothing more to do than to send a part of his fleet to cruise before Colombo, so that the Portuguese, out of fear for their capital, would send no forces into the field, and would thus leave the lands at Matara free for the cinnamon harvest to be gathered there. Another part of the fleet was sent to Batticaloa, which, as previously observed, was more a burden to the Dutch than an advantage. But they could not leave it to be re-taken by the Portuguese, nor could they give it up to



Raja Sinha till he had made good the whole promised 1,000 bhars of cinnamon. The garrison of Galle was now strengthened to 450 men.

Thus the expedition to Ceylon, on which the Supreme Government had placed such great hopes, brought no advantage to the Company. Neither Colombo nor Negombo had been taken, and the only change in the situation effected by the presence of the fleet was that the Portuguese were obliged to leave the neighbourhood of Galle. The Dutch cast a great deal of blame for this failure on Raja Sinha, as he had been informed in time of their plans and urgently requested by Thysz to come to his assistance; but he remained in the interior, paying no attention to these demands. Yet he had been persistent in urging the Dutch to attack and take Colombo. There is no doubt that the expedition would have met with better success if the Dutch forces had been to some extent supported on land by native soldiers. The Dutch also blamed Raja Sinha for the failure to obtain supplies of cinnamon during the year 1642. So long as the fleet cruised along the coasts of Ceylon, the Portuguese kept within the walls of Colombo, and during that time the cinnamon harvest in the neighbourhood of Galle might have been gathered without hindrance; but the moment the fleet left for Coromandel the danger which threatened their fort was removed and the Portuguese again invaded the country around Matara. A Dessave of the King, who, late, had been sent to collect cinnamon there, fled to the hill country on the approach of the enemy, driving before him all the inhabitants of the villages with their cattle and household goods. The Dutch could not send another fleet



to proceed with the war, as the arrival of the report of the ratification of the Treaty was daily expected, and any hostilities begun would have to be stopped within a time too short for any successful attack on Colombo. In these circumstances it was decided to take no action, in the hope that when the peace was proclaimed, the Portuguese would, according to its terms, at least leave the neighbourhood of Galle.

On the 2nd October, 1642, arrived the ship "Salamander" from Europe, bringing the ratification of the Treaty by the King of Portugal on the 18th November, 1641, and that by the States General of the United Netherlands on the 22nd February, 1642. With this came orders from the Directors of the East India Company to the Governor-General and Council to proclaim the Truce as soon as possible in all parts of India. This was done in Batavia on the 7th October, but the order could not be so quickly carried out in the remaining stations in the East. Article 12 of the Treaty, to which reference has already been made, declared that both parties should remain in possession of the land they held at the time the Truce was proclaimed in the province or district ; and the apportionment of these lands was left to be settled by the Dutch and Portuguese authorities in India, viz., the Supreme Government at Batavia and the Viceroy at Goa. The negotiations which followed in pursuance of this decree gave rise to endless trouble and disagreement. In Ceylon, the Dutch, possessing the fort of Galle, considered they had the undoubted right to the lands surrounding it. These included the districts of Matara and Saffregam—a strip of land 30 miles in length

and 10 to 12 miles in breadth. This, they regarded as attached to and within the jurisdiction of the fort of Galle. In this belief they expected that as soon as the peace terms were known the Portuguese would vacate this territory; but Thysz was at once made to understand by the Portuguese who were in occupation that there would be no evacuation, as the Portuguese did not consider these lands an appendage to the fort of Galle. As their deputy to confer with the Viceroy the Supreme Government at Batavia chose Pieter Boreel, a Member of the Council of India. His instructions were to make the delivery of the lands in question surrounding Galle the condition on which the proclamation would be made. If the Portuguese refused to vacate the lands the Dutch were to proceed with the war, not only in the Island of Ceylon, where the difference arose, but over the whole of India. Boreel left Batavia on the 21st October, and having touched at Malacca and Batticaloa on the way, reached Galle on the 3rd February, 1643. He brought with him a letter from the Governor-General and Council for Raja Sinha, which was at once despatched. In this letter the King was informed that although in the previous year the Dutch had declared themselves ready to support the King with forces, they were prevented from doing this, as they had not yet received payment for the expenses which they had incurred on his account. His debt to them still amounted to 473,589 reals of eight or a million guilders<sup>1</sup>. They advised him in the meantime, to enter into a temporary peace with the Portuguese, as they, the Dutch,

(<sup>1</sup>). See *antè*, p. 81, note.

themselves were doing, because in the existing circumstances this seemed the course of greatest benefit to him and his kingdom.

Boreel found on arrival at Galle that the Portuguese under de Motha Galvao were encamped at a distance of two miles from Galle, at a place in the middle of morasses so fortified by nature that Thysz found no means of driving them away. From this camp they continually ravaged the whole neighbourhood and prevented all transport of provisions into Galle. Boreel's request to de Motha to vacate the lands being met with a peremptory refusal, he sent the Opperkoopman Marten Vinck as his emissary to Colombo to interview the Captain-General Mascarenhas. But the latter only supported the position taken by de Motha and expressed surprise that the cessation of hostilities had not been proclaimed in Galle. He was still more surprised at the reason alleged for this. He declared that the Dutch could not claim the lands at Matara and Saffregam, as the cinnamon fields were the exclusive property of the Portuguese, conquered by them in the course of time from the Princes of the land. The Dutch had taken the fort of Galle but not the lands surrounding it. These lands probably, in former times, came under the jurisdiction of Galle; but all the old rights relating to Galle had become void, and the fort had now become only a redoubt to protect the harbour. For a long time Colombo was the only stronghold which commanded the whole Portuguese territory, and on which all the cinnamon fields depended. Vinck pointed out that the Dutch had conquered the provinces of Matara and Saffregam in the



name of Raja Sinha, and that they had persistently resisted the Portuguese occupation of the lands, which were only invaded by them as a flying camp; for they were quick enough to break up and vacate them as soon as Colombo was threatened the previous year. But Mascarenhas was obdurate, and, in defiance, offered to buy back Galle for a good price, as the fort could be of little use to the Dutch standing alone. Boreel on receipt of the report from Vinck resolved to leave for Goa and meet the Viceroy. Just before his departure from Galle, on the 26th February, 1643, a letter was received from Raja Sinha in reply to the one sent to him from Batavia. The King agreed that in the existing circumstances it would be advantageous to him to stay hostilities against the Portuguese; but he wished it clearly understood that the Portuguese were to give up to him the lands at Matara and Saffregam.

The negotiations with the Viceroy began on the 5th April and lasted till the 22nd, but they ended in no better result than the conference with Mascarenhas in Colombo. The Viceroy, after entering into the question of the interpretation of certain terms in the Treaty, maintained that the lands in question were to remain as Portuguese territory and could not be given up. Boreel pointed out that although the Portuguese had the cinnamon lands in their possession, yet the King of Kandy had the overlordship of them, and he had hypothecated the lands of Matara and Saffregam to the Company for the amount that he was indebted to it. As the King had declared his willingness to join in the Truce, the Portuguese could not in justice hold back these



lands. The Viceroy refused to recognize the overlordship of the King of Kandy or his right, being a heathen potentate, to join in the European peace. It was now only left to Boreel to declare, that, in view of the refusal of the Portuguese to give up the lands, he would not proclaim the Truce at Goa. But he hoped that, if he could not bring the Viceroy to accede to the full demands of the Dutch, he would yet be able to induce him to agree to some practical solution of the difference between them, whereby the Company would be saved from the utter loss which they would otherwise sustain. So, on his own responsibility, with no warrant for it from the Supreme Government at Batavia, he proposed what he considered a reasonable compromise. It was that, leaving the final decision to the two respective Sovereign Powers in Europe, the terms of Article 12 of the Treaty should be held to apply to the country which lay between the two forts, Colombo and Galle, and that the lands which should be reckoned as belonging to Galle be equally divided between the Dutch and the Portuguese; that when the price of the cinnamon had been fixed, each party should receive one half of the yield. The Viceroy was not prepared even to enter into this compromise. He could only consent to the Dutch Company occupying so much land outside Galle as lay within a cannon shot from the fort, and nothing more. Boreel now found his patience at an end and made no further effort to move him. He

quickly took his leave, and, going on board, ordered anchor to be weighed at once. Then, the hoisting of the red flag (*bloed vlag*) and the discharge of a number of rounds from the guns of the ships, announced to the fleet that the Dutch had renewed the war.

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## CHAPTER X.

### RE-CONQUEST OF NEGOMBO BY FRANCOIS CARON.

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#### MAATZUYKER'S MISSION.

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### PROCLAMATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE PORTUGUESE.

[AUTHORITIES.—*De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon*, van Geer, pp. 111-135 ; Correspondence between Raja Sinha and the Dutch, edited and annotated by Donald Ferguson, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.*, Vol. XVIII pp. 181-88 ; Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. Ceylon*, Chap. XLI p. 143 ; Ribeiro, *Fatalidade Historica*, Liv. II. chaps. XIV-XVI. (Lee's Trans., pp. 103-5 ; Pieris' pp. 303-13). See also Extract from a Diary, 15, April, 1644, *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. II. pp. 84-5.]

The unfavourable result of Boreel's mission reached Batavia. The Supreme Government had long decided that in the event of the Portuguese refusing to give up to the Company the lands at Galle which they unlawfully held, they would renew the war throughout the whole of India. Ample drafts of ships and soldiers, which they had repeatedly applied for from the Fatherland, at length arrived ; and they were now in a position to equip a second fleet consisting of 9 ships with a crew of 1,550 to be sent to Ceylon. This fleet was placed under the command of Francois Caron, a member of the Council of India ; and the war against the Portuguese was renewed. The Governor-General and Council cherished


great expectations from this expedition. They believed that this fleet, united, if necessary, with that of Blocq, who was before Goa, was fully equal to conquer not only Negombo, but also Colombo. The help of Raja Sinha was considered wholly unnecessary, and they would not ask for it, but merely write and inform him that the war would proceed, a great fleet having come over to carry on operations. Yet they were waging the war in the name of the King of Kandy, in which they felt they were perfectly justified, as the Portuguese had definitely refused to accept this King as a party to the Truce. They decided that if the Truce were established they would not give up any of the acquisitions they would now make.

After the departure of Boreel for Goa there was a temporary suspension of hostilities at Galle, and the Portuguese made a show of friendship, although they still held the country round Galle, and stood in the way of the Dutch obtaining any provisions. But, as soon as the news arrived that Boreel's demands were not acceded to at Goa, the suspension was considered at an end. The Portuguese then prepared to carry out a plan they had in view, viz., to make themselves master of the village of Belligam, south of Galle, and, after fortifying the place, to establish themselves in it. When this reached the ears of Thysz he quickly sent out 320 soldiers to be beforehand to frustrate their plan. But again it appeared that in the open field the Dutch were at a disadvantage against the enemy. On the 7th May, 1643, at Akuressa in the neighbourhood of Belligam, the Dutch troops, by their own imprudence, fell into an ambuscade laid for them



by the Portuguese. In the fight which ensued, the Dutch lost nearly 100 men, of whom some were killed and some taken prisoner and conveyed to Colombo.

The loss of the Portuguese was not ascertained. Thysz sent no more men into the field and decided to await the arrival of Caron. The latter appeared before Galle on the 30th September, and Thysz, along with Marten Vinck, proceeded to meet him with 300 soldiers in two



*2 Miles to inch*

PLAN OF SKIRMISH AT AKURESSA


ships which lay in the Galle harbour, with a view to discussing the plans best calculated to do damage to the Portuguese. Caron decided, first of all, to seize possession of the disputed lands surrounding Galle, and to this end to land his whole force, numbering 1,400 men, in the neighbourhood of Galle. Then, as soon as possible, they were to march eastward in order to surprise the Portuguese army and entirely destroy it if they could. Succeeding in this, the conquest of Colombo, would be an easy matter. The Portuguese, however, were on their guard. De Motha Galvao

had assembled together the whole of his force, which consisted of 500 or 600 men, and made them take up a strong position in a plain surrounded by deep morasses. Caron in vain attempted to reach them, and when, after several days, he succeeded in finding a passage to the Portuguese encampment and penetrated there, he found the place empty. The Portuguese had gone away along a road known only to themselves. Caron immediately returned with his troops to Galle. He perceived that the Portuguese army would try as soon as possible to reach Colombo, and that he must therefore take care to be before them. On the 1st January, 1644, he had his whole force re-embarked, and the fleet sailed along the coast to Colombo. But here again fortune did not favour him. The Portuguese force, escaping from the neighbourhood of Galle, succeeded by quick marches in reaching Colombo in safety. This exploit was performed through the skill of their commander Anthonio de Motha Galvao. Having, with much difficulty, reached the coast between Galle and Colombo, they found themselves at a point just opposite where the Dutch fleet was at the moment. They took care to keep pace with the fleet; so that at the same time that the ships appeared before Colombo, the gates of the fort opened to receive de Motha and his men.

The Portuguese, full of confidence in the strength of Colombo, rightly surmised that Negombo would be the object of attack of the Dutch. They strongly fortified this place and increased the garrison to 500 men; a force, which, with the armed Burghers and the natives in the

town, was considered amply sufficient to resist any attack. To Negombo were sent two of their best commanders, Anthonio de Mascarenhas, predecessor and brother of the Governor of Colombo, and Antonio de Motha Galvao, who had just, with great prudence, effected a safe retreat from Galle. When the Dutch fleet approached, de Motha's advice was that the enemy ought to be prevented from landing. This might have been done easily ; but Anthonio de Mascarenhas was of a different opinion. He insisted that the Dutch ought to be allowed to land, so that they could be put to rout in a body. The result was that on the night of the 3rd January, 1644, Caron was able, without any difficulty, to land his whole army. The following morning he marched to Negombo, where he soon came up with the Portuguese, who intended to give battle outside the walls of the fort. Apparently ignorant of the number of their enemy, the Portuguese fell on the Dutch forces with great impetuosity, but quickly retreated when they saw their inferiority. Thus was the victory secured for the Dutch. In the conflict which followed, not only was the best part of the Portuguese army vanquished, but the two brave Generals, Don Anthonio de Mascarenhas and Antonio de Motha Galvao, lay dead on the battlefield. When the few remaining Portuguese rushed in through the gates of the fort, the Dutch also forced themselves in without difficulty. Those in the town still offered resistance, but to no purpose. Caron ordered the houses from which they shot on his soldiers to be set on fire, and when the fire reached the powder magazine, it blew up, entirely destroying a great part of the

town. Within three hours Caron was thus able to win a battle and to capture a fort. Only 52 of his men were killed and 140 wounded. The loss of the Portuguese was enormous: no fewer than 300 of their soldiers were dead, while 150 were made prisoner. The remaining 50 were able to take flight to Colombo. Half way they met a detachment of 300 soldiers which Philippò de Mascarenhas was sending to the help of his



DUTCH PIKEMAN.


brother. These, on meeting the fugitives, had to turn back to Colombo, crest fallen and disappointed, to carry to the Captain-General the news of the doleful calamity.

After the conquest of Negombo Caron spent some days in repairing the fortress, which had become a heap of ruins by the fire and the blowing up of the powder magazine. Then, leaving 100 men as a garrison, he marched with his remaining force, of about 1,100 towards Colombo. The fleet also proceeded along the coast. Half way, when they reached a river, the forces on land



were held up by a party of Portuguese who had marched to meet them from Colombo. In vain Caron tried to drive them away by a heavy artillery fire; they would not turn back—not even when the fleet arrived before Colombo and began an attack. As it appeared impossible to reach the other side of the river, and the fleet unaided could not accomplish much, the Dutch force was obliged to turn back to Negombo. Caron now gave up his plan of attacking Colombo, and devoted his attention to the strengthening of Negombo, which he feared the Portuguese would try to re-conquer as soon as the greater part of his men were withdrawn from the neighbourhood. The bulwarks, which the Dutch had put up in 1640, were now completely removed and broken up, and outside the stone fort, a square earthen wall was raised, protected with tree trunks and provided at the four points with bastions. During two months, in spite of the heat, the workmen were constantly busy on the wall and the moat. The work would have been done more quickly had Caron received the help which he expected from the Sinhalese; but during this expedition they failed to give any assistance at all. It is true Raja Sinha had sent 2,000 Sinhalese towards the coast; but this clearly was with the object of garrisoning Negombo, when the Dutch should give up the fort to him. Caron had no intention of doing anything of the kind, for Raja Sinha had yet failed to pay anything towards their expenses, and, to all demands which Caron made, he either replied not at all or made evasions and pretences. The King declared that the strengthening of Negombo by no means found favour with him,





*From Baldeus*

NEGOMBO.

and he forbade his subjects to help the Dutch in any way whatever. The Sinhalese army thus remained idle close by Negombo, and it was with difficulty that Caron curbed his anger against them.

By the beginning of March the defences of Negombo were nearly complete, and a garrison of 500 was placed in the fort under the command of Pieter Vincboons, a clever engineer who had come with Caron from Batavia. Caron left for Galle on the 4th March, where he arrived on the 11th following. He decided to increase the garrison of Galle to 900 men, believing that the Portuguese could thus be prevented from falling on the surrounding lands, and that Thysz would be able, in his turn, to make incursions in the direction of Colombo. A part of the fleet was also ordered to cruise between Galle and Negombo. With the remaining ships Caron sailed away to Batavia. The chief result of the success which had now attended the Dutch arms was that the Viceroy, Count d'Aveires, was at last disposed to come to some terms in regard to the lands at Galle. He addressed a letter to the Supreme Government at Batavia on the 8th April, 1644, in which he consented to the terms which Boreel had proposed the previous year, on the condition that everything in Ceylon was restored to the state in which it was at the time the Truce ought to have been proclaimed in India. He further stipulated that whatever had been taken from the Portuguese in the interval should be restored to them. Needless to say this did not satisfy the Dutch authorities. It is true that the lands surrounding Galle would now come into their undisputed possession ; but the Viceroy had refused



to accede to their demand for these when it was first made, and the subsequent conquests were the result of the stubbornness on the part of the Portuguese. The Dutch considered themselves justified in keeping these conquests, at any rate on the basis that the war was waged by them on behalf of the King of Kandy. The reply of the Governor-General and Council of India to the proposal of the Viceroy was to send another embassy to deal with him in the matter. Joan Maatzuyker, who that year had become a Member of the Council, was chosen for this mission. His instructions were similar to those given to Boreel the previous year. Only on the condition that the Viceroy agreed to their terms would the Government at Batavia cause the proclamation of the peace. To these terms was now added the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Negombo and its dependent lands. Maatzuyker sailed from Batavia on the 10th August, 1644, with a fleet of 10 ships and 2,049 men under the command of Klaas Kornelisz Blocq, and arrived at Galle in the beginning of September. He found that the fear which had been entertained that the Portuguese would endeavour to re-capture Negombo was by no means groundless. Early in 1644, d'Aveires had received considerable reinforcements from Portugal and was in a position to send some 8 or 9 large ships with 400 soldiers to Ceylon with a view to re-take Negombo. These troops were immediately marched to Negombo under the command of Fernando de Mendosa, and arriving there on the 27th May, they began an uninterrupted cannonade on the fortress. Fortunately for the Dutch, the defences had been greatly improved after they captured the

place, and they were not behindhand in answering the fire of the enemy, taking care that any damage done to the works by day was speedily repaired by night. A month passed in this way, and the Portuguese were still far from their goal. The letter by which Mendosa demanded the surrender of the fort was scornfully returned to him by



GRENADIER.

Vincboons. The Portuguese at first shot with grenades filled with squibs, but these could do little damage, as they spread scarcely a foot on explosion. They then adopted other methods which proved more effectual: and it seemed as if the stone fort would soon become a heap of *débris*. It was then that Caron's great forethought in building the strong earth wall before

his departure became manifest. If this had not been done the besiegers would easily have re-conquered the fortress, as the garrison, through sickness, had been reduced to not more than 100 men. When the Portuguese at last found that the 7,000 bullets which they shot into the fort from the 27th May to the middle of July failed to gain them any advantage, they decided to storm the fort. On the 23rd July Mendosa got his whole force to rush on the walls. This was done three times, but his soldiers were repeatedly driven back with great loss. While the Dutch on this occasion lost, at the most, only 25 dead and 60 wounded, the loss of the Portuguese, according to their own account, was no less than 568. The foremost officers, and among them, Mendosa himself, lay dead on the field. The storming of the 23rd July reduced their forces to less than half the number with which they began the attack. At the end of June, Thysz had sent 580 men to the vicinity of Colombo in order to compel the Portuguese to raise the siege of Negombo, and Philippo Mascarenhas found it necessary to call his army back; so, by the middle of August, the remainder of the Portuguese troops broke up their camp round Negombo and left the fortress free from danger.<sup>1</sup>

It was a month later that Maatzuyker appeared before Galle with his fleet, as already stated; and a few days after, he sailed for Goa in prosecution of his mission to the Viceroy. His negotiations with the latter began on the 13th October, and resulted in a treaty, of which the

<sup>1</sup>Further details of the Portuguese efforts to take Negombo will be found in the Diary of W. G. de Jonge on board the "Delfthaven," 7 April, 1644.—See *Ceylon Lit. Reg.* II p. 68.



foremost provisions were the following : (1.) the division of the cinnamon lands between Galle and Colombo was to be made in terms of Boreel's interpretation of Article 12 of the Treaty of 1641, i.e., by a line drawn at an equal distance from the two forts ; (2.) Negombo was to be given up by the Portuguese, and the boundary line between the lands belonging to that fort and Colombo was to be drawn in a manner similar to that towards Galle ; (3.) the produce of the lands was to be held in trust by the Dutch till the final decision of the Sovereigns in Europe was received ; (4.) the proprietors and lessees of the villages should be allowed again to take possession of their holdings, and within 6 months therefrom deliver to the Dutch the same produce which they had been accustomed to yield to the Portuguese ; (5.) they were also to be allowed the free exercise of their religious rites, except in the open country and within the Dutch forts. The Viceroy also withdrew his objection to Raja Sinha being included in the Peace Treaty. The whole text of the Treaty, signed by the Viceroy and Maatzuyker, of which the foregoing is an extract, will be found in Baldeus' *Malabar and Coromandel*, pp. 91 and 92.

Thysz had just sent a detachment of 200 men towards Colombo before the news of the agreement between the Viceroy and Maatzuyker reached him. He then immediately called it back and decided to go to Colombo and interview Mascarenhas with regard to the division of the produce of the cinnamon fields. Mascarenhas, he found, was in no way pleased with what had taken place between d'Aveires and Maatzuyker at Goa. He was prepared to raise objections.



But when Maatzuyker appeared at Negombo, and, taking matters in hand, sent the *Padre* de Veloso, the Viceroy's representative, to Colombo, he had to give in. Nothing now stood in the way of the division of the cinnamon lands, and this took place at once. It was agreed, however, that between Colombo and Negombo the division was not to be by a direct line, but according to the Korales, as that was better calculated to facilitate the exercise of jurisdiction. The boundary between Colombo and Galle was to be the Alicam river. As soon as this division was agreed to, the Truce was publicly proclaimed in Colombo, and a few days later in Galle and Negombo.

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## CHAPTER XI.

### RAJA SINHA'S TACTICS.

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THYSZ DECLARES WAR AGAINST HIM.

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THE KING'S MEN ATTACK THE DUTCH  
NEAR NEGOMBO AND SLAY THEIR  
COMMANDER ADRIAAN VAN DER STEL.

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MAATZUYKER ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT.  
HIS EARLY CAREER.

[AUTHORITIES.—Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*, pp. 121, 122; Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch, edited by Donald Ferguson, *Journal of the R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XVIII, p. 189; *Dagh-Register v. h. Casteel Batavia* (van der Chys), anno 1644-45, pp. 301, 302; *Beknopte Historie van de Gebeurtenissen op Ceilon*, (Dutch original), pp. 376—78, of which an English translation, somewhat imperfect, appears in the *Journal R. A. S., C. B.*, Vol. XI pp. 35-46; *De Opkomst v. h. Nederlandsch Gezag over Ceilon*, van Geer, pp. 136-153. See also Johan von der Behr's *Account of Ceylon* in 1644-49 reproduced in the *Ceylon Literary Register*. Vol. VI p. 98. For an account of Maatzuyker's career see *Leven der Gouverneurs General van Nederlands India*, Du Bois, Vol. XX. pp. 169, 246.]

While the negotiations were going on in Ceylon and Goa between the Dutch and the Portuguese with regard to the Peace Treaty between the two Powers, it would appear as if both parties had put Raja Sinha somewhat aside in their deliberations. But the Dutch at any rate had hardly for a moment lost sight of the fact that he would sooner or later have to be reckoned with. They had come here at his request to help him to get rid of the Portuguese, although they had also their own interests to serve.

They had need of the produce of the country, to procure which they had gone to great labour and expense ; and the Portuguese stood in the way of their obtaining this. Raja Sinha could help them to do so, or, if he were so disposed, could prevent them or put obstacles in their way. So long as the war against the Portuguese was the bond which united the King and the Dutch, the understanding between them was clear enough; but once these hostilities ceased, their position towards each other would naturally be completely changed. The Dutch would then no longer render the King the service for which he wanted them, and he, on his part, would be relieved of all obligation to supply them with merchandise. The friendly feeling between them, of which there was much profession at first, if it ever existed, could now be the only motive for the King to satisfy the demands of the Dutch ; but it had very much cooled of late. The Dutch had, against the wishes of the King, kept possession of the Portuguese forts which they had conquered, and he looked upon this as a violation of the contract between them, which he much resented. On the other hand, Raja Sinha had given the Dutch little or no support in their strife against the Portuguese, and he did not provide their garrisons with the necessities for their maintenance : moreover he had paid nothing of any consequence towards the settlement of his debt to them for services rendered, which amounted to nearly 14 tons of gold. Yet their policy was to keep well with him by pretending friendship even when he had given them cause for bitter resentment and revenge ; as, in the instance of the murder of Coster. They

had begun to realize early in the course of their dealing with him, that, while he was willing to accept their help against the Portuguese, he had no desire to let them have the promised merchandise, being in the hope that they would be compelled in the end to leave the country of their own accord. Realizing this, the Supreme Government at Batavia at once saw the necessity for making preparations to reimburse themselves for their expenses by establishing the means of obtaining the merchandise themselves, without relying on Raja Sinha's fulfilment of his promises. The plan which suggested itself to them was the occupation of the cinnamon lands in the manner the Portuguese had done till then. This could only be done, while the war lasted, by occupying them in the name of the King and by seizing the opportunity afterwards to appropriate the lands and bring them under the dominion of the Company. As a preparatory measure they sent Thysz instructions to win over the villagers to enter the service of the Company, and to take those who were disposed to do so under his protection. No sooner had Thysz proceeded to carry out these instructions, in a quiet and friendly manner, than Raja Sinha saw clearly what effect it was likely to have; and he took measures to frustrate the designs of the Dutch. Without at first letting his displeasure be known, he sent confidential agents to Galle and Negombo to persuade all the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of those places to go into the interior, and, if necessary, to compel them to do so. He then went on to hinder and destroy the cinnamon harvest by getting lawless armed bands to invade the lands, ostensibly without his knowledge. The



Dutch were wise enough to see that they could not openly or directly oppose these tactics. So they themselves devised a plan of dissimulation by which to attain their object. Pretending not to know that these gangs of ruffians had been sent by Raja Sinha, they prepared to fight them as "highway robbers and outlaws" in the name of the King, and to declare that they would save the cinnamon harvests with a view to enable the King to discharge his debt to the Company. Raja Sinha, could not, without laying himself open to the charge of gross unfairness and ingratitude towards the Company, plead that these robbers and outlaws had been sent by him: he was obliged passively to suffer the Dutch to wage a war against him in his own name. At the same time, to secure themselves against opposition from the Portuguese, Maatzuyker was charged by the Governor-General and Council, after the peace had been proclaimed in Ceylon, to enter into an agreement with the Portuguese for the protection of their mutual possessions in the Island. The latter were willing to do this, especially in view of the stipulation in the Treaty of Goa that the lands of Negombo were to be held by the Dutch only in deposit till the final decision of the Sovereign Powers in Europe was known. So, on the 9th March, 1645, an agreement was signed at Galle, between Maatzuyker, as deputy for the Supreme Government at Batavia, and Fr. Gonçalo de Veloso as representative of the Viceroy, by which the Dutch and the Portuguese were to render each other help against the "invasion, robbery and infestation" of the cinnamon fields by "Ceylon folk whosoever they may be or by whomsoever sent."

There was no mention here of the name of Raja Sinha, but the agreement bound both the parties not to enter into any contract with the King against each other. The agreement was to hold good till the final decision from Europe arrived.

Thysz, in pursuance of the instructions he received, first endeavoured to bring under the protection of the Company, the inhabitants of the cinnamon lands, of whom a great number had been dispersed during the war and most of them driven into the interior by Raja Sinha, but a few of whom remained. To defend these against the robbers and invaders and to induce them and others to come and settle in their dwellings, he sent 300 men from the garrison of Negombo and 450 out of Galle into the field. He leased out the produce of the villages in the districts of Galle and Negombo to the natives who had submitted, in the same manner as had been done by the Portuguese formerly, and these lessees were to deliver yearly a specified quantity of cinnamon and other produce. These cinnamon lands were soon inhabited, and the Company had a fair prospect of their plans maturing. It was possible to estimate the yield of the cinnamon harvest for the year at 800 bhars, equal to 348,000 lbs. The elephant hunt was also begun, and, in a short time, 10 animals were caught in the neighbourhood of Galle, with a probability of the yearly number of 30 being reached. A profitable trade was also expected in precious stones, which abounded in the hilly part of Sabaragamuwa, as Raja Sinha had shown no inclination to oppose this.

Just when these favourable prospects in Ceylon gave the Company every hope of prosperity from their intercourse with the Island, an event occurred which, as it were at a stroke, dashed this hope to the ground. This was the declaration of open war against Raja Sinha by Thysz on behalf of the Governor-General and Council of India. There has been much controversy over this action on the part of Thysz. That he received no authority for it from the Supreme Government at Batavia is a positive fact; far from this, his action was met by them not with surprise only but with consternation. They had no desire at this juncture to get into loggerheads with the King of Kandy, but, on the contrary, to be on the best of terms with him. It will be remembered that before sailing away from Galle, Maatzuyker had entered into an agreement with the Portuguese by which the two parties bound themselves to protect their mutual possessions against the lawless bands which were devastating the cinnamon lands. Whatever their intention was, no mention was made of any hostility against Raja Sinha. On the 25th May, 1645, Thysz appears to have been provoked to make proclamation of this agreement, and in doing so, in the name of the Governor-General and Council of India, to word it with direct reference to the King of Kandy, in the following form: "henceforth in future they were to carry on all acts of enmity, offence, and hostility against the subjects of the King of Kandy and their property and to do every damage to them wherever or however they could." This was nothing more or less than a declaration of war. Thysz explained that he had been prevailed upon to do




this by the Portuguese. If this were so then their object was clear enough, for nothing would suit their purpose better than an open war between the King and the Dutch. But yet Thysz's conduct appeared to the Supreme Government to be somewhat inexplicable; for he had well known their plans, had advised them thereto, and had even proceeded to carry them out with some success. It was seen at once that this blunder of Thysz, as the authorities at Batavia looked upon it, would lead to serious consequences. The King would now, instead of small bands surreptitiously let loose, openly send a great force to the cinnamon fields; to protect which, the Company would be obliged to keep a larger number of troops than hitherto, and at great expense. But this was not the only trouble which the Dutch foresaw. So long as they were on amicable terms with Raja Sinha, even ostensibly, they could take and hold the lands surrounding Negombo as agents of the King. They could not urge this plea, when they were themselves at war with him. In terms of the Treaty at Goa they were holding these lands for themselves till the decision of the Sovereigns in Europe was known, and on that depended whether they were to continue in possession or not. The decision was now shortly expected, and they were faced by the possibility of the Portuguese pressing for a restoration of Negombo.

In this dilemma the Supreme Government at Batavia could see but one means of remedying the mistake made, and that was to send to Ceylon without delay an "experienced, bold, and discreet person" to throw oil on troubled waters. Their choice fell on Joan Maatzuyker, who was charged



to take all steps to bring about a reconciliation with Raja Sinha ; to make it clear to him that the declaration of war was made entirely without the knowledge of the Governor-General and Council and against their express wishes ; and also, in the hope that that would go some way to appease the King, to remove Thysz from his post at once and send him to Batavia. When Maatzuyker arrived at Galle on the 17th April, 1646, he found that the war had already broken out. Just before his arrival Raja Sinha had sent a hostile force into the district of Negombo, which was driven away without difficulty by the Company's troops sent out by the Commandant of Negombo ; but in this expedition 4 elephants, the personal property of Raja Sinha, had been caught and taken. Enraged beyond measure at this, which he looked upon as a personal insult to himself, Raja Sinha made a second attack with a much larger force. The Dutch troops were this time driven back and closed in, in a village called Hegari, where they had entrenched themselves, and a detachment of 143 men with 2 cannon was despatched at the King's request to withdraw them peacefully and orderly ; but these were attacked and completely destroyed by Raja Sinha with an overwhelming force, as if they had come with offensive intentions. Their Commander Adriaan van der Stel was slain and many soldiers taken prisoner. Raja Sinha, proud of his achievement, tauntingly sent to the Dutch Commandant at Negombo the head of the unfortunate van der Stel in a silken bag, and when,

shortly afterwards, the band of men who had sheltered themselves at Hegari were also obliged to give themselves up, he returned to Kandy in triumph with nearly 500 prisoners.<sup>(1)</sup>



SCENE OF VAN DER STEL'S DISASTER.

Maatzuyker found his task of endeavouring to appease the enraged monarch after these events by no means an easy one. To none of his letters to the King written during the months of May and June could he obtain any reply. Nor did the dismissal of Thysz, who set sail to Batavia on the 24th May, or the removal of Nicolaas

(1) "Hegari" or "Hegerri" is the name given in the *Beknopte Historie*, p. 378, and by Jurgen Anderson in his *Reisbeschryving*, of the place where the massacre took place. No other writer supplies this information; but "Panare" is mentioned in a letter of Raja Sinha to Maetzuycker, 21 May, 1646, as the camp from which the troops were to be withdrawn. Probably the places, which it is difficult to identify, were in the vicinity of each other.

Overschie, the Commandant of Negombo, seem to have made any impression on the King's mind. Thysz's subsequent career in the Company's service has no connection with Ceylon, but it is of interest to know that he did not long remain in disgrace for an act, which, at the worst, appears to have been committed under great provocation. He was raised to the rank of Extraordinary Councillor of India in 1656 and held this rank for twelve years, being in the meantime appointed to the post of President of the Court of Magistrates at Batavia. His successor in the Government of the Dutch Possessions in Ceylon, Joan Maatzuyker, was a man of a somewhat different stamp from him. He was an accomplished scholar and a great statesman. Born in Amsterdam in 1606, although his family had been chiefly seated in Haarlem, he finished his education in the University of Louvain, at that time one of the principal seats of learning in Europe: of which Erasmus records as a common saying, "no one could graduate at Louvain without knowledge, manners, and age." Here Maatzuyker took his degree of Doctor of Laws. He is said to have been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith, and it has been even mentioned that he was a Jesuit; but this can scarcely be credited when it is considered how strongly opposed to Roman Catholicism in any shape were all the agencies of the Dutch East India Company. In 1635 he sailed for the East Indies, having been appointed pensionary or chief magistrate of Batavia, and he filled in succession several offices, chiefly judicial, at the Indian Headquarters. In 1641 he was made an Extraordinary Councillor of India and three years later promoted Ordinary

Councillor. We have seen that in 1644 he was entrusted with the special mission to Goa to treat with the Portuguese Viceroy on the question of the delimitation of boundaries ; and now, in 1646, he was appointed Governor of Ceylon, the first to bear that title, for his two predecessors were named President.

While Maatzuyker's efforts to bring about amicable relations with Raja Sinha had thus far proved futile, the event occurred of which the Dutch had so long been apprehensive. The Portuguese demanded the restoration of Negombo. On the 27th March, 1645, independently of the Treaty of Goa, a treaty was signed at The Hague between the Ambassador for Portugal and the States General, by which it was stipulated, *inter alia*, that the lands of Galle should remain temporarily with the Portuguese on their paying the Dutch yearly 600 quintals<sup>1</sup> of cinnamon, and that whatever had been conquered by either party after the date at which the Peace should have been proclaimed in India, viz., 22nd February, 1643, should be restored. This, the Portuguese interpreted as the final decision of the Sovereign Powers in Europe which had been waited for. The Count d'Aveires, whose term of office as Viceroy of Goa had expired, was succeeded in that office early in 1645 by Philippo Mascarenhas, the redoubtable Captain-General of Colombo, who had stubbornly opposed the Dutch claims to the lands surrounding the conquered forts, and who now charged the new Captain-General Manoel Mascarenhas to insist

<sup>1</sup> The *quintal* was a Portuguese measure of weight equal to about 128 lbs.



on the terms of the treaty being forthwith carried out. So, in May, 1646, Maatzuyker received from the latter a formal demand for the restoration of the lands in question, including the fortress of Negombo. Maatzuyker found himself in a quandary. At his departure from Batavia the Supreme Government had charged him to defend the Company's claims to the utmost, should the Portuguese demand the restoration of Negombo. In the circumstances which had arisen he saw that such a defence would indeed be very difficult, and any claim which the Dutch could urge for these lands as agents of the King of Kandy they had completely lost by the declaration of war against that monarch. Maatzuyker decided to temporize. He had not yet succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation with Raja Sinha, but he entertained hopes of doing so, and in the meantime he entered into a correspondence with Manoel Mascarenhas with regard to the relative force of the terms of the Treaty of The Hague and the Treaty of Goa. About five months had gone in this way when, on the 24th October, 1646, appeared the Viceroy's Deputy, Fr. Gonçalo de Veloso, at Galle, with peremptory orders from his chief to bring the pending matters to a final close. Opportunely, however, Maatzuyker was relieved of the necessity of entering into any further negotiations on these questions by an event which occurred abroad. A revolt of the Portuguese in Brazil brought about a rupture between the Powers in Europe, and the war between the Portuguese and the Dutch in Ceylon was renewed.

## CHAPTER XII.

### RENEWAL OF WAR WITH THE PORTUGUESE.

#### DISAGREEMENTS WITH RAJA SINHA.

#### MAATZUYKER'S POLITIC ADMINISTRATION.

[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. Ceylon*, pp. 143, 144 (Chap. XLII) Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*, pp. 124-127; Instructions of Joan Maatzuyker to his successor Jacob van Kittensteyn, *Ceylon Government Archives*, Vol. D. 1028, which has now been translated into English by E. Reimers, Government Archivist; *De Opkomst v. h. Nederlansch Gezag over Ceilon*, van Geer, pp. 136-153; Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch, edited by Donald Ferguson, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 191-203. This correspondence is also partly reproduced in the *Beknopte Historie*, pp. 378-389.]

It will be seen that Maatzuyker had acted with great prudence and foresight in protracting his negotiations with the Portuguese in regard to yielding up Negombo and the adjacent lands. The position of the two parties towards each other was now completely changed. On the 16th August 1646, the Directors of the East India Company informed the Governor-General and Council at Batavia, that, as friendly relations between the States General and the King of Portugal had been broken off, there was no need for further thought of giving up Negombo. So, the Dutch were now able to hold the lands in dispute without any reference to the King of Kandy. During the pendency of the dispute, and previous to the proclamation of peace, they had got possession of the greatest part of the

cinnamon fields and thus gained the ascendancy in the cinnamon trade, the monopoly in which, for the future, was within sight, and only awaited the complete expulsion of the Portuguese from the Island, which was a matter they could ere long accomplish. But there was one hindrance to their gaining their object, and that was the unfriendly attitude of Raja Sinha. He had all the power to make it difficult for them to reap the advantage of their successes by getting the cinnamon fields devastated. He had been doing this, as we have seen, in a clandestine manner, while pretending friendship, but ever since the declaration of war by Thysz he had been more or less openly on the war path. It therefore needed all Maatzuyker's shrewdness, diplomatic ability, and firmness to restore and maintain amicable relations with the artful and irascible monarch ; and the greater part of Maatzuyker's rule in Ceylon was occupied in this task. In the first letters he addressed the King after his arrival at Galle, he put forth every effort to pacify him ; he informed him that Thysz's action in declaring war was without authority and contrary to the wishes and intentions of the Supreme Government ; that for that reason Thysz as well as Overschie had been removed from their posts, and that he (Maatzuyker) had been sent to Ceylon in the place of the former. The King was also informed that the 4 elephants wrongly captured by Overschie, had been sent for and would be restored to His Majesty whenever it should please him to receive the letters and presents from the Governor-General and Council at

Batavia. The King was assured that it was never the intention of the Dutch to deprive him of his lands, but only to protect them against the Portuguese; so that His Majesty might be able to enjoy the fruits thereof and the more easily make payment of his debt to the Company by delivering to them the merchandise which they needed, at a reasonable price; this being in accordance with the treaty made with Westervold. Before these communications reached Raja Sinha, the episode, already related, of the massacre of van der Stel and his force, occurred. That force had been sent at the King's own request, that the camp at Panare in<sup>(1)</sup> the Seven Korles should be withdrawn, but it was attacked and mercilessly destroyed without any just cause. Raja Sinha sought to explain his action by the plea that the men had come with arms and artillery and were therefore mistaken for a hostile force. When Maatzuyker learnt of what had taken place he felt himself compelled to remonstrate with the King on his faithless conduct, which, it was pointed out, would only give encouragement to the Portuguese. The King was asked to state definitely if he wanted peace or war. Frequent reports had come of inimical acts committed on Dutch subjects with the King's sanction in the neighbourhood of Negombo, and it was also rumoured that Raja Sinha had sent ambassadors to Colombo to seek help from the Portuguese against the Dutch. In the circumstances Maatzuyker could only warn the King that the

(1) See p. 122 *note*.



Dutch may be compelled to oppose force by force, and to prepare to occupy Batticaloa, Cottiya, and Trincomalee, and take possession of the places they had wrested from the Portuguese in the King's name. Raja Sinha remonstrated that it was not right to seek peace from Kings with threats of war. To which Maatzuyker retorted that His Majesty was not so high or the Dutch so low that they should not be allowed to speak the truth. His (Maatzuyker's) words contained no threats, but they were a warning, and the Dutch did not seek for peace as if they were powerless, but they invited the same, or, on refusal, a just war. Raja Sinha had been reiterating his determination to abide by the treaty he had made with Westermold, and insisted that in terms thereof Negombo, should be given up to him, which, he complained, the Dutch on several occasions fortified against his orders or consent. Maatzuyker justified the present occupation on the ground that this had not only been acquiesced in by the King in view of the Truce with the Portuguese, but that he had undertaken to pay for and maintain the garrison, lest the Portuguese should unexpectedly come and again take lodgment there. It was indeed necessary that Negombo should be held by the Dutch for at least another year to see how the Portuguese behaved themselves during the truce. And again in a more vehement manner, Maatzuyker declared that the Dutch were willing to hand over Negombo to the King, but in the relations in which they stood towards each other then, this would not take place except by the King driving them out of it by force. Up to that date not a larin had been paid towards the expenses incurred in the conquest of the fort, and yet His

Majesty demanded that it should be given up to him, which was unjust and unworthy of so great a King. The Dutch fully intended to make peace and to keep to the contract made by Westerwold, but only provided that His Majesty, in the first place, released all the Dutch whom he had in detention, and next, issued orders that the cinnamon etc., were to be delivered to them. At this point Raja Sinha broke off all epistolary intercourse with the Dutch and retired with his army from the neighbourhood of Negombo to Kandy. Maatzuyker's attempts to get into communication with him proved ineffectual. Several of his letters elicited no reply till, at last, fully a year since his previous communication, a letter was received from the King dated 12th July 1647. Maatzuyker had been urging that it would be best that the Dutch should be allowed to occupy Negombo for 6 or 8 months longer, as it was most likely that there would soon be open war between them and the Portuguese; also that His Majesty should leave them 2 or 3 years longer in possession of the district, that they might find payment in cinnamon for the expenses they had incurred, which would, to a great extent, diminish His Majesty's debt to them. The Dutch, he hoped, would also be able to ascertain in the meanwhile what and how much the neighbourhood of Negombo yielded. After that period they would restore all the districts, keeping only the fortress of Negombo. As no reply was received to his letters, Maatzuyker proposed to send the Koopman Maarschalk to Kandy as Commissioner to the King, when the long-deferred letter, just referred to, dated 12th July 1647, arrived. This letter cannot now be traced, but it appears from

the reply to it by Maatzuyker that after his return to Kandy the King had been laid up with a protracted illness, probably a continued fever. In his letter the King expressed a wish to confer with the Commissioner whom Maatzuyker proposed to send, and Maarschalk proceeded on his mission on the 23rd August. In a subsequent letter of Raja Sinha (29th August), which also is no longer extant, Maatzuyker had been asked by His Majesty for his views in regard to a proposal of peace made to him by the Portuguese. Maatzuyker's reply was to the effect that the King was to please himself in the matter and to act in the manner he considered best calculated to promote the interests of his kingdom ; as for the Dutch, they were resolved to maintain the contract made by Westerwold with the King so long as he was likewise minded. The object of the Portuguese in seeking peace with His Majesty was obvious. Peace between the Dutch and the Portuguese in Ceylon had been broken off, and it would be therefore an advantage to the latter, at this juncture, not to have the King on the side of their enemy. But they would be deceived in their calculations, for the contract with Westerwold would not prevent the Dutch doing them all the harm in their power. The only difference would be that the Dutch would now be carrying on the war against them, not in the name of the King of Kandy but of the States General of the United Netherlands, and every conquest made would enure to the benefit of the Dutch exclusively ; so also His Majesty would have no claim on Colombo when it came into the hands of the Dutch. Reports had reached Maatzuyker after this that the King had had



friendly dealings with the Portuguese, but he was not able to assure himself of the truth of these. At any rate Raja Sinha had been acting in a variable and inconstant manner for some time. The Dutch had been prevented from passing through the King's territory and obtaining any cinnamon, although this had been allowed to the Portuguese; and Maarschalk was needlessly detained in Kandy. Maatzuyker wrote to the Governor-General and Council in November 1647 that no lasting peace was to be expected with Raja Sinha, notwithstanding all his professions. Meanwhile several presents had been conveyed to the King from the Dutch, among them a horse, which was described as "worthy to be ridden by a king." The Dutch had been pressing for the appointment of a *dessave* of their nation over the territory of Matara, as they were confident that that would be the only means of securing the cinnamon harvests of the region. They also desired to place a resident ambassador at Kandy. To these proposals His Majesty at length gave his acquiescence, and the message was received at the hands of Maarschalk, who returned to Galle on the 15th July 1649, after a detention of nearly two years. He was accompanied by two ambassadors from the King, who conveyed a large elephant as a present from the King to the Dutch Governor. He also brought the Articles of Peace by which it was proposed to settle the existing differences between them. These Articles were signed by Maatzuyker with some reservations regarding the monopoly in cinnamon, and were returned to His Majesty at the hands of his envoys, who were accompanied by two Company's servants, one of whom was



to remain at Court. The Dutch *dessave* proposed for Matara by Maatzuyker was Lambert Camholt, and the envoy selected to proceed to Kandy was Burgard Cox, who took with him the Articles of Peace, and was commissioned to return with the Dutch whom His Majesty was to release. He came back on the 3rd December, bringing several of the persons who had been detained.

Maatzuyker's term of office had now drawn to a close. On the 27th December, Jacob van Kittensteyn, who had been appointed to succeed him, arrived at Galle from Batavia, and Maatzuyker lost no time in giving intimation of this to Raja Sinha, taking the opportunity to thank him for a breast jewel which the King had sent him; and he sent Pieter Kieft as Commissioner to Kandy. In his last letter to the King, dated 5th February 1650, Maatzuyker, having heard from Kieft that Raja Sinha had broken out into rather abusive expressions against the Dutch, charging them with having broken the terms of peace and applying to them the opprobrious term *casta hollandese*, remonstrated with His Majesty for this unprovoked and wholly undeserving animosity. He suspected the King had been incited to it by the *Dessave* Rampot, who had lately been removed from Matara. Maatzuyker left Ceylon at the end of February 1650 leaving for Kittensteyn an elaborate memoir, the first of the series of these documents which each departing Governor prepared for the guidance of his successor.

In this Memoir, of which what follows is an outline, having recapitulated all the events and circumstances connected with the arrival of the

Dutch in Ceylon, their relations with the King of Kandy, and their operations against the Portuguese, Maatzuyker proceeded to point out that the Dutch had fulfilled their part of the contract made by Westerwold; while, on the other hand, Raja Sinha, influenced by the evil counsel of the Portuguese creatures whom he always had at his Court, and suspicious of the good intentions of the Dutch, not only neglected to deliver to them the produce of this country, which had been contracted for in payment of the expenses incurred by the Dutch, but did his best to prevent it from coming into their hands by getting the lands devastated. He had been led to this by the hope that the Dutch, becoming weary of looking for these profits, and seeing no chance of getting them, would leave the Island in despair. In consequence of this the Dutch judged it best, whenever they could, to bring the cinnamon lands under their own dominion. This was accomplished in 1645 after the conclusion of the Truce with the Portuguese, without violation of the contracts with the King; as they occupied these lands on the understanding that they were saving them from the predatory bands who were devastating them and injuring the inhabitants. As matters stood at the moment two points called for consideration, viz. (1.) That the lands surrounding Galle were held by lawful right, and the occupation of those at Negombo would be equally justified if they could be brought under subjection; because the King was still in debt for the expenses incurred by the Dutch on his account. (2.) The King was on no account, to be allowed to place any of his *dessaves* over these lands, which should be administered

by Dutch officials. These lands, over which the Dutch had dominion, extended on the sea board, from the river Alican on the north to the river Walawe on the south, and inland, over a part of Walawita Korale, some villages in Pasdum Korale, Galle Korale and Jackawile, Agras, Billigam Korale, Moruwe Korale and the Dolos das Korale. These lands were administered by the following officers : Moruwe Korale, Dolos das Korale and Billigam Korale by Marcus Casser, Dessave of Matara, who, as Captain of the Korale, had also jurisdiction over Galle Korale and Jackawille ; Agras by the Captain of the Korale, the Fiscal Philip Angel ; Walawita Korale and Pasdum Korale by the Commanding Lieutenant van Westernen, who had also under him the guards on the Alican river. These officers, had, in addition, the administration of justice and the disposal of small causes. The Sinhalese army, consisting of 960 lascarins, was divided as follows : under the Dessave of Matara 500 ; under the Captain of the Galle Korale 400 ; under Lieutenant van Westernen 60. The lands within the territory mentioned, which were occupied by the Chalias or cinnamon peelers, were exempt from the above-mentioned authority and were specially under the jurisdiction of the Captain of the Mahabadde, Jan Kroon. These lands were Cosgodde, Belitotte, Madampe, Reygamme, together with Dadalle, Magalle, and Lanumodere. The Dutch army consisted of 1426 European soldiers, viz., 430 in Negombo and 996 in Galle, besides 430 under Lieutenant van Westernen distributed as follows : Matura 100 ; Akkuressa 100 ; Moruwe Korale 100 ; Hakmana 30 ; Matara 100. Besides these the vryburghers, handicraftsmen and foreign mili-



tary also formed a good company of at least 180, available when necessity arose. Of the Sinhalese headmen, the most to be relied on were those of the Galle Korale, as they were the farthest removed from the King's jurisdiction, while the inhabitants and headmen of the other districts were liable to be influenced by the Court of Kandy; and they were also heathen or weak Christians. To remedy this last-mentioned evil a school had been established in every important station, and the youth required to be instructed in the Christian religion. A fortress had been built at Matara in which, or at least within the 4 Gravets of the town the Dessave was to get the headmen to reside. Encouragement to secure their loyalty had also been held out to these headmen by the grant of benefits and dignities, which they value, as they were persons of some consequence; they were also so sensitive that no affronts should be offered to them.

Of the profits which the Company looked forward to from these lands for the disbursement of their expenses, the foremost was that from cinnamon, the best of which was to be obtained in the district of Negombo or the Seven Korales. For peeling the cinnamon a particular caste or class of people called the Chalias had been set apart from ancient times. They must be regarded well on account of the profits which they brought. Besides these there was, in the Walawita Korale, a caste called Panneas or grass cutters, who, in ancient times, for some crime committed, had been commanded by the King to pay a certain tax in cinnamon. They were a despised race. The Chalias and Panneas were under the officer who bore the title of Captain of the Mahabadde, then Jan



Kroon, who had directly under him 4 vidanes. The number of Chalias and Panneas last enrolled for the service of collecting cinnamon was 515, who were to deliver 898 bhars of 480 lbs. the bhar; 520 bhars without payment and receiving for the remaining 378,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  rixdollars the bhar. The subject next in importance to cinnamon as a source of profit to the Company was the trade in elephants. For the capture of these animals, also, a distinct class of people had from ancient times been set apart. The elephant hunt was carried on under the authority of the Dessave of Matara with Manampey Arachchi directly under him, assisted by 4 headmen or vidanes. These were attached each to a district called a *betma*, viz., Hittigala Betma; Gallogamme Betma; Cacunagodde Betma; and Giereway Betma; where they reside and where the hunting snares were set up. The 4 vidanes and headmen were bound to deliver yearly 84 elephants, of which 4 must be tuskers. This number could not however be reached so far owing to certain difficulties. Twenty-two animals realized 18652 rix dollars. Other merchandise which came within the terms of the contract were pepper, cardamom, indigo, wax and rice. There was not much hope with regard to indigo, though it was to be found wild in the Seven Korales, as the expense of collecting it would be prohibitive. Wax and rice were to be obtained in moderate quantities at Batticaloa and its neighbourhood. But the King's neglect to supply the cinnamon which he was bound to do gave no hope of much of these commodities being obtained. Arecanut was not mentioned in the contract, but it was procurable though not of much importance, for

the purpose of trade. Tolls, land taxes and other imposts were also a source of revenue. Last year (1649) they realized fl. 224. 12. 5.

A reduction was to be made in the rate of salaries of those received into the Company's service. It was well to reduce the number of paid servants and to see that the Colony was extended by an increase in the number of Burghers. The number of the initial grade of the former, when



MAATZUYKER.

Maatzuyker assumed the Government, was 15; at the date of his retirement it had increased to 68.

The subject of the propagation of Christianity demanded attention. Various schools had been established in the Dutch territory, viz., 1 in Bamberende, a large village; 1 in Dikwelle; 2 in Dondure; 1 in Matara; 1 in Atturala; 1 in Mirisse; 2 in Billigamme, viz., 1 in Malabar and 1 in Sinhalese; 1 in Cockelle; 2 in Galle, besides the Dutch school and the old Portuguese school; 1 in Reygamme; 1 in Ambalangodde; 1 in Billitotte; and 1 in Cosgodde—in all 16 schools.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### KITTENSTEYN'S TRANSACTIONS WITH RAJA SINHA. VAN DER MEIDEN SUCCEEDS KITTENSTEYN. SKIRMISHES BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE PORTUGUESE. ARRIVAL OF HULFT. CAPTURE OF KALUTARA.

[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. Ceylon*, (Dutch orig.) Chap. XLII. pp. 144-147; Valentyn, *Byzondere Zaaken v. Ceylon*. Chap. XII. pp. 137-148; *Beknopte Historie* (Dutch orig.) pp. 389-396; Correspondence between Raja Sinha and the Dutch, edited by Donald Ferguson, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 203-225; Johann Jacob Saar's *Account of Ceylon*, translated by Ph. Freudenberg, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.*, Vol. XI pp. 282-298.]

Jacob van Kittensteyn, who succeeded Maatzuyker in Ceylon, was a native of Delft. Very little is to be found recorded of his antecedents. He does not appear to have been a Member of the Council of India or to have held any post either at Batavia or elsewhere in the East Indies. It is therefore to be presumed that he had recently arrived from Europe and was selected for the government of Ceylon in consequence of his possessing special qualifications for the appointment. The first subject to which Kittensteyn addressed himself on assuming duties was the replacement of the Sinhalese Dessave at Matara by a Dutch official. The King's Dessave Rampot, whom Maatzuyker just before his departure had succeeded in inducing to leave Matara, had again made an incursion into the

district and driven away the Dutch guards, putting his own men in their place. The Dutch Governor was compelled therefore to have them forcibly ejected, but he feared that the circumstances would be misrepresented to Raja Sinha. To a letter which Kittensteyn addressed to the King, the latter, in the course of a long communication, undertook to enquire into the matter, and, if he found his Dessave was to blame, to remove him from office and send another in his place; but he did not appear agreeable to the substitution of a Dutchman for one of his own officers. From a subsequent letter of the King, Kittensteyn learnt that the Dessave Rampot had been sent for, but the result of the enquiry does not transpire. At any rate, the post of Dessave of Matara was held hereafter in a long succession by a Dutch Company's servant of the highest grade (*Opperkoopman* or senior merchant). The King's attitude towards the Dutch about this time appeared to be somewhat variable. In August 1650 he had shown a disposition to be friendly, by releasing from the ship "De Haan", which had put in at Calpentyn, 4 persons who had been sent by the Commander of the vessel with despatches to Negombo, and whom the Dessave of the Seven Korales had detained. But Kittensteyn had to complain of the strict surveillance to which the Dutch emissaries and their attendants were subjected at Kandy. A servant of Kieft, the Dutch Commissioner at the Court, had become so weary of his confinement and loss of freedom that he contrived to run away and reach the Dutch territory. As a matter of discipline he was at once made prisoner. But Kittensteyn pleaded with the King to relax this severity of




treatment of free Dutch subjects and to allow Kieft and his followers such liberty as was granted by all princes in the same circumstances, and also to permit them to write to their fellow countrymen more frequently. This request was accompanied by a present of the following articles : 5 ells of broad cloth, 10 ells of gold and silver lace,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ells of broad silver lace, a hat with a plume, a case of Dutch spirits, a small cask of Spanish wine, and some Dutch butter. These were followed in April 1651 by a number of presents which had been long expected from Batavia. They were despatched in charge of Lieutenant Frans Has, and consisted of the following : a handsome gold chain ; a saddle with silver gilt bands finely embroidered and provided with all accessories ; a bridle, likewise silver gilt, consisting of a head and tail piece ; a gold and silver embroidered quiver ; a bow case, also silver and gold, 15 gilt arrows and 2 bow strings. Raja Sinha, for his part, had presented the Dutch Governor with a large elephant. His passion for hawking was shown by a request that " some good hawks, as well as other birds of prey that hunt well, and other matters pertaining to the chase " may be sent to him. A hawk which he had brought up " with great love and tenderness " had disappeared when he was once taken to the chase. There are abundant references in the records to such requests as these being attended to by the Dutch and of many odd objects fancied by the King being procured for him.

The war between the Dutch and the Portuguese in Europe had been resumed during the year 1650 ; and the position of the latter in Ceylon at this particular time was not as secure as it

had been for some time previous. They were doubtless anxious to win over the King in the fierce struggle which they foresaw must follow with the Dutch in the Island, and they lost no time in making overtures to Raja Sinha. A Portuguese envoy, Dom Jeronymus de Azavedo, had written a letter to the King, making certain proposals which Raja Sinha appears to have rejected, as he promptly forwarded the correspondence to Kittensteyn. Again His Majesty's brother Prince Vijiya Pala, whose claims the Portuguese supported, and whom they kept at Goa as a menace to the King, was made to write him a letter, which also Raja Sinha sent for the information of the Dutch Governor. These manoeuvres were considered strange by Kittensteyn, who could not be certain of the actual designs of the Portuguese. He warned Raja Sinha against placing any confidence in these proposals or giving the Portuguese envoy any audience. Meanwhile the Dutch had resumed their warlike operations against the Portuguese in Ceylon and had already taken possession of all the territory as far as Kalutara, the Portuguese having abandoned the fortress and left it a prey to them. Raja Sinha now showed his inclination actively to join the Dutch, and he prepared to send troops against the Portuguese at Macucaraware. There could be no question that at this time Raja Sinha had made up his mind to give his Allies some effectual help, moved, it is said, by the fact that internal dissensions among the Portuguese in Colombo just then placed them in a disadvantageous position. A number of the soldiers, with some prominent citizens of the town, placing themselves under the leadership of Gaspar Figuera

de Cerpe, the Captain of the city, rebelled against the authority of the Captain-General Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, and placed him under arrest. The conspirators then, gathering a large force of 800 white soldiers and a great number of natives, secretly left the fort and took upon themselves the prosecution of hostilities against the Dutch. The latter, having fortified Kalutara and garrisoned it with 500 soldiers, had erected a strong stockade at Anguruwatota, not far from



it on the Kaluganga, garrisoning it with 140 men, one company of Javanese and 400 lascarins. The Portuguese now attacked this stronghold vigorously, and, after 11 days' resistance, the Dutch were compelled to surrender on the 8th January 1653 with 94 Dutch, 24 Javanese and many lascarins. Meanwhile Raja Sinha, who had learnt of the straits in which the Dutch were at Anguruwatota, got a Dessave of his to attack the enemy's post at Cottegore and to capture their advance guard at the Passes near Colombo, where-

upon the Portuguese General quickly summoned his whole army from the Pasdum and Reygam Korales to Colombo. This was followed by skirmishes in different parts of the country without definite results. The Portuguese had received reinforcements from Goa and a new Captain-General or Governor, Francisco de Melo Castro, had taken the place of Mascarenhas Homem who had got into disgrace.

The Dutch President Kittensteyn had, it appears, been in poor health for some time and had asked the Governor-General and Council to relieve him of his post. So, in October 1653, Adriaan van der Meiden was sent to replace him in the government of Ceylon. Kittensteyn left for Batavia almost immediately, arrived at Batavia in a serious condition on the 4th December, and died within a month of that date (26th December 1653). As in the case of van Kittensteyn, van der Meiden's record of service in the East prior to his appointment as Governor of Ceylon is very meagre. He is mentioned in Maatzuyker's Memoir for Kittensteyn in 1650, previously referred to, as having been an *Oppeerkoopman* and in charge of certain construction works at Negombo. It is probable that he had seen some service in Ceylon during the early years of the struggles with the Portuguese.<sup>(1)</sup> His appointment to the Council of India did not take place till 1657, and he married in Batavia in 1663, after his return there, Clara Sweer de Weerd, widow of Adriaan van Groenesteyn. His

(1) It will be found from his Report furnished to the Council of India in 1660, on his return from Ceylon, that van der Meiden was in the company of Thysz and Helmond, the emissaries sent to the King of Kandy in 1637 prior to the arrival of Westerwold.—Valentyn, Vol. V. *Byzondere Zaaken*. pp. 141-148.



name has become famous as the Governor under whose rule the complete expulsion of the Portuguese from the Island took place.

In the beginning of 1654 the Portuguese again came with their forces before Negombo, but were not able to entice the Dutch to come out and give battle. They then marched towards Kalutara and encamped by the river, and from there sent foraging parties through the Pasdum and Wallalawiti Korales to Pitigala and Alicam to fetch crops, cattle and other provisions. The Dutch forces were then under the command of Jan van der Laan, who was afterwards joined by Adriaan van der Meiden from Galle. They pursued the Portuguese through Barberyn to the forest at Dodangoda and Tebuwana, where the parties had an encounter without any decisive result.<sup>(1)</sup> The Dutch then, having halted with their main body for some rest, marched on to Kalutara, the Portuguese making their way back to Colombo. Some fighting of an indecisive character took place after this, both on sea and land, in which the Portuguese more than once gave the allies some blows, and in these encounters on land the Sinhalese participated with the Dutch actively.

In May 1654 Rycklof van Goens, commanding the Naval and Military forces of the Dutch, captured and destroyed 40 Portuguese frigates off the coast of India, and took 5 large galleons with a great quantity of booty. He was thus able to rescue 20 of the Dutch prisoners taken at Anguruwatotte and to land them at Galle. These exploits of van Goens reduced the Portuguese means of transport considerably and pre-

(1) See sketch map on p. 144.



CALETVRE.



*From Baldeus*

KALUTARA.



vented them for the time from bringing reinforcements from Goa, while the Dutch were now receiving supplies of men from time to time.

In September 1655, Gerard Hulft, who had recently arrived at Batavia from Europe, came as Director-General of the Naval and Military forces to Ceylon, with instructions to prosecute the war against the Portuguese ; and, in the first week of October, having been joined by Captain Jan van der Laan and Adriaan van der Meiden, the Governor of Galle, he prepared for an attack on Kalutara. This fort had, as we know, been once occupied by the Dutch, but had again fallen into the hands of the Portuguese. They soon succeeded in surrounding it and shutting out all succour from the besieged, so that the Portuguese under their Commander Anthonio Mendes de Aranha, were compelled, from sheer want of provisions, to surrender the fort before a blow had been struck. The garrison, consisting of 255 men, marched out on the 15th October and were disarmed, and the Dutch, entering the fort, found to their surprise a fairly good supply of guns, arms and ammunition. Placing Ysbrand Godskens in command of Kalutara, Hulft, with van der Meiden and van der Laan, marched on in the direction of Colombo. On the way they were met by a force under the Portuguese Captain Gaspar de Figuera, which had been sent from Colombo for the relief of Kalutara, but, as it happened, came too late. An engagement took place in the neighbourhood of Panadure which resulted in the complete defeat of the Portuguese, who were pursued by the Dutch as far as Wellawatte to the spot where stood the Portuguese



Church, Milagriya. Hulft, then, making a detour, found himself at Agua de Loupe (Wolvendaal), from where he took a survey of the enemy's position, and then encamped on the hill which to this day bears his name. The siege of Colombo began on the 21st October 1655 and lasted seven months.

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*From Baldeus*

PORTRAIT OF HULFT.



## CHAPTER XIV

### THE SIEGE AND CONQUEST OF COLOMBO.

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[AUTHORITIES.—Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. Ceylon* (Dutch orig.), Chaps XXIV to XXXIX, pp. 66-127. Baldeus has also appended to his work, pp. 205-232, an account of the Siege of Colombo by a Portuguese writer (*Belegeringe van Colombo door de Portugese beschreven*) handed to him by Mattheus van den Broek, a Director of the Dutch East India Company who had been a Councillor in India. It gives the Portuguese version of the events, but is not at variance in general particulars with the Dutch account. See also Saar's Account of Ceylon, translated by Ph. Freudenberg, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XI pp. 290-304; *Beknopte Historie* (Dutch orig.) pp. 395-406, translated in *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XI. pp. 50-59; and Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch, edited by Donald Ferguson, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 222-238.]

The Portuguese fortress of Colombo extended much further landwards than that which has been known as the Dutch fort, for it included the Pettah. A line of fortifications of considerable strength faced the Dutch as they lay encamped on the hills of Wolvendaal, Hulftsdorp, and San Sebastian. First, on their right, overlooking the harbour, was the Bastion St. Joan, the site of which may be fixed in a modern map at the end of St. John's Street; then came the bastions St. Stephen and St. Philip at a little distance from each other; and last, on the lake, Madre de Deos. All these were connected with one another by a curtain or low rampart.

The conquest of Colombo had been, as we have seen, a scheme which King Raja Sinha had set his heart upon for a long time, and he took



a keen interest in the operations by which the Dutch were now going to achieve this object. He not only kept up a regular correspondence with Hulft during the siege, but sent as much help as he was able to. Early in the siege came the Dessave of Saffragam with the offer of assistance, followed by the Dessave of the Four Korales with 700 men and the Dessave of the Seven Korales with 500 men. Later came the Dessave of Ouva and Matale and other officers of the King with large numbers of lascarins. The total number according to various accounts appears to have been considerable ; but what manner of help these forces rendered to the Dutch is not very clear. Many of the men were set to work to fetch and carry the cannon balls and ammunition, and others were employed in hewing down and setting up the coconut trunks used for the batteries. But that they rendered much help in the actual fighting appears more than doubtful from a passage in Baldeus. They are said to have come crowding in great numbers and to have given more trouble than help. It is said they only hankered after the booty and filled the air with shouts and clamour, so that they proved rather a hindrance than a help.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the 9th November, all arrangements for an attack being complete, a council of war was held and General Hulft sent his challenge to the Portuguese Governor Antonio de Sousa Coutinho. The acceptance of the challenge was received

(1) The whole passage is as follows :—" Die door menighte alles vervullden, en meer gewoel dan hulp deden ; want een Cingaleesch is een heerlyk Zoldaat op een verwonden Man, en Zoud hem na zyn dood noch wel thien wonden geven, vlammente alleen op den buyte, en wetende met geschreeuw en getier de Lucht te vervullen dikmaal meer nadeel dan voordeel doende.—Baldeus, *Beschr. v. h. Eylandt Ceylon*, p. 121.

next day and the Dutch made elaborate preparations for the conflict. The land forces were disposed of in sections under different commanders at special points of attack, and, of the ships laying outside the harbour, two were ordered to come in and join in the attack, while the others, continuing outside, were to weigh anchor and put up the red flag with the pretence of intending to follow. The attack was fixed for the 11th but had to be postponed to the following day owing to the weather. Hulft himself, with 10 companies, was to attack the Bastions St. Stephen and St. Philip and the fortifications on the land side; Major van der Laan, with 9 companies, was to attack the Bastion St. Joan from the harbour side; and the Sea Captain Jacob Lippen, with 2 companies of soldiers and a number of marines, was to sail across the lake in seven Chinese *champans* and attack the city on its weakest side.


The whole enterprise however ended in disaster. The preparations made by the Dutch were watched by the enemy, and when the attack began, the Portuguese from within the fortifications kept up a desperate fire on the men who were ordered to set up the scaling ladders. These, wounded and killed by the grape shot which was showered on them, were unable to proceed with their task. Hulft, observing this, himself pressed forward with some of his officers to accomplish the object, and was wounded in the thigh. As he was being carried back a cry reached him that van der Laan had succeeded in making a breach in the Bastion St. Joan and had effected an entry. Regardless then of his wound, he turned to rally his men, but found only hopeless confusion;

so that he was obliged to order a retreat. Major van der Laan, who was opposed on the bastion St. Joan by the Portuguese Captain Gaspar de Figuero, also found himself unable to maintain his men in the breach that had been made, and, after vain attempts to recover his position, was obliged to withdraw. Only one bold soldier, Lieutenant Melchior van Schoonbeek, succeeded in getting on to the battery, and he had to pay for his act of daring with his life. In the meantime Lippen, who had been entrusted with the affair on the lake, although harassed by four of the enemy's boats, managed to enter the city ; but he was severely wounded and had to get away with some of his men. The rest, deprived of the support of their comrades, easily fell into the hands of the Portuguese, and were made prisoner. No better success attended the adventure of the ships, of which two, the "Maagd van Enkhuysen" (Maid of Enkhuysen) and the "Workum," entered the harbour. The former, which approached nearest the fort, began its attack on the water fort, but was so battered and riddled by the enemy's guns that she could no longer keep afloat, and her crew were only saved by the timely arrival of a sloop. The Portuguese, finding her abandoned, drew her shorewards and stranded her ; and the "spoiled maid"<sup>(1)</sup> furnished her captors with a welcome and unexpected supply of food and other necessities, such as casks of wine, barrels of meat and some artillery and ammunition. The other ship "Workum" escaped the enemy's fire and, by cutting her cables, glided out of the harbour, over the reef, without much damage.

(1) "Die verkrachte Maagt"—Baldeus, *Beschr.* p. 73.







- |  |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| 1. Thulst's Head Quarters              | 6. Battery of 6 Guns |
| 2. Church of Nossa de Lopo             | 7. Do 4 Do.          |
| 3. San Sebastian                       | 8. Do 2 Do.          |
| 4. Bridge over Canal.                  | 9. Morters           |
| 5. Gallary where Thulst lost his life. | 10. Outwork.         |

The loss in dead and wounded which the Dutch suffered in this luckless enterprise has been differently computed by different writers ; but there is no doubt that it was very considerable ; so much so that the Dutch had to suspend operations for a time. The Portuguese had also lost so many men in this battle that they were not able to pursue their advantage. Had they been able to do this, they would perhaps have succeeded in destroying the Dutch army and thus completely changing the course of events in Ceylon.

The Dutch, however, soon recovered their energy and then set about more deliberately to strengthen their means of attack. These consisted in the cutting of trenches, building lunettes or half-moon formations, and setting up batteries against the northern or land front of the fortress ; while, at the same time, their fleet kept a constant watch for any ships which came with succour for the besieged. The Portuguese Governor of Jaffanapatam, Antonio Amiral de Menezes, going from Mannar to Colombo, was taken prisoner by the Dutch at Mutwal with letters which disclosed some of the plans which they had in contemplation for the relief of the city. The Dutch had made the Bastion St. Joan their chief objective, and towards this they directed their principal operations. A lunette built near the sea shore was planted with a mortar which created no little damage and disaster within the city by the discharge of various kinds of bombs. Some of these bombs were covered with inflammable material and carried projectiles which went off on all sides on explosion, causing great havoc among the buildings and inhabitants. The inven-

tion was a new one to the Portuguese who thought that only the devil himself could have been its author. But they were able after a while to use it themselves. While the Dutch were bringing their trenches up to the ditch and their batteries were continuously pounding on the bastions St. Joan and St. Stephen, the Portuguese were by no means idle. They kept up a constant fire



FIRING FROM A MORTAR.

from the Bastions, harassing and impeding the Dutch besiegers at their task, and they also bravely set to work to repair damages and to fortify themselves at those points where the attack seemed imminent. The Bastions St. Joan and St. Stephen were strengthened by fascines, the brushwood for which was fetched by parties sent out, some beyond the southern limits of the fort, and some in boats across the harbour, braving




the vigilance of the Dutch. The curtain between these two Bastions was also buttressed by a solid wall of coconut trunks constructed to bear cannon, and so cut off from the Bastions themselves as to serve for a safe resort in case of necessity.

All this while frequent desertions took place on both sides, those who came over to the Dutch, by far the greater number, being induced chiefly by want and privation. Spies were also at work to keep each side informed of the doings of the other. Thus the knowledge of the fact that the Dutch were laying a mine under the Bastion St. Joan was soon communicated to the besieged, who prepared themselves for it by a counter mine. They also planted palisades in the ditch where the Dutch were bringing up a gallery, and so harassed the workmen who bravely undertook this task by firing upon them from the Bastions, that these men had to suspend their operations. But the Dutch were nevertheless gaining ground, while the position of the Portuguese, shut out of communication with their headquarters at Goa, and running short of provisions and ammunition, was becoming more and more desperate. At the end of February 1656 deserters from the city reported that it could not hold out beyond May. The scarcity of food was so great that the Portuguese Governor formed the design of driving out of the city all useless folk of both sexes and all ages. Some 2000 people were thus expelled and ordered to go and satisfy their wants outside. The Dutch, who had no desire that the city should obtain relief in this way, compelled the outcasts to return, but the gates were closed against them. The result was that



great numbers in desperation drowned themselves in the moat while others died of starvation. Within the city famine and sickness prevailed to an alarming extent. Dogs, cats, and rats were killed and eaten publicly, and even the flesh of dead elephants became a luxury. One native woman is said to have killed and eaten her own child. A fearful form of pestilence, which also appeared in the later months of the siege, carried away 22,000 persons, whole families in a house being found dead in some cases.

While these things were doing the relations between Raja Sinha and the Dutch were of the most cordial nature. The King seemed now within sight of realizing his cherished hope of obtaining possession of Colombo. What he desired was that the Dutch should drive the Portuguese out of the fortress and hand it over to him to be demolished. It was in the indulgence of this hope that, although suffering from a continued illness, he left his hill capital and personally approached as near as convenient to the scene of hostilities. Moving in stages, he had arrived and fixed his temporary Court at Reygamwatte, a short distance from Colombo beyond the Kelani river. It was here that the long-desired interview between the King and Hulft took place. The Dutch General was at the time in the turmoil of momentous operations, which made his presence with the army a matter of great importance, but he nevertheless seized the opportunity of the proximity of the Court to pay his respects to His Majesty. He left the camp with his staff and attendants on the 5th April, and, crossing the river, proceeded towards the royal precincts. A brilliant reception awaited




*From Baldeus*

HULET'S PROCESSION TO RAJA SINHA'S COURT.









From Baldeus

RAJA SINHA'S RECEPTION OF HULFT.



him. Richly caparisoned horses with a train of elephants, soldiers and musicians, came to convey him to the Court, and a large number of noblemen were in attendance. The King unfortunately was again ill and could not receive him in audience till the 7th, but, when the interview did take place, it was a ceremonial of great magnificence. The most cordial and friendly exchange of courtesies took place with solemn pledges on both sides. Hulft, on bended knee, received a gold chain round his neck and a ring on his finger, put on by the King's own hands. The Dutch presents to the King and the Prince consisted of Persian horses, greyhounds, sandalwood etc. But Hulft could not tarry at the Court where he was made so welcome. His presence was urgently needed with the army, and he therefore took a hurried leave of the King and arrived at the camp on the 9th April.

On the day following his return, Hulft repeatedly visited the works in progress for the attack on the Bastion St. Joan, where they were endeavouring to fix a gallery across the ditch. The workmen were much harassed and impeded in their efforts by the besieged, who kept on throwing fire-pots, stinkers and various inflammable matter on them. While the men were doing their best to quench the fire, Hulft, in order to give them a helping hand, thoughtlessly exposed his body to the view of the enemy on the ramparts. A shot fired from the Bastion out of a carbine or firelock entered below his right shoulder causing a fatal wound, and, with one short exclamation, he breathed his last. The death of Hulft was a great loss to the Dutch ; for he was not only a brave and experienced

General, full of resource, but a man of much tact and judgment. Even the enemy bore testimony to his admirable qualities. The news of his death was received with profound grief by King Raja Sinha, who put himself and his Court into mourning on the occasion. The body of the deceased General was conveyed to Galle and buried in the church there, where it remained




DUTCH COMMANDING OFFICER.

till 1658, when it was brought back to Colombo and deposited with much ceremony in the church in the Fort.

Adriaan van der Meiden, the Governor of Galle, at once took command of the army, and hostilities were continued without abatement. On the 18th April, seeing the odds were much against the Portuguese, he sent a summons to the Governor Antonio de Sousa Coutinho to

surrender, pointing out the hopelessness of holding out any longer. It was futile, he said, to rely on succour from Goa, as their ships would not be able to reach Colombo, and the prolongation of the siege only increased the sufferings of the inhabitants. The reply to this was received next day. It was curt and trenchant. "You have doubtless read and comprehended my reply of the 9th November to General Hulft," said the Portuguese Governor. "I have no other reply to make. For neither the war nor the want of provisions is any reason for me to change my determination, which is to defend the city



DUTCH CANON.

and to do all in my power to protect the interests of my lord and King". The Dutch then resolved no longer to delay the assault, and, on the 27th written instructions were given to the Commanding Officers as to the manner in which the attack was to be conducted; and the Sinhalese King was also informed of these plans. But it was not till the 7th May that the actual assault was made. After the Dutch had kept up an incessant bombardment of the Bastion St. Joan, they, on that day, made a sudden dash for the bulwark, which at the moment was very weakly guarded. Having killed the small garrison of three, they easily made themselves master of the position, the walls having already been much



damaged by their batteries. Further incursions were prevented for the time by the active resistance of the inhabitants, who put up a hard fight and slew 76 of the invaders, three of them being officers. The Portuguese, however, could not recover possession of the Bastion, which the Dutch now occupied and planted with cannon, making it a point of vantage. It went so badly with the besieged after this, that on the 10th May they put out a white flag and hostilities ceased.

Negotiations were then entered into for the surrender of the fort, and the following were, in substance, the terms agreed upon: The city was to be surrendered before noon of the same day the soldiers were to march out with their baggage, colours flying, drums beating, match-cords lit, and guns slotted, and to lay down their arms under the great Dutch Standard, and were to await their transport to the coast of India; the Governor, the Clergy and the high officers, civil and military, were to be protected against insult, treated with honour, and transported to India with their slaves and movable property as soon as the opportunity offered; all other respectable Portuguese citizens were to be accorded the same protection until their departure, those who made themselves subject to the Dutch rule were to be treated with kindness and courtesy and left in the peaceable possession of their property—movable and immovable, but were not at liberty to dispose of their lands or estates in the event of their choosing to depart, such property being at the disposal of the Dutch Authorities; those born in the Island and having

their domicile here were to be dealt with according to the discretion of the Dutch General; the mudaliyars, arachchies, lascorins and their retinue were to be treated with the same consideration as the Dutch the sick and wounded were to remain in hospital until recovery all officers, married people, privates and unmarried ladies were to remain under the protection of the Dutch Governor. In an unauthorized report of the events which has come down to us, the stipulation is also mentioned that the unmarried daughters of the Portuguese were to remain and to marry Hollanders. The unconditional truth of this may perhaps be questioned.

The Treaty was signed by Adriaan van der Meiden "in the name of His Imperial Majesty of Ceylon, the States General of the United Netherlands etc." on the 12th May, and, on the evening of that day, the Portuguese soldiers marched out, looking more dead than alive, a very small fragment of the brave forces which had from the first resisted the attacks of the Dutch. The Standard of the Prince of Orange was hoisted from the water fort and the cannon discharged a salvo in token of victory. The Dutch thus took possession of Colombo after a siege of seven months, during which many a bloody conflict had taken place, many valuable lives lost, and incredible suffering endured. It has been said that notwithstanding their promise the Dutch Authorities allowed the soldiers to commit many gross acts of plunder in the city, or, at least, were unable to prevent this being done.

## CHAPTER XV.

### STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN KING RAJA SINHA AND THE DUTCH.

### THE CONQUEST OF MANNAR AND JAFFNAPATAM.

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[AUTHORITIES.—Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch, edited by Donald Ferguson, *Journal R. A. S., C. B.* Vol. XVIII. pp. 238-246 ; Baldeus, *Beschryvinge v. Ceylon* (Dutch Orig.), Chaps. XLII-XLV, pp. 149-160 ; *Beknopte Historie* (Dutch orig.) pp. 406-409 ; The Conquest of Jaffna by the Dutch by A. C., *Ceylon Literary Register*, Vol. I pp. 334-336, 342-344.]

The Treaty for the surrender of Colombo, as we have seen, was signed by van der Meiden on behalf, not only of the Supreme Dutch Authorities, but also of Raja Sinha. It is evident however that the King was little consulted about the terms. The urgency of the circumstances may perhaps have made this inconvenient, or the Dutch General may have considered that he was acting as plenipotentiary of the King in these transactions, as he was of the Dutch authorities in the Netherlands and Batavia. At any rate Raja Sinha was seriously displeased with his Allies for what he considered a deliberate violation of their pledges to him. He remonstrated with them and also, according to his way, lost no time in giving them tangible proofs of his displeasure by preventing the Dutch garrisons from obtaining supplies in the land. Many of the Sinhalese adherents of the Dutch were also induced to go over from them to the King,

who now demanded that the fortresses of Negombo and Colombo should be given over to him in terms of the agreement made with him by General Hulft. The Dutch, it is clear, for reasons of their own, were not prepared to do this just then. Whether they would have done so at a later stage if events had taken a different course, are circumstances into which it is not necessary for us to enter here. But a certain measure of sympathy must go out to the King, when it is remembered that the expulsion of the Portuguese from Colombo had been one of the dearest objects of his life, as it had also been that of some of his predecessors, two of whom, Don Joan and Raja Sinha I, went so near to the accomplishment of this design as to lay siege to the fortress. To be baulked of his object just when the hope of its realization was highest must indeed have been a source of great disappointment and vexation to him. It would also appear that the Dutch had for some time allowed him to indulge the hope of getting possession of the fortress as soon as it was conquered, for the purpose of being demolished. Yet, in forming any judgment in this matter, it is necessary to consider some of the circumstances on their side. They had now had nearly twenty years' experience of his dealings with them. Coming over at his behest, they had, at the expenditure of large sums of money and the sacrifice of a great many lives, carried on hostilities against the Portuguese, conquering fort after fort. Two of these, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, had already been given over to him, and they looked to him, for the fulfilment of his part of the compact, which was to reimburse them their expenses with supplies



of cinnamon and other products of the country which were at his command. This, he did not seem ready to do; on the contrary, he often threw obstacles in the way of their procuring them. One of the things the Dutch had begun to realize in their intercourse with him was that he would rather have them leave the Island after helping him to drive out the Portuguese; and the plan by which he sought to make them do this was by depriving them of the commodities by which they set so much store. They had seen how, when it suited him, he sometimes tried to play one European nation against the other, so that he might thereby be rid of them both. Had he been sincere in his profession of loyalty to the Dutch, he might have helped them to make themselves masters of Colombo in 1640, when the Portuguese had withdrawn most of their regular troops for the relief of Galle and left the capital unprotected. But instead of this he considered it more to his interest to allow the Portuguese a little time to recover breath.

After the conquest of Colombo the relations between Raja Sinha and the Dutch became more and more strained. Van der Meiden complained to the King of the impropriety of his proceedings, which, he said, would give the Portuguese their opportunity. He tried to appease his wrath in various ways, even offering to surrender to him the fortress of Negombo; but to little or no purpose. From petty acts of violence and opposition offered in various localities, the King's agents proceeded to open acts of hostility against the Dutch, and Raja Sinha even entered into negotiations with the Portuguese. He devastated the low lands from which the Dutch obtained

their supplies, ignoring the fact that his debts to them had not yet been paid. The chief Sinhalese subjects of the Dutch, at the same time, in secret, proved treacherous to their masters.

Meanwhile the Portuguese, who held the forts in the north of the Island, continued to be a menace to the Dutch, and the Council at Batavia, at the end of the year 1657, sent Rycklof van Goens, who later played an important part in the fortunes of the Island, with a fleet to attack the enemy on the coast of India and Ceylon.



RYCKLOF VAN GOENS.

He came with the imposing title of Commissioner, Superintendent, Admiral and Commander of of the Forces on land and sea. Having captured Tutucorin on the 1st February 1658, he proceeded to Mannar. The Portuguese, anticipating an attack, entrenched themselves along the sea strand to prevent any landing; and, as soon as the Dutch fleet arrived, sent out a number of *sanguicels*, which were light boats equipped with offensive implements, in order to harass and impede the intruders. But the artillery from the Dutch vessels made short work of them, so that they were

quickly sunk or run aground. Under cover of their guns the Dutch troops then landed in places convenient for them. Forming into a squadron, they met the Portuguese, who had now to leave their entrenchment; and a battle ensued in which the latter were completely defeated, being not only outnumbered by the Dutch, but also unable to withstand the artillery fire from their vessels. Among the Portuguese slain was the Captain-General Antonio Amiral de Menses. After this, on the 22nd February, the




ISLAND OF MANNAR

fortress surrendered without making any defence, the soldiers abandoning it and retreating to Jaffnapatam. The Dutch then proceeded to garrison it.

In the beginning of March the Dutch set out on their expedition to Jaffnapatam, by land, the Portuguese who had escaped from Mannar having preceded them and joined those in the Peninsula in order to resist them. The Dutch troops marched through the country of the Wannias and reached the banks of the so-called Salt River, tired and weary. There, finding the





*From Baldens*


THE CAPTURE OF MANNAR.





way to the head of the channel, where they had proposed passing over, sandy and tedious, they decided to cross over in boats, which they did in batches of 200 and 300. The enemy had however gone on to meet them at the head of the channel and they proceeded thither. In their march the Dutch found the inhabitants of the country friendly and sympathetic, the Portuguese appearing to have incurred their animosity in certain ways; so that they seemed to be glad enough for the Dutch to come and replace them. The enemy, on being met, offered no resistance, but retreated as the Dutch advanced, until they came to Chundukkuli near Jaffnapatam, where there was a smart skirmish in which the Portuguese fared badly. On the next day the Dutch advanced to the city, which, not having fortifications, was easily entered; and the Portuguese were pursued from street to street and dislodged from one position after another, until at last, on the 18th March, unable to make any further resistance, they quitted their houses and sought refuge within the fortress, many inhabitants of the country flocking in with them, and thus crowding the limited space within the walls. The Dutch now established themselves in some of the churches and spacious monasteries which stood in the city, and prepared for the siege. It was first resolved to take effectual measures to prevent any succour reaching the besieged from Goa; so, while the main body of the army surrounded the fort, a detachment was sent to capture the little fortress of Ham-en-Hiel, built on a rock at the narrow entrance to the bay within which the city of Jaffnapatam stood. This little fortress so guarded the city that it was

called the Key to Jaffnapatam. After the Dutch had tried the plan of bombarding it, first from the island of Caits and then from that of Karaitivu, and finding the distance too great for any impression to be made by the guns, they decided on attacking it by means of vessels protected by breast work and carrying guns. But the task was both difficult and hazardous, as the little fort was of considerable strength, being solidly built of stone. It is difficult to say what the result of the attack would have been, but the Dutch were saved the trouble of attempting it, as the garrison was compelled to surrender owing to the want of fresh water. They capitulated on the 10th April, and the soldiers, who were allowed to march out with the honours of



HAM-EN-HIEL.

war, were transported to Batavia. Meanwhile the siege of Jaffanapatam was going on, the Portuguese being so completely shut in that they were brought to great straits for want of food and other necessaries. Every little boat sent out to fetch provisions was discovered and driven back. Nor could they expect any succour from Goa, for the


Dutch Admiral Adriaan Roothaes had been keeping the enemy there fully engaged, causing much loss. At the end of two months, after an incessant battering of the fortifications, the Dutch sent the enemy a summons to surrender, offering reasonable terms; but these were refused, and the defence continued in spite of the severest hardships. Rice and other foodstuffs were failing, all the salt had been exhausted, and even gunpowder was running short. At the same time the bombs from the Dutch mortars, charged with inflammable materials and with stones broken off from the tombstones in the cemetery, were doing the same kind of damage which they did in Colombo. As the days passed the Portuguese felt the hope of any favourable turn of their fortunes gradually diminish. They had also now for some days ceased to hear the sound of firing from Ham-en-Hiel and concluded that the fort had surrendered. At last in despair, they, on the 21st June, put up a white flag. The surrender took place the following day and terms of capitulation somewhat similar to those of Colombo were granted. The Portuguese prisoners were to be sent to Batavia and thence to Europe, but they were not allowed to take away any jewellery, gold or silver. When they passed out of the fort on the 24th March, the soldiers and other inhabitants were closely searched for any valuables which they may have secreted, and we are told by the Portuguese historians that the Dutch treated these folk with great indignity on the occasion. On entering the fort the Dutch found that the bombs had caused great havoc in the place, which they also found in a very filthy



condition and smelling very foul. So they quickly set about to clean the premises and to repair the damages. To the friendly inhabitants of the country, who came in numbers to greet them, they held out inducements to settle down among them.

Matters being so far settled, most of the Dutch troops were despatched to the Coromandel to engage in the operations for the reduction of Negapatam, and the slender garrison left behind was composed chiefly of the Portuguese who had taken service under the Dutch. A considerable number of the prisoners also still remained. Taking advantage of these circumstances, a plot was organized against the Dutch by some Portuguese with the connivance of King Raja Sinha. It was fortunately discovered in time by a faithful Sinhalese adherent of the Dutch, Don Manuel de Andrado, a native of Kalutara. The traitors were brought to trial and executed, three of the ringleaders in a most barbarous manner. The fortress of Jaffnapatam was the last stronghold left to the Portuguese in Ceylon ; with its fall the Dutch struggle with them for mastery came to an end, and their rule in the Island became a matter of the Past.

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From Baldus

THE PENINSULA OF JAFFNAPATAM.



## CHAPTER XVI.

### DUTCH COLONISATION IN CEYLON.

[AUTHORITIES.—Most of the information contained in this chapter has been gleaned from unpublished manuscript records in the Government Archives; such as, memoirs of Governors, Commandeurs, and other high officials; reports; diaries; minutes of council; protocols of deeds; acts of appointment, etc.; while Baldeus, Valentyn, Saar and other contemporary writers also throw much light on the subjects treated.]

It has been said that the Dutch East India Company, established for commercial purposes, which primarily set out in the interest of trade, came sometimes into possession of territory which they had not intended to acquire. We have seen how it was with them in Ceylon. Their ostensible object in coming here was to obtain cinnamon, pepper, ivory, and other products of the island that were in great demand in Europe. With this object they expended large sums of money in the equipment of ships and armed forces, and sacrificed many lives in expelling the rivals who stood in their way. Had the Sinhalese King been ready to reimburse their expenses by providing the articles they wanted, in return for their services to him; they would perhaps have had no excuse for settling down in the country and establishing themselves in it. But the King, as we have seen, was not so eager to fulfil his obligations. It would seem as if he had enough to do with one European nation and



had no desire that another should settle down in his midst. He had sought the assistance of the Dutch in order to be rid of the Portuguese, and once his object was gained, his wish was that they should go away and leave him in peace. If he readily furnished them with the commodities they wanted, he would be offering them inducements for coming and remaining here. So, it became his policy to withhold from them what they came for, not only by delaying to supply it himself, but by throwing obstacles in the way of their obtaining it themselves. Thus he hoped to make them go away in despair. He had, however, reckoned without his host. The Dutch were then on their commercial war-path. It was the age of adventure, discovery, and rivalry in trade ; and, in their determination to maintain their position as the greatest Naval Power and the foremost commercial nation of Europe, they were prepared to run great risks, to suffer many pains and penalties, and also, if compelled, to use force in gaining their object. The produce of the island was necessary for their trade, and they had made up their mind to obtain it at any cost. They were masters in the art of diplomacy ; they flattered and fed the vanity of the proud despot then on the throne, whom, for all his extravagance and self-conceit, they found to be both shrewd and masterful. They suffered indignities at his hands, but were resolute in insisting on obtaining what they considered their right. During his long reign of fifty years they played with his varying moods, meeting his wiles and treachery with artifices of their own. But while they had to guard against the frequent incursions of his subjects, who were constantly harassing

and hampering them in the collection of cinnamon and other products, they had also to protect themselves against a danger which threatened them from abroad. The English and the French were in the field against them, and were becoming formidable rivals in commercial enterprise. The old Portuguese forts, which were only strengthened on the land side, were no safeguard against this new menace. The Dutch, in re-building these fortifications, had therefore to strengthen them on the sea side by strong bastions and ramparts. This was done both in Colombo and Galle.

Having possessed themselves of Negombo, Galle, Kalutara, Colombo, and Jaffna, and acquired dominion over some of the surrounding country, the Dutch next turned their attention to the establishment of a proper civil government, and to the administration of justice among the people whom they found within their territory. These consisted mainly of Low-country Sinhalese—so called to distinguish them from the King's subjects in the hill country—who had been a century-and-half subject to the Portuguese; had served them in various capacities, both in town and country ; and had, some few of them who chiefly lived in the towns, intermarried with them and adopted Portuguese names and the Roman Catholic religion. Besides these there was a community known as the *Tupases*<sup>(1)</sup> who were

(1) The origin of the word "Tupas" or Toepas" was the subject of some controversy in the *Ceylon Antiquary* a short while ago. There appears to be no doubt that the first part of the word, "tu" or "toe," is closely related to the Hindustani prefix "du" in words like "dubash." This prefix stands for two or double. In this case "tupas" may mean one who was of two races and who used two languages. Compare "tuppahe" in the term "tuppahe mudiyanse," Interpreter Mudaliyar. "Tuppahige", which still occurs as the cognomen of some Sinhalese families, may be supposed to

of Portuguese paternity, generally wore European dress, and spoke a debased Portuguese, but had mixed freely with the natives---the Sinhalese in the south and the Tamils in the north. Further mention will be made of these in a subsequent chapter. These two classes with a considerable number of Moors---men, women and children---who had long been settled on the coast, formed the bulk of the population. But there was also a certain proportion of aliens from the neighbouring continent and islands, who had come here in the ranks of the army or in pursuit of trade and other occupation, who, though a moving class, must be included among the free people who inhabited the maritime parts of the island. The rest of the population were slaves imported here by the Portuguese, of whom more will be stated in a subsequent chapter.

To the various classes of people above-mentioned were now added those whom the Dutch brought with them---men of European race, mostly from the Netherlands---officials of the Company, soldiers and sailors, and artizans of various sorts, with not a few adventurous gentlemen of fortune. And we come now to the point where the Dutch colonization of the maritime districts of Ceylon began. It was early conceived by them that in order to maintain their footing in the island, the proportion of people of their own race ought to be largely increased. This was inculcated in the minds of successive rulers, who were

indicate a remote Portuguese paternity. Moens in his *Memorandum on the Malabar Coast*, 1781 (Madras Dutch Records) mentions in a list of articles of trade, "tuppatti", a kind of cloth, on which the learned editor of the publication has the following note: "Tuppatti is doubtless dupattia, a common word for cloth, from Hindustani doppata, double breadth."



enjoined to offer inducements and encouragement to their Dutch subjects to settle down and trade in the island. It happened that the earlier settlers from Europe were chiefly men who came out to take part in the warlike operations of the East India Company, and that few, if any, women or children accompanied them to Ceylon. The absence of Dutch women during these early years appears, however, to have been in some measure compensated for by the presence in most of the conquered forts, of large numbers of Portuguese women and Portuguese descendants. These, the Dutch soldiers were encouraged by the Government to marry. If credence may be given to a statement in one of the narratives of the times, there was a stipulation in the Agreement made between the Dutch and Portuguese, which required the unmarried Portuguese women to remain in the island to become the wives of the Hollanders. In the meantime the Chamber of XVII in Holland lost no time in making provision for the emigration of men, women, and children from Europe, who were to go out and colonize the newly-acquired dominions. A Regulation passed in 1669 laid down the conditions on which those desirous of going out to Ceylon, either singly or with their wives and children, were to be accorded passages in the Company's ships. These ships, which arrived from Europe in small fleets of three or four or more vessels twice a year, brought numbers of emigrants, not only from Holland, but also from some of the neighbouring countries in Europe, who sought to make their fortunes here under the banner of the Dutch East India Company. Thus the



Dutch community in Ceylon was soon enlarged by the advent, not only of Hollanders, but also of Hanoverians, Brandenburgers, Bavarians, Danes, Swedes, Austrians, Frenchmen, Poles, and also a few Londoners, Scotsmen, and Irish. Most of these came out on contracts of service, and, on arrival, were taken on the strength of the establishment, civil or military. Others, whether new arrivals or residents, who were not in the Company's service, and were called Burghers, were permitted to earn their livelihood in such ways as suited them, and to carry on any trade, so far as it did not interfere with the commercial interests of the Company. To those who wished to take up agriculture as a living, the Company offered free land in proportion to their capacity. But it was soon found that, in this respect at least, Ceylon was not a "white man's country." The climate and the circumstances were not suitable for the physical labour which agricultural pursuits imposed on the immigrants. These occupations were therefore left by the Dutch to the natives, while their own people confined themselves to the towns.

The Portuguese system of colonization by assimilation with the natives did not find favour with the Dutch. Marriages with native women, which they could not altogether prevent, were not approved by the authorities, and measures were taken to lessen and mitigate what was considered to be a danger to the well-being of the community. The European servants of the Company were forbidden to form such alliances, and those who did so under special Government dispensation were ordered to educate and bring up their children, so that they might be fit to marry

in the community. From the first the Dutch Company discountenanced immorality. It is found that as early as 1641 a Proclamation was issued by the Council of Galle, embodying severe measures for the prevention of concubinage. The Dutch community in Ceylon, made up of the various European races who had come out, was, generally, without distinction, denominated *Hollanders* or *de Hollandsche* (pronounced *Hollañ-se*), which the Sinhalese shortened into *Lansi*, a term which has survived to this day.<sup>(1)</sup> This community included the three denominations, European, Castis, and Mixtis—the last term, though etymologically analogous to, having no connection with the West Indian word *mestiço*. The term European was applied only to those actually born in Europe, Castis meant generally the issue of Europeans born in the island, and Mixtis that of a European or Castis father and a native mother. Besides the *Hollandsche* or *Hollanders* the free town population included the *Tupases*, of whom mention has already been made, and the *Libertines*. These latter were the emancipated slaves of the Dutch, who received their freedom on the death or departure of their masters. They easily merged into the *Tupases*, so that the name gradually fell into disuse.

Some mention must be made in this place of the other inhabitants who were subject to the Dutch Rule. These were the Sinhalese in the south and the Tamils in the north, who, except a small

(1) It occurs in such expressions as "*lansi oppuwa*," Dutch document; "*lansi palliya*," Dutch church; "*lansi basa*," Dutch language; and the name *Lansi* has been the distinguishing designation for the Dutch and their descendants in Ceylon throughout the British occupation. Like all other words of a similar class, it is liable at the present day to be misapplied and misunderstood.

number of the humbler class who lived in the towns and took domestic service, dwelt chiefly in the country places and carried on agricultural pursuits. They were permitted, as far as possible, to hold land under their ancient tenures and to render various services to the Company for their holdings, under a well-organized quasi-military system. They were subject to the Dutch Laws, but were allowed to follow their own habits and customs and the exercise of their own religion ; although, in pursuance of their Christianizing policy, the Dutch Company generally made it compulsory for anyone appointed to a particular post in the service to embrace the Christian religion. Besides these there were, as we have said, subject to the Dutch, a considerable number of Moors, who lived within and without the towns. They were petty traders and hawkers of small wares, and, although governed by the Dutch Laws, practised their own religion and followed their own customs, rites, and ceremonies.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

### CIVIL ESTABLISHMENTS.

[AUTHORITIES.—The most comprehensive work on the Rise of the Dutch Power in the East is J. K. J. De Jonge's *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost India*, in 13 vols.; but there is not much particularly relating to Ceylon that can be learnt from it, although it gives a good general history of the Dutch East India Company's operations and thus throws some light on matters relating to this island. For the constitution of the government and the functions of its officers the "Instructions" and "Digests of Permanent Orders" contained in letters from Batavia, preserved in the Government Archives, are the best sources of information. Here also the "Memoirs" are a useful guide, while the "Statutes of Batavia" compiled in 1642 defines to a certain extent the duties and powers of the officers. The admirable introduction (a learned and elaborate work) by A. Galletti, I. C. S. to Volume 13 of the *Dutch Records of the Madras Government*, published in 1911, is a very useful relative guide to most of the matters dealt with.]

The system of Government introduced by the Dutch East India Company into her colonies was elaborately designed and so perfect in operation that the Directors of the English Company in those early days set it up as a model to the servants in their settlements. The following passage has been quoted from a letter of Governor Yale of Madras to the Directors of the English East India Company in 1687: "our design on the whole is to set up the Dutch Government among the English in the Indies (than which a better cannot be invented)." Rightly to understand this system in relation to Ceylon, it is necessary to go back to the organization of



the Company in Holland. We have seen how this Company came into existence in 1602. To recapitulate briefly what has already been stated, it was a confederation of certain "chambers" or local assemblies of the ports from which the ships sailed for the east. These chambers—of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft etc—supplied Sixty Directors, who, in turn, appointed seventeen of their number to be the governing body of the Company. Among the powers of this Assembly of Seventeen or the "Lords Seventeen," as they were called, was that of nominating the Governor-General and the Councillors for the East Indies, of issuing general orders to the Government in India, of arranging for the departure of the ships, and for the sale of the produce brought back by them. The headquarters of the Company in the east was in Batavia, which was also the seat of the Governor-General. The powers of the Governor-General, so far removed from the home centre, were considerable. Valentyn, whose work on the East Indies appeared in 1726, speaking of these powers, says, that "they were nearly those of a King." He was President of the Council of India, and, though bound to follow the votes of the members, was often able, by his character and authority, to act more or less independently of them. The Council was composed of a limited number of ordinary and extraordinary members, called Councillors of India, the former of whom had specific functions to perform. One was a commercial expert, one a jurist, another a military commander, and so on. The member next in status to the Governor-General, who was described as the "second in Council,"

was the Director-General, and he was considered the commercial head of the Company in the East. The Governors of Ceylon, Coromandel, Malacca, etc., were *ex-officio* members of the Council of India, who were either appointed to these posts from their seats in Council or were made Councillors on appointment. These Governors and their establishments were under the supreme authority of the Governor-General and Council of India, under whose instructions they acted and to whom they had, regularly, to furnish reports of their transactions.

The full title of the Governor of Ceylon after the Dutch Government was well established in the island, was "Councillor Extraordinary of Netherlands India and Governor and Director of the Island of Ceylon with its Dependencies," although some of the Governors personally held the higher rank of Councillor in Ordinary. The Dependencies were called *costa d'enseada* or coast of the bay. They included the Dutch factories within the southern limits of the territory belonging to the Chief of Madura, of which Tutucorin was the most important. The Governor was assisted by a Political Council consisting of eight members, as follows; the Chief Revenue Officer (*Hoofd Administrateur*); the Officer Commanding the Forces; the Agent of the Government for the Rural Districts (*Dessave*); the Treasurer (*Zoldy. Boekhouder*); the Political Secretary; the Chief Warehouse Keeper (*Eerste Pakhuismeester*); the Public Prosecutor (*Fiscaal*); and the Trade Commissioner (*Negotie Boekhouder*). In addition

to these the Lieutenant-Governors of Jaffna and Galle, called Commandeurs, also had seats in the Council when present in Colombo, and took precedence next after the Governor.

The servants of the Company were divided into five classes according to their functions, viz., Political, Ecclesiastical, Naval, Military, and Artizan; to which might be added a somewhat undefined class, the Scientific. In the Political Service, which corresponded to the Civil Service of the present British Government, the commercial character of the Company was indicated by the designation of the several grades. The highest grade was that of Senior Merchant (*Opferkoopman*), the next, Merchant (*Koopman*), then Junior Merchant (*Onderkoopman*), then Book-keeper (*Boekhouder*) and then Assistant (*Adsistent*) while the Writers or Cadets were called Apprentice Clerks (*Ankweekelingen by de pen*). These apprentice clerks were often taken on the strength of the military, and, though performing civil duties, were supposed to be liable to military service till promoted to the next grade of Assistant. They were styled "Soldaat by de pen." The salaries of the officers of the Political Service were in accordance with their rank. That of senior merchant was from 80 to 100 guilders a month; of a merchant 60 to 70 guilders; of a junior merchant 40 to 50 guilders; of a book-keeper 30 guilders; of an assistant 16 to 26 guilders; and the apprentice clerks received from 9 to 10 guilders. The purchasing power of the guilder at that time may be roughly estimated at about one pound sterling of the present day. Besides his salary, each officer also received certain allowances, a table allowance which ranged from

12 to 24 rix-dollars, and other allowances in kind, such as liquor, spices, oil, wood, rice, vinegar, candles etc. The Governor's salary was 200 guilders and a table allowance of 20 rix-dollars, and that of the Commandeurs of Jaffna and Galle, 120 guilders with proportionate allowances. All the Company's servants were also allowed a certain amount of private trade, and many of them were thus enabled to amass wealth without infringing the rules of the Service. But instances were not wanting of the abuse of this privilege, and of officials being removed from their post in consequence.

The Political Servants were distributed in several departments of the Service, such as the Political Secretariat, the Trade Office (*Negotie Kantoor*), the Treasury or Pay office (*Zoldy Kantoor*), the Audit Office (*Visitie Kantoor*), the Warehouse, etc. They were also attached to the courts of justice and to certain civic boards and committees, and they bore the titles of their particular offices. The Political Secretary, who was of the rank of merchant, had as next in authority under him the First Sworn Clerk (*Eerste Gezworen Klerk*), who was a junior merchant. Other sworn clerks were of the grade of bookkeeper, and the subordinate officers, who did most of the clerical work, were assistants or apprentice clerks. In the same way the official who presided at the Treasury was the *Zoldy Boekhouder*, who was of the rank of merchant, and his second in authority was the *Zoldy Overdrager*, an officer of the rank of junior merchant. There were out four officials of the rank of senior merchant in the whole Service, the Chief Revenue Officer or Hoofd Administrateur at Colombo,



and the Dessaves of Colombo, Jaffna and Matara, *dessave* being a title borrowed from the Sinhalese, denoting a governor of a province, and applied by the Dutch to an officer whose sphere of duty lay in the rural districts, outside the towns; and he dealt with the native subjects of the Company.

At the provincial stations, Jaffna, and Galle, called the *Commandements* of Jaffna and Galle, the chief executive officer was the Commandeur who, subject to the Governor of the Island, exercised both civil and military authority within his jurisdiction. The minor stations, except Matara, where the Dessave was the local chief, were placed under a Government Agent styled *Oppeerhoofd*, who was usually of the rank of merchant or junior merchant. The establishments at the outstations were modelled, with necessary reductions after that of Colombo. Jaffna and Galle had each a Council at which the Commandeur presided, and the other members were the Dessave, the Revenue Officer (*Administrateur*), the Pay Officer (*Zoldy Boekhouder*), the Trade Commissioner (*Negotie Boekhouder*) the Warehousekeeper (*Pakhuismeester*), the Public Prosecutor (*Fiscaal*) and the Secretary. Besides these, there were at Jaffna, the Captain of the Wanni, and at Galle, the Superintendent of the Galle Korale, who also had seats in the Provincial Council. Each department at these stations had its office or *kantoor* as in Colombo with its proportionate number of officers. The minor stations directly subject to Colombo, were Negombo, Kalutara, and Chilaw; those under Jaffna were Mannar, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa; and under Galle, Matara.

Of the judicial tribunals the highest court of the land was the *Raad van Justitie* at Colombo, which exercised both an original and an appellate jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction in civil matters was confined to all suits among the Dutch community where the subject matter of the suit exceeded 120 rix-dollars in amount, and also in suits against natives residing in the Fort of Colombo and in any place within Kayman's Gate, where the same amount was involved. It also exercised an exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters. The president of this court was the Hoofd Administrateur, and the members were chosen from those of the Political Council. The court next in order was the *Land Raad*, which exercised jurisdiction over natives in all disputes relating to land, and in matters of contract and debt where the amount involved exceeded 120 rix-dollars. The Dessave of Colombo was the president of this court, and the members were the Public Prosecutor (*Fiscaal*), one or two junior merchants and bookkeepers (*Boekhouders*), the First Maha Mudaliyar, the Attapattu Mudaliyar, and the Dutch *Thombo houder* or Keeper of Records. After this came the *Civiel Raad* or *Hof van Kleine Gerechts Zaaken*. This was the court of small causes, which dealt with all matters of contract and debt not exceeding 120 rix-dollars. This court exercised jurisdiction over Europeans as well as Natives. At Jaffna and Galle the judicial tribunals were modelled after those at Colombo. The *Raad van Justitie* was presided over by the Commandeur, while over the *Land Raad* the Dessave presided at Jaffna, and the *Opziender* or Superintendent of the Korale, at Galle. An appeal lay from the

Raad van Justitie at Jaffna and Galle and from the minor tribunals to the Raad van Justitie at Colombo in all matters, civil as well as criminal, while a further appeal was permitted from this court to the Raad van Justitie at Batavia in cases where the subject in dispute exceeded 300 rix-dollars, or where the accused in a criminal prosecution was above the rank of an adsistent or sergeant. In the smaller stations, such as Matara, Trincomalee, Manaar, etc., where there was no Raad van Justitie, the Land Raad, from which an appeal lay to the Raad van Justitie at Jaffna or Galle, exercised jurisdiction over Europeans as well as Natives.

The Ecclesiastical Service, of which more will be said in a subsequent chapter, consisted of two grades of clergymen: fully qualified preachers called *predikants*, and visitors or comforters of the sick, who were designated *krank-bezoekers* and *ziekentroosters*. These latter performed all the minor pious and benevolent services among the congregation. The Church was held in high regard as one of the most important branches of the service, and the predikants, who exercised much influence in the community, were given nearly the same status as the senior merchants, and drew salaries which ranged from 90 to 100 guilders a month, with corresponding allowances. The krankbezoekers generally ranked with the adsistents in the Political Service and received the same allowances. Besides these two grades of ecclesiastics, who were sent out by the "Classes" of the Reformed Dutch Church in Holland, the Company, in pursuance of their proseletyzing policy, trained and educated in their seminaries at Colombo and Jaffna a



number of native youths, who, after passing a satisfactory examination, were appointed *proponents*, to preach, in their own language, to the native congregations.

In the Naval and Maritime Service the grades of officers were, Captain at Sea (*Kapitein der Zee*), Lieutenant at Sea, Skipper, Chief Steersman (*Opferstuursman*), Steersman, Boat-swain, etc, down to the ordinary sailor or *mattroos*. The principal officer who served on land was styled *Equipagiemeester*, which corresponded to Master-Attendant. He was usually of the rank of Captain, and drew a salary of from 60 to 70 guilders a month. There was an *Equipagiemeester* at Colombo and one at Galle. In his department were also employed a staff of pilots (*lootsen*), qualified seamen with salaries ranging from 24 to 40 guilders, rising by annual increments of 8 guilders. The *equipagiewerf*, or naval yard, with a staff of European foremen, also belonged to this department.

The strength of the military which the Dutch maintained in Ceylon varied from time to time. The attitude of the Kandyan King sometimes necessitated the employment of larger forces than at other times. And towards the latter part of their rule the danger of attack by the English and French compelled the Company to strengthen their garrisons in the fortified towns by increasing the number of European and Native troops. Ryckloff van Goens in his Instructions in 1660 fixed the strength of the European army at 2000 for the island, exclusive of local forces which were to be raised among the Burghers, and of the Malays, Sepoys, and other Oriental (*oostersche*) soldiers. At the end of the



Dutch rule, shortly before the arrival of the British, when the Dutch had been about a century-and-half in Ceylon, the garrisons at Colombo and Galle yet consisted only of 1345 and 1232, respectively, of Europeans, Malays, Sepoys, and a few Moors; while the artillery altogether numbered less than 300. The European forces included the mercenary regiments—that of the Duke of Wurtemberg, the Luxemburg Regiment, and the Swiss Regiment of De Meuron. The Military Service in Ceylon at the middle of the eighteenth century consisted of a Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding in chief, with a salary of 200 guilders, two or three Majors, each drawing 150 guilders, Captains with 80 to 100 guilders, Captains-Lieutenant 60 guilders, Lieutenants, 50 guilders, Ensigns (*vaandrighs*), 40 guilders, and non-commissioned officers, called *onder officieren*, from 20 guilders downwards. The pay of the private was 9 guilders. During peace time the rank of the officer commanding the forces was not above Major.

We now come to the last of the divisions mentioned, viz., the Artizan Service, called by the Dutch *ambachtslieden* or handicraftsmen. They represented most of the industrial trades, such as carpentry, smithery, tailoring, masonry etc. Each department had a European master or superintendent (*Baas*) with skilled European foremen. So much importance was attached to the functions of these craftsmen, that the masters or superintendents of some of the professions were given high relative rank and salary in the service. One of the principal officers was the Master of the Ships and House Carpenters (*Bass der Scheeps en Huis Timmerlieden*), who,

in Colombo, rose to the rank of senior merchant with a salary of 90 to 100 guilders, and in Galle to that of merchant with 80 guilders. There was also a master of the smiths, a master of the armoury and a master of the brick and tile works, these being posts filled by men from Europe with special technical knowledge of their profession. The foremen, called *meester-knechten*, or master workmen, were also trained men from Europe. Large numbers of people of mixed descent and some natives found employment in the *winkels* or workshops.

Before concluding this outline of the various services, mention must be made of the Company's hospitals, in which medical men of different grades were employed. They included three grades of physicians, styled *eerste*, *tweede*, and *derde meesters*, with salaries ranging from 30 to 80 guilders, and also three grades of surgeons : Senior Surgeon (*Opperchirurgyn*), with 60 guilders, Surgeon (*Chirurgyn*) with 30 guilders and Junior Surgeon (*Onderchirurgyn*) with 20 guilders.



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